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ABSTRACT
Taiwanese people are committed to the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights.
Nowadays, according to the rating posted on the Freedom House website, Taiwan is considered
one of the world’s free countries and is among the best in providing political rights and civil
liberties. Knowing this current state, it is hard to believe that the small island was under a period
of martial law lasting for 38 years in the middle of the twentieth century.
Tremendous progress and transition in Taiwanese politics and society has happened after
democratization. One significant change is the progression of the right to freedom of speech. The
right to free expression in Taiwan is strongly guaranteed now, compared to the active censorship
of expression under martial law before Taiwan became a democracy. However, any regulation of
hate speech is still notably missing in Taiwan’s legal system. As a system in an emerging
democratic country, the current Taiwanese legal system does not have any law specifically for
hate speech unless the speech relates to an individual victim. Courts at all levels in Taiwan have
usually given ample protection for people to comment on public affairs or issues, including the
media commenters using hate speech. However, possible problems with hate speech still exist in
Taiwan. These forms of speech have become specific issues in Taiwan. However, the current
system fails to resolve the above problems.
After democratization, Taiwan underwent a rapid democratic and progressive societal
change based on importing parts of legal systems from Western democratic countries and
adapting them to form Taiwan’s own approach. Therefore, considering other countries’ strategies
is useful in making the constitutional argument to find the appropriate approach in dealing with
hate speech in Taiwan. Some democratic governments have strict limits or punishments for hate
speech. Two different political models are usually discussed for hate speech regulations:
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“militant democracy” and “liberal democracy.” Most of the European approaches, including
Germany, are based on the militant democracy theory, while the United States is a liberal
democracy. The different approaches in Germany and the United States show the diverse
attitudes countries may hold toward the limitations imposed on hate speech.
The motivation of this dissertation is to uncover whether hate speech undermines
democracy under the perspective of comparative constitutional law. This article will compare
freedom of speech rights in some democratic countries, such as the United States, Germany,
South Africa, and the European Court of Human Rights, and consider the standard set by
international organizations to understand why they have a diverse approach to regulating or not
regulating hate speech. This dissertation will also consider how the new approach could resolve
or alleviate the hate speech problems in Taiwan. I will make a constitutional design argument to
find the appropriate method to deal with hate speech in Taiwan.
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CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION
Taiwanese people are committed to the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights.
This country only underwent the democratization process a little over thirty years ago. There is
not an exact date at which Taiwan converted to democracy, but a political transition through
multiple decades. However, the 1986 and 1987 political reform were recognized as the milestone
of Taiwanese democratization, which included a free press and lifting bans on new political
parties and street protests in 1986, as well as the end of the martial law period in 1987.2
The democratization in Taiwan seems to have been successful so far.3 Nowadays, according
to the rating posted on the Freedom House website,4 Taiwan is considered one of the world’s
free countries and is among the best in providing political rights and civil liberties.5 Knowing
this current state, it is hard to believe that the small island was under a period of martial law
lasting for 38 years in the middle of the twentieth century.6 Tremendous progress and transition
in Taiwanese politics and society has happened after democratization. One significant change is
the progression of the right to freedom of speech. The right to free expression in Taiwan is
strongly guaranteed now, compared to the active censorship of expression under martial law
before Taiwan became a democracy.7
See REUTERS, Timeline: Taiwan's Road to Democracy (Dec. 13, 1:07AM, 2011),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-election-timeline/timeline-taiwans-road-to-democracyidUSTRE7BC0E320111213.
3
Chris Horton & Austin Ramzy, Asia's Bastion of Free Speech? Move Aside, Hong Kong, It's Taiwan Now, THE
NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/world/asia/china-taiwan-hong-kong-freespeech.html.
4
Freedom House is a non-profit non-governmental organization (NGO) to perform research and advocate
democracy and human rights since 1941. It mainly receives founding from the US government. Freedom House
provides “Freedom in the World” surveys since 1973. The researching data offers standards to evaluate political
rights and civil liberties in all countries in the world. See FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/ (last visited
May 17, 2020).
5
FREEDOM HOUSE, Taiwan, https://freedomhouse.org/country/taiwan/freedom-world/2020 (last visited May 17,
2020).
6
THE NEW YORK TIMES, Taiwan Ends 4 Decades of Martial Law (Jul. 15, 1987),
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/15/world/taiwan-ends-4-Decades-of-martial-law.html.
7
FREEDOM HOUSE, Taiwan, supra note 5.
2
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However, any regulation of hate speech is still notably missing in Taiwan’s legal system. As
a system in an emerging democratic country, the current Taiwanese legal system does not have
any law specifically for hate speech unless the speech relates to an individual victim, in such
cases it would label as “criminal threatening,”8 “fighting words,”9 and “defamation.”10 Courts at
all levels in Taiwan have usually given ample protection for people to comment on public affairs
or issues, including the media commenters using hate speech. However, possible problems with
hate speech still exist in Taiwan: speech that demonstrates the tension and conflict between
ethnic groups or national identities, speech that denies or downplays the past human rights
violation, speech that challenges Taiwanese democracy, promotes dictatorship to threat the “free
democratic order,”11 or promoting a war, and statements that spread hatred toward LGBTQ
minorities. These forms of speech have become specific issues in Taiwan. However, the current
system fails to resolve the above problems.
After democratization, Taiwan underwent a rapid democratic and progressive societal
change based on importing parts of legal systems from Western democratic countries and
adapting them to form Taiwan’s own approach. Therefore, considering other countries’ strategies
Article 305 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China: “A person who threatens to cause injury to the life, body,
freedom, reputation, or property of another and thereby endangers his safety shall be sentenced to imprisonment for
not more than two years, short-term imprisonment, or a fine of not more than three hundred yuan.” HSING FA
[Criminal Code] art. 305 (Taiwan). An English version of Criminal Code of the Republic of China (Taiwan) is
available on Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic of China (Taiwan), available at
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=C0000001 (last visited May 23, 2020).
9
Article 309 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China: “A person who publicly insults another shall be sentenced
to short-term imprisonment or a fine of not more than three hundred yuan. A person who by violence commits an
offense specified in the preceding paragraph shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one-year, shortterm imprisonment, or a fine of not more than five hundred yuan.” HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 309 (Taiwan).
10
Article 310 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China: “A person who points out or disseminates a fact which
will injure the reputation of another for purpose that it be communicated to the pubic commits the offense of slander
and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year, short-term imprisonment, or a fine of not more
than five hundred yuan.” However, the article also rules that “A person who can prove the truth of the defamatory
fact shall not be punished for the offense of defamation unless the fact concerns private life and is of no public
concern.” To offer a clause to waive the speaker’s criminal liability. HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 310 (Taiwan).
11
Lynn Lee, Taiwan: Spies, Lies and Cross-straits Ties, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 06, 6:09 AM, 2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2018/09/taiwan-spies-lies-cross-straits-ties180906054720310.html.
8
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is useful in making the constitutional argument to find the appropriate approach in dealing with
hate speech in Taiwan. Some democratic governments have strict limits or punishments for hate
speech. 12 For example, many countries ban racist speech, regardless of those countries being
common law or civil law systems.13 Two different political models are usually discussed for hate
speech regulations: “militant democracy” and “liberal democracy.”14 Most of the European
approaches, including Germany, are based on the militant democracy theory, while the United
States is a liberal democracy. The different approaches in Germany and the United States show
the diverse attitudes countries may hold toward the limitations imposed on hate speech.
Compared to most democratic countries in the world, the United States values freedom of
speech more strongly, as laid out in the First Amendment of the Constitution. The United States
Supreme Court has held that limiting hate speech based on race, ethnic, or gender constitutes
viewpoint discrimination against speakers.15 Thus, hate speech in the United States is allowed.
“Liberal democracy”16 is the core of the US political theory, which emphasizes the right to
freedom of speech. The Taiwanese social situation changed after democratization, and
individualism and freedom of speech are now deeply rooted in the Taiwanese people’s mindsets
and in Taiwanese society. The decisions from the Taiwanese Constitutional Court have also
JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 8 (2012).
The purposes include “those designed to safeguard public order,” and “those aimed at protecting human dignity.”
See Jeannine Bell, Restraining the Heartless: Racist Speech and Minority Rights, 84 IND. L.J. 963, 976 (2009).
14
See Ruti Teitel, Militating Democracy: Comparative Constitutional Perspectives, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 49 (2007).
15
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
16
Ruti Teitel describes Liberal democracy as follows: “the United States and its constitutional system have offered a
competing jurisprudential model, namely, a constitutional scheme in which rights are framed and protected in a
radically individualist fashion. The U.S. Constitution makes no reference to collectivist goals, such as political or
cultural survival, which are asserted both in the post-war European constitutions, as well as in the European
Convention rights scheme. Insofar as there is a formulation of the constituent value, one might say that the U.S.
Constitution is framed in individual rights terms, subject to certain limits related to state police power or compelling
state interests.” Teitel, Militating Democracy, supra note 14, at 67.
12
13

3

shifted the freedom of speech model from the German militant democracy’s17 to the US liberal
democracy’s;18 hence, the United States is also a good model for Taiwan to consider.
In contrast, the theory of militant democracy supports different approaches from the United
States model. The first valuable militant democracy approach for Taiwan may be the German
hate speech approach. The German system may have one of the strictest restrictions on hate
speech, which criminalizes hate speech, narrows protections on freedom of speech and punishes
statements supporting the Nazis and denying the Holocaust.19 Article 1 of the German Basic Law
states that “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all
state authority.”20 Human dignity is at the core of the German Constitution. Section 130 of the
Federal Criminal Code is significant as a regulation of hate speech, punishing “disturbing the
public peace, inciting hatred or assaulting the human dignity of others.”21 Also, the statute rules
that when someone “denies or downplays” the acts committed under the Nazi regime, or
Taiwanese Justices held that the “freedom of democratic order” is the boundary of constitutional modification in a
Taiwanese Justice’s Decision, See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 499 (司法院大法官第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499] (Mar. 24, 2000) (Taiwan). The finding follows the same concept as the German militant
democracy system that recognizes a fundamental value in the Constitution and acknowledges the group focus on
rights. This holding seems to indicate that the Taiwanese Constitution is closer to the German approach. English
versions of All Judicial Yuan Interpretations are available on Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan of the Republic of
China (Taiwan), available at https://cons.judicial.gov.tw/jcc/en-us/jep03 (last visited May 23, 2020).
18
However, in Interpretation No. 644, the Taiwanese Justices held that to advocate Communism or the partition of
the national territory is constitutional, until the speech causes a “clear and present danger.” See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan
Jieshi No. 644 (司法院大法官第 644 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 644] (Jun. 20, 2008) (Taiwan).
19
Anna Sauerbrey, How Germany Deals with Neo-Nazis, THE WASHINGTON POST. (Aug. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/23/opinion/germany-neo-nazis-charlottesville.html.
20
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 1: “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.” GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, art 1 (Ger.)
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/ (last visited May 23, 2020).
21
Germany, Federal Criminal Code, Section 130(1)&(2): “Whosoever, in a manner capable of disturbing the public
peace, incites hatred against a national, racial, religious group or a group defined by their ethnic origins, against
segments of the population or individuals because of their belonging to one of the aforementioned groups or
segments of the population or calls for violent or arbitrary measures against them; Whosoever assaults the human
dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning an aforementioned group, segments of the population or
individuals because of their belonging to one of the aforementioned groups or segments of the population, or
defaming segments of the population. Whoever, in public or in an assembly, approves, denies or minimizes an act
described in genocide committed under National Socialism, in a manner which is liable to disturb the public peace.”
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] § 130, para. 1&2. Cited from Winfried Brugger, Ban on or Protection of
Hate Speech? Some Observations Based on German and American Law, 17 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 5-6 (2002).
17
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“violates the dignity of the victims by approving of, glorifying, or justifying National Socialist
rule of arbitrary force,”22 these are all hate speech statements and criminal offenses. The German
constitution is based around militant democracy. Militant democracy is a significant
characteristic of German political theory, which holds that individual rights should not destroy
the free democratic basic order.23 The German approach not only limits hate speech, but also
recognizes denying historical oppression and challenging the democratic order as hate speech.
Therefore, the approach is valuable to Taiwan as a model to deal with historical oppression and
to protect the institution of democracy.
Another example of militant democracy is the regulation of hate speech in South Africa.
Article 16 of the South African Constitution rules that its citizens have the right to freedom of
expression. However, three types of speech are specifically not guaranteed by the constitution,
including “propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and advocacy of hatred that is
based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes an incitement to cause harm.”24
Also, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, so-called the
Equality Act, is the other relevant speech regulation on the statutory level. The Equality Act
prohibits “unfair discrimination, hate speech, and harassment, particularly on the grounds of
race, gender, and disability.”25 Furthermore, the legislature of South Africa is drafting the
Germany, Federal Criminal Code, Section 130(3)&(4): “(3) Whosoever publicly or in a meeting approves of,
denies or downplays an act committed under the rule of National Socialism of the kind indicated in section 6 (1) of
the Code of International Criminal Law, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace shall be liable to
imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine. (4) Whosoever publicly or in a meeting disturbs the public peace in
a manner that violates the dignity of the victims by approving of, glorifying, or justifying National Socialist rule of
arbitrary force shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.” Strafgesetzbuch [StGB]
[Criminal Code] § 130, para. 3&4. Cited from id.
23
Bradley A. Appleman, Hate Speech: A Comparison of the Approaches Taken by the United States and Germany,
14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 422, 428-429 (1996).
24
Constitution of South Africa, Section 16(2): “(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to a) propaganda for
war; (b) incitement of imminent violence; or (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or
religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.” S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16(2), available at
https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1 (last visited May 23, 2020).
25
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of
22
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Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill to restrict hate crime and hate
speech. 26 The approach toward hate speech in South Africa may be valuable to Taiwan because
South Africa is a newly emerging democracy and has a similar history to Taiwan, and the
countries share the constitutional values of human dignity and militant democracy.
Furthermore, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that the right to
dignity and the right to equality should be guaranteed. 27 Two international covenants, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), require prohibiting hate
speech and racism. Although not a member of the United Nations, Taiwan has repeatedly
attempted to unilaterally ratify two United Nations covenants: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. The Taiwanese Congress has passed acts to implement the two covenants in local
contexts.28 Therefore, from the perspective of transnational constitutionalism, an international
organization may offer another perspective from which Taiwan can consider hate speech issues.
The motivation of this dissertation is to uncover whether hate speech undermines
democracy under the perspective of comparative constitutional law. This article will compare
2000 [hereinafter Equality Act] Section 2: “The objects of this Act are (c) to provide for measures to facilitate the
eradication of unfair discrimination, hate speech and harassment, particularly on the grounds of race, gender and
disability.” Equality Act § 2 (S. Afr.), available at https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2000-004.pdf (last
visited May 23, 2020).
26
See the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill (S. Afr.), available at
https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Docs/bill/9febb155-8582-4a15-bf12-5961db2828c2.pdf (last
visited May 23, 2020).
27
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (1948), Art. 1, available at
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (last visited May 23, 2020).
28
English versions of both Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights & the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are available on Laws & Regulations Database of
the Republic of China (Taiwan), available at https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=I0020028
(last visited May 23, 2020).
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freedom of speech rights in some democratic countries, such as the United States, Germany,
South Africa, and the European Court of Human Rights, and consider the standard set by
international organizations to understand why they have a diverse approach to regulating or not
regulating hate speech. This dissertation will also consider how the new approach could resolve
or alleviate the hate speech problems in Taiwan. I will make a constitutional design argument to
find the appropriate method to deal with hate speech in Taiwan.
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CHAPTER TWO: WHAT IS HATE SPEECH?
I.

INTRODUCTION
Hate speech does not have a single definition.29 The narrowest definition of hate speech is

speech expressing hatred for a specific group whose members share the same characteristics. 30
However, a variety of approaches to defining hate speech exist in different countries. Similarly,
there is no consensus among scholars on a single definition of hate speech. However, by
reviewing different approaches, principles and frameworks of hate speech, a working definition
can be identified. Also, hate speech can be limited by who is protected and what speech is
limited. In this chapter, I will try to provide my principles and frameworks of defining hate
speech.
II.

HATE SPEECH AND GROUP LIBEL
The following are some of the widely accepted views of hate speech and they are useful to

know about when drafting and creating hate speech regulations. One approach to frame hate
speech is to focus on the element of group libel. The function distinguishes hate speech from
individual defamation. Jeremy Waldron uses group libel to describe hate speech. Waldron
illustrates section 130 of Germany's Penal Code as an example of a group libel statute,31 which
punishes defaming a group’s human dignity. In his view, group libel is a legal term to describe
hate speech regulation. Waldron further explains that hate speech is an opinion from one group
Bell, Restraining the Heartless, supra note 13, at 963-964.
Ivan Hare & James Weinstein, General Introduction: Free Speech, Democracy, and the Suppression of Extreme
Speech Past and Present, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 1, 4 (Hare, Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds.,
2009).
31
Jeremy Waldron mention that, “In many countries, a different term or set of terms is used by jurists: “group libel”
or “group defamation.” Sometimes this is how the legislation describes itself; it is the terminology used, for
example, in section 130 of Germany's Penal Code, prohibiting “attacks on human dignity by insulting, maliciously
maligning, or defaming part of the population.” In other countries, “group libel” and “group defamation” are terms
used in judicial doctrine and among lawyers to describe restrictions of the kind we would call hate speech
restrictions.” Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1601-1602
(2009).
29
30
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in a community that recognizes members of another group as not worthy of equal citizenship.32
Also, Alexander Tsesis excludes speech to individuals from his definition of hate speech as
well.33 In a similar vein, Robert Post recognizes that hate speech undermines a communal norm,
so-called human dignity. Dignity is not merely subjective but is based on the claims of members
in a community. Post points out that cultures would establish institutions such as schools and
laws to offer authoritative interpretations of norms.34 Thus, the hate speech regulation is a kind
of authoritative interpretation of a norm. The hate speech regulation, under Post’s definition, is
based on a cultural or group-based communal norm.
Some countries include group libel in their statutory definition of hate speech. The Criminal
Code of Canada prohibits speech related to “hatred against any identifiable group;”35 the Danish
Penal Code restricts any speech in which “a group of people is threatened, derided or degraded;”
36

and the Federal Criminal Code of Germany rules that hate speech is prohibited against “a

national, racial, religious group or a group defined by their ethnic origins.”37 The Criminal Code
of Germany takes special care to call out National Socialism in sections 130(3) and (4).38 The
clause protects the dignity of the Jewish people. In my view, hate speech targets a group’s human
Id.at 1601.
ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, 211 (2002).
34
Robert C. Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 123, 129 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds.,
2009).
35
Canada, Criminal Code 1985, Section 319(1): “(1) Everyone who, by communicating statements in any public
place, incites hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace is
guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or (b) an offence
punishable on summary conviction.” Criminal Code 1985 § 319(1) (Can.). Cited from WALDRON, THE HARM IN
HATE SPEECH supra note 12, at 236 n.8.
36
Denmark, Penal Code, Article 266(1): “(1)Any person "who, publicly or with the intention of wider
dissemination, makes a statement or imparts other information by which a group of people are threatened, insulted
or degraded on account of their race, color, national or ethnic origin, religion, or sexual inclination shall be liable to
a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years.” Penal Code ch.27 § 266(1) (Den.). Cited from id.
37
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] § 130, para. 1&2. Cited from Brugger, Ban on or Protection of Hate
Speech? supra note 21, at 5-6.
38
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] § 130, para. 3&4. Cited from id.
32
33

9

dignity. It is different from individual defamation. However, hate speech might be broader than
libel. It includes insulting, maliciously maligning, or other negative receptions.
III.

WHO IS PROTECTED?
1. The term “minority”
If hate speech is group libel, how do we define the protected group? Scholars have

sometimes used minorities to identify protected groups. For example, Tsesis, Jeremy Waldron,
Mari Matsuda, Jeannine Bell, Richard Delgado, and Jean Stefancic have all used minorities to
describe protected groups in their books or articles.39 The “minority” seems to be an ideal term to
define potential victims of hate speech.
Nevertheless, I argue that only taking into account minorities may not be the best way to
describe this demographic. Minorities could be linked with the minorities in the population. In
the United States, it would be true that the oppressed groups in history were most typically the
minorities in the population. The supporters of restrictions on hate speech are usually a distinct
minority and from oppressed communities, such as people of color or the LGBT community.40
This oppression could be due to the power structure in US history such that straight, white males
with economic power hold power over both groups. But South Africa showed a contrary
example: the white minority governed the black majority in the past and deprived the black
people of their rights. Another complicating example is the history of hate speech toward
women. Women are not a minority in the population, but sometimes they are included in the
classification of hate speech definitions. The Human Rights Watch defines hate speech as “any
See TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 33; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note
12; Bell, Restraining the Heartless, supra note 13; RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
AN INTRODUCTION (2017).
40
MARI MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE, RICHARD DELGADO, & KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (2019).
39
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form of expression regarded as offensive to racial, ethnic and religious groups and other discrete
minorities, and women.”41 Moreover, it is not only the minorities in the population who could be
weakened and placed under oppression. For example, the state of Mississippi made a law
designating law enforcement as one of the protected groups in its hate crime act.42 But law
enforcement is not weak or under oppression.
So how can we find a better term to define a group for hate speech definitions? John Hart
Ely’s book Democracy and Distrust might offer an appropriate solution. Ely emphasizes
discreteness and insularity, which was held by the US Supreme Court in case United States v.
Carolene Products Co. in 1938,43 as a key point to use when defining a minority.44 A discrete
and insular group is powerless to defend themselves through the political process. 45 In his view,
although women may not be a minority in the population, they still have been “operating at an
unfair disadvantage in the political process.”46 The historical oppression of women in the US
renders them a discrete and insular group.
2. Historical oppression and hate speech
In my view, the perspective of historical oppression is a more important factor than the
picture of a minority in the population. Tsesis argues that a protected group could be defined as
“members of historically oppressed racial and ethnic groups, the outgroups”47 He uses three
Bell, Restraining the Heartless, supra note 13, at 963-964.
Katarina Luketich, Crimes against Law Enforcement Are Hate Crimes in Mississippi, Alabama Considers Harsher
Penalties, WKRG NEWS 5 (May 10, 2019), https://www.wkrg.com/state-regional/crimes-against-law-enforcementare-hate-crimes-in-mississippi-alabama-considers-harsher-penalties/.
43
United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 145 (1938).
44
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 145-170 (1980).
45
United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 145 (1938).
46
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 44, at 164-165.
47
However, he used the term minorities a lot of times in his book as well. He used both terms interchangeably in his
writing. His theory claims that hate speech results in “institutional inequalities TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES,
supra note 33, at 101-102 (2002).
41
42
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historical oppressions, including the Holocaust, American slavery, and the Indian Removal, to
prove his hypothesis: hate speech results from systematic persecution in human history.
Tsesis mentions that German society cleaved to the idea that Jewish people were “vermin,
unworthy of life and requiring fumigation”48 before the Nazis persecuted them. In America, the
supporters of slavery believed that black people’s abilities were lesser than whites’, such that
African Americans should live under white people’s ruling.49 Before the Indian Removal, the
public opinion in US society was that the Indians were the enemy of God. The disease, which the
Indians met, was the Puritans’ weapon.50 Accordingly, those destructive messages would cause
bias toward specific minorities and result in mass persecution.
Additionally, Tsesis emphasizes a theory: the social psychology of scapegoating. He points
out: “A racist society may actually promote bigotry in order to unite ingroup members and
distract them from real political and economic problems by sacrificing a historical scapegoat.”51
When minorities refuse the majorities’ values and community regulations, the majorities feel
anger and force the minorities to follow its orders.52 Although some have disagreed with Tsesis’s
causal theory,53 the link between historical oppression and hate speech cannot be denied.
Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech the Regulation of Hate Speech in A Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
497, 505-506 (2009).
49
Id. at 506.
50
TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 33, at 53.
51
Id. at 85.
52
Id. at 105-106.
53
Nevertheless, Anuj Desai disagreed with Tsesis causal theory. Desai responded to Tsesis’s point of view by using
a very critical perspective. Desai challenged Tsesis’s hypothesis, hate speech causes persecution, by mentioning that
the causal relationship between racism and slavery is still an argument in the history profession and that economics
might be the real cause of slavery, which then triggers racism. It is a “chicken-egg” debate without much-supporting
evidence. In addition, Desai pointed out that Tsesis’sproposal to ban hate speech is aimed to avoid systeic
persecution. However, the example of oppression that Tsesis used to support his point, the Holocaust, was not
persuasive evidence because both Imperial and Weimar Germany had hate speech regulations, and they failed to
stop the bias and persecution from happening in the following years. Tsesis’sclaim seems to hold that “hate speech
was a necessary condition for Holocaust” but lacks logical connection. Thus, it was useless to rely on a hate speech
ban to avoid systemic persecution. Anuj C. Desai, Attacking Brandenburg with History: Does the Long-Term Harm
of Biased Speech Justify A Criminal Statute Suppressing It? 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 353, 366-370 (2003).
48
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Jeremy Waldron argues a similar point about historical association with hate speech
regulation.54 He argues that no matter how much the European countries and the United States
developed, their hate speech theories were strongly related to their past acts of oppression, such
as Nazism, the Holocaust, racism, or segregation.55 Also, Mari Matsuda uses the phrase “a
historically subjugated group” in her article to discuss the protected group as well. She mentions
the structural domination between different groups.56
Jeannine Bell makes a similar argument. She described hate speech in the United States as
“racist speech, anti-gay and anti-religious speech.”57 She adds that the victims of hate speech are
mostly those who “lack social power, and are frequently discrete and insular minorities, and have
been historically discriminated against.”58 Her definition is based on the cases and data research
in the United States. The protected groups have more particular descriptions, including being the
minorities in the population, having less social power, and being historically discriminated
against.
In sum, for my purposes, hate speech only targets a discrete and insular group, not an
individual. Additionally, I argue that simply being a minority group is not enough to be defined
as a protected group for hate speech regulation. I contend that the group that can be defined this
way has been historically oppressed. Therefore, hate speech regulation should protect a discrete
and insular group or a group that has been historically oppressed.
Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at 1634-1635.
Id. at 1634-1635.
56
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2361-2362.
57
Bell, Restraining the Heartless, supra note 13, at 963-964.
58
Id.
54
55
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IV.

SCOPE OF HATE SPEECH REGULATIONS

Hate speech targets to a historically oppressed, discrete, or insular group. However, not all
speech expressing hatred is protected by hate speech regulation. Hate speech regulation has a
scope. Mari J. Matsuda mentions that the hateful expression could be “violence and genocide;
racial hate messages, disparagement, and threats; overt disparate treatment; and covert disparate
treatment and sanitized racist comments.”59 What are the options for limitations on the scope of
hate speech? Form? Reception? Violence? Possible options are as follows.
First, hate speech regulation only limits a specific form. If the definition does not limit types,
the application may be too broad. For example, Tsesis’s definition of hate speech is antisocial
oratory that persecutes people for “their race, color, religion, ethnic group, or nationality.”60 His
description is broader than previous ones because it would include any statement relating to “the
culture of racial and ethnic stratification.”61 Tsesis does not clearly distinguish hate speech from
the following three terms: “hate propaganda,” “destructive messages,” and “biased speech.” No
intention of hatred is required in his definition.62
Anuj C. Desai critiques Tsesis’sdefinition as too vague to separate speech “uttered as an
expression of opinion on a neutral scientific, academic, or religious subject, intended to incite
persecution, or intended to promote destructive behavior.”63 Desai says: “After all, if Chaucer,
Shakespeare, and Dickens constitute proscribable ‘hate speech,’ Tsesis’s argument amounts to
the creation of a substantial police state, excising large chunks of our cultural heritage, not to
mention popular culture. Modern day book burnings would be trivial in comparison.”64 I agree
59

Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2332.
Desai, Attacking Brandenburg with History, supra note 53, at 358-361.
61
Id. at 358-361.
62
Id. at 358-361.
63
TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 33, at 211.
64
Id.
60
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that the forms of hate speech could be narrowed to avoid punishing the expression of opinions on
a neutral scientific, academic, or religious subject. Also, Matsuda recognizes that some symbols,
like the Swastika, could themselves show hatred toward oppressed groups, so the symbols are
also used as hate speech. 65
Secondly, I would like to emphasize reception. In Robert Post’s argument, the types of
expression used are the other important part of defining hate speech. Thus, the current hate
speech regulations usually include additional elements beyond the expression of dislike or
abhorrence. The attached conditions are the manner of speech or the likelihood of causing
contingent harm, like violence or discrimination. Lawmakers could narrow the reception of
expression. A hate speech regulation does not just punish content but also the reception of the
involved speech, such as when it “insults, offends, or degrades.”66
Some examples coming from different countries support my point: the Public Order Act of
the United Kingdom prohibits “threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior;” 67 the
Danish Penal Code restricts speech in which “a group of people is threatened, derided or
degraded.” 68The Human Rights Act of New Zealand restricts any speech that is “threatening,
abusive, or insulting… words.”69 The Federal Criminal Code of Germany rules that hate speech
65

Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2365-2366.
Post, Hate Speech, supra note 34, at 126-127.
67
United Kingdom, Public Order Act 1986, Section 18(1): “Use of words or behavior or display of written material.
(1)A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior, or displays any written material which is
threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of an offence if (a)he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or (b)having
regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.” Public Order Act, 1986, ch.64, S 18(1)
(UK). Cited from WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH supra note 12, at 237 n.12.
68
Penal Code ch.27 § 266(1) (Den.). Cited from WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 236 n.9.
69
New Zealand, Human Rights Act 1993, Section 61(1): “It shall be unlawful for any person (a) to publish or
distribute written matter which is threatening, abusive, or insulting, or to broadcast by means of radio or television
or other electronic communication words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting; or (b) to use in any public
place as defined in section 2(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1981, or within the hearing of persons in any such
public place, or at any meeting to which the public are invited or have access, words which are threatening, abusive,
or insulting; or (c) to use in any place words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting if the person using the
words knew or ought to have known that the words were reasonably likely to be published in a newspaper,
magazine, or periodical or broadcast by means of radio or television, being matter or words likely to excite hostility
66
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involves “assaulting human dignity of others by insulting [or] maliciously maligning.”70 The idea
that laws should include reception is an international consensus.
Moreover, some scholars argue that incitement to violence should be included in the
definition of hate speech. Tsesis states that violent hate speech is anti-democratic and excludes
the weak minority from the democratic discussion. 71 I recognize that the incitement of violence
should be considered a kind of hate speech.72 An excellent example of regulating incitement is
South Africa. In South Africa, Section 16(1) of the Constitution of South Africa defines the
freedom of speech right.73 The unprotected speech is directly addressed in Section 16(2) as the
exception clause to Section 16(1), including “propaganda for war, incitement of imminent
violence; or advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that
constitutes incitement to cause harm.”74 Besides, Section 10 of the Promotion of Equality and
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the Equality Act) limits any speech that is
“hurtful, [is] harmful or to incite harm, or promote or propagate hatred.”75 Regarding incitement
as an element of hate speech would greatly limit the scope of hate speech regulation.
against or bring into contempt any group of persons in or who may be coming to New Zealand on the ground of the
color, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons.” Human Rights Act 1993 § 61(1) (N.Z.). Cited
from WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 236 n.11.
70
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] § 130, para. 1&2. Cited from Brugger, Ban on or Protection of Hate
Speech? supra note 21, at 5-6 (2002).
71
TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 33, at 178-179.
72
However, the provocation of violence is only a kind of hate speech, and not all hate speech aims to trigger
violence immediately. Some hate speech only incites hatred or discrimination. Michel Rosenfeld, Conference: Hate
Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1528-1529 (2003).
73
The Constitution of South Africa, Section 16(1): “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which
includes—(a) freedom of the press and other media;(b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; (c)
freedom of artistic creativity; and (d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.” S. Afr. Const. 1996 §
16(1).
74
S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 16(2).
75
Equality Act, Section 10: “(1) Subject to the proviso in section 12, no person may publish, propagate, advocate or
communicate words based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be
construed to demonstrate a clear intention to (a)be hurtful; (b) be harmful or to incite harm; (c)promote or propagate
hatred. (2) Without prejudice to any remedies of a civil nature under this Act, the court may, in accordance with
section 21 (2) (n) and where appropriate, refer any case dealing with the publication, advocacy, propagation or
communication of hate speech as contemplated in subsection (1), to the Director of Public Prosecutions having
jurisdiction for the institution of criminal proceedings in terms of the common law or relevant legislation.” Equality
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However, the scopes of expression should not be designed too narrowly. The reason is that
the type of hateful expression could be very different. Michel Rosenfeld distinguishes the
difference between “hate speech in the form and hate speech in substance.” 76 Hate speech in
form is pure sanction or suppression, such as racist insults. The other is indirect information or
communication. Holocaust denials are a kind of hate speech in form.77 He states that the hate
speech of today is different from what happened in Nazi Germany. Also, current hate speech
producers may use more indirect ways to present their racist messages rather than broadcasting
direct insults; for instance, they may cite scientific debate or invoke certain statistics to support
their racist claims. For instance, they may say “proportionately blacks commit more crimes than
whites.”78 Consequently, some hateful communications and misleading research might be
considered hate speech.
In sum, the options for limitations on the scope of hate speech should include a specific form,
like a reception, such as that it insults, offends, or degrades. Inciting violence is a type of hateful
expression as well. An indirect way to express hatred should also be considered hate speech.
V.

A VARIETY OF CHARACTERISTICS OF HATE SPEECH

If hate speech is speech expressing hatred for a specific group whose members share the
same characteristics, what are those characteristics? Legal regulations from different countries
offer the first track to understanding the characteristics of hate speech regulations.79 For
example, the Public Order Act of the United Kingdom prohibits “racial hatred;”80 the Danish
Penal Code rules against speech that degrades anyone “because of their race, color of skin,
Act § 10 (S. Afr.).
76
Rosenfeld, Conference: Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence, supra note 72, at 1527-1528.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1525-1526.
79
Cited from Waldron, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 8 (2012).
80
Public Order Act, 1986, ch.64, S 18(1) (U.K.). Cited from id. at 237 n.12 (2014).
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national or ethnic background;”81 the Human Rights Act of New Zealand prohibits speech that
targets a group “on the ground of the color, race, or ethnic or national origins;”82 and the Federal
Criminal Code of Germany rules that hate speech targets “a national, racial, religious group or a
group defined by their ethnic origins.” 83
On the international organization level, international conventions offer other sources to
understand the universal definition of hate speech. The following are some examples. Article 20
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that hate speech is
“propaganda for war, advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred;”84 Article 13, section 5 of
the American Convention on Human Rights says: “Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of
national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or any other
similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race,
color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law;” 85
and Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
mentions that it “… shall declare an offense punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based
on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence
or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another color or ethnic origin,
and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities.” 86 The above international
conventions focus on avoiding propaganda for war and protecting race, color, national origin,
racial background or religious affiliation.
Penal Code ch.27 § 266(1) (Den.). Cited from id. at 236 n.9 (2014).
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Also, private companies sometimes have their own rules for regulating hate speech. For
instance, Facebook’s regulation mentions “an attack, such as a degrading generalization or slur
targeting a ‘protected category’ of people, including one based on sex, race, ethnicity, religious
affiliation, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, and severe disability or disease.” 87
Although there are differences between the definitions of hate speech in the above examples,
those regulations have protected groups that could be identified by specific characteristics. The
particular groups are usually based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, nationality, and severe
disability or illness, but is not limited to these examples. Females, under specific cultural
contexts or societal backgrounds, belong to the group as well.
VI.

HATE SPEECH AND OFFENCE

Besides, Jeremy Waldron recognizes that hateful expression is not aimed at an individual’s or
a group’s feeling or reputation, but at the basics of the social standing of a community whose
members are connected by specific characteristics. Thus, in his view, hate speech regulation is a
protection for individuals not from the offense or a painful feeling, but from an assault on the
dignity and social cohesion of their communities.88 That is why Waldron kept emphasizing the
status and reputation of a community rather than an individual’s or a group’s feelings. His
argument is also based on protected groups with specific characteristics. But his view differs a
great deal from the perspective of victims’ experience.
Waldron’s argument is also significant to me. His point of view correctly makes a distinction
between the objective social standing of a community and subjective offense. For instance, in his
book, critiquing the idea of Islam is not the same as abusing Muslims. Comments about
Audrey Carlsen & Fahima Haque, What Does Facebook Consider Hate Speech? Take Our Quiz, NEW YORK
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/13/technology/facebook-hate-speechquiz.html.
88
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Muslims’ beliefs might cause Muslims to feel bad. However, only assaulting their objective
social position constitutes hate speech.89 For me, this example may more clearly explain the idea:
a statement supporting human rights for Hong Kong might cause some Chinese people to feel
unhappy, but the support is not prosecutorial, hateful, or degrading to the social cohesion of their
communities.90 The speech is not a hateful expression at all. Hence, hate speech regulation
should only focus on protecting the basics of a community’s social standing, not people’s
feelings.
VII.

HOW TO DEFINE HATE SPEECH
The definition used in my argument most closely aligns with Matsuda’s. Matsuda’s

definition was a narrow view due to the compromise with the First Amendment. It was “The
message is of racial inferiority; the message is directed against a historically oppressed group,
and the message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.”91 She argues that the first element is
the identifier pointing to the targeted group as inferior; the second factor connects the racism to
power and subordination, to constitute “a historical vertical relationship,”92 and the third
emphasizes the harmful form. The definition focuses on structural subordination in history. The
power structures in history are the main reason to constitute the protected groups in different
countries. Hate speech should be limited to speech that is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.
I will exclude her first factor because her article focuses on racism, but historically oppressed
encompasses more than race. I strongly agree with the idea of using a discrete and insular group
or requiring the group to have been historically oppressed. These may include race, ethnicity,
WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH supra note 12, at 105-143.
Lauren Frias, Activists supporting the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong filled the stands at a Brooklyn Nets
game, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 19, 2019, 1:53 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/activists-supporting-hongkong-protests-filled-stands-at-nba-game-2019-10.
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religion, gender, nationality, and severe disability or illness, but such a definition is not limited to
these examples.
Moreover, the speech should be prosecutorial, hateful, and degrading. The factor is enough to
distinguish hate speech and expression, which is only an opinion on a neutral scientific,
academic, or religious subject. Nevertheless, the element does not exclude any hateful
communication or misleading research based on the evidence proving the bad intention in
individual cases.
Hate speech has been defined in a variety of ways by different scholars and governing
bodies. But in the subsequent argument, I will rely on the following definition. First, hate speech
targets specific protected groups with specific characteristics. I argue that this must be a discrete
and insular group, or the group has been historically oppressed. This could be an exact term that
lawmakers use to present the structural subordination in history in different countries. The time
and the relationship between the groups involved could determine whether the expression
constitutes hate speech. Also, the expression could be diverse but must be persecutorial, hateful,
and degrading to the protected groups. These safeguards would help protect the expression of
dissenting opinions. However, the definition should not exclude hateful communication or
misleading research because those types of statements are still persecutorial, hateful, and
degrading. Finally, the speech should harm the objective social standing of a community, not
only stand as a subjective offense.
VIII.

CONCLUSION
Hate speech does not have a single definition. A variety of approaches can be applied to

different perspectives. After considering the above definitions, I conclude that my definition
should be:
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Hate speech targets a discrete and insular group, or the group has been historically
oppressed. The speech could be diverse but must be persecutorial, hateful, and degrading
to the protected groups, including hateful communication, misleading research, or any
other forms of expression that are persecutorial, hateful, and degrading. The speech
should harm the objective social standing of a community, not only be considered a
subjective offense.
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CHAPTER THREE: APPROACHES TO HATE SPEECH REGULATION
IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
I.

INTRODUCTION
While Chapter Two provided a basic framework for defining hate speech, the next chapter

will introduce three countries’ approaches and one international standard on hate speech for
comparison purposes in this chapter. As discussed in Chapter Two, the nature of the historical
oppressions people in different countries have faced profoundly relates to the approaches toward
hate speech each country has taken. Taiwan can look to different models. This chapter will first
introduce the model in the United States, which emphasizes freedom of speech as the most
important right. The second section will cover the German approach, which strongly protects
human dignity in its legal system. The third section is the South African approach. As an
example of the third wave of democracy, South Africa also emphasizes human dignity and
balances dignity and freedom of speech. Finally, I will analyze the approach taken by the
European Court of Human Rights from the perspective of transnational constitutionalism to
provide a general rule on international law standards.
II.

APPROACH OF THE UNITED STATES
1. Overview
The approach toward hate speech in the United States reflects the uniqueness of its history

and culture. The United States protects freedom of speech for its several significant functions,
including individual self-fulfillment, attainment of truth, participation in decision-making and
balance between stability and change.93 The reason that the US emphasizes the freedom of
speech is because of the Red Scare in the 1910s and the McCarthy era that stretched from the
93

Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 NO. 5 YALE L. J., 877, 878-886 (1963).
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1940s to the 1950s. Freedom of speech was under deep oppression during the above periods.
Therefore, the US has not followed European experiences and applied strong limitations to hate
speech. 94 The country has not developed a ban on hate speech, and, on the contrary, the Supreme
Court has legally protected hate speech. In the following section, I will discuss more formative
examples of oppression in the United States.
Racism is one of the most significant issues in the United States’ history, and white
supremacy has substantially dominated its legal system. The history of racism in the country can
be seen through various examples, such as slavery, segregation, and the genocide of indigenous
peoples.95 Other oppressed groups, such as women and the LGBTQ community, have also
suffered discrimination and persecution throughout the United States’ history.
Racism can be traced back to the colonial history of the United States. The Atlantic slave
trade enslaved the African people from the 15th century on,96 and the transportation of slaves
between Africa and North America caused an enormous number of deaths.97 After the American
Civil War, Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution abolished
slavery.98 However, the Southern states still enacted the Black Codes, which imposed unfair
treatment of African Americans. These codes limited the blacks’ ability to own property, to find
employment, to make testimony, and to marry white people, and those restrictions constituted the
extension of slavery.99 Instead, the rules allowed for these states to enact laws that would further
Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29,
42-43 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
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restrict African Americans’ rights by using the gray zones of the Amendment, such as
grandfather clauses, poll taxes, or literacy tests. After the Reconstruction era, the Deep South still
had many unequal laws toward African American people. For example, the Jim Crow laws
enforced racial segregation in the Southern states.100
In addition to racism, the oppression based on gender is another dark side in American
history. Some states could limit women’s suffrage.101 Both the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth
Amendments only guaranteed the rights of male citizens to vote. This voting discrimination
lasted until 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment guaranteed women’s suffrage. Nevertheless,
black women could not vote until later.102 Women are still oppressed in the United States
nowadays, for instance, “high-profile allegations of sexual assault and increasing restrictions on
women’s access to abortion” still remain.103
Another vector of discrimination in the United States is how LGBTQ groups are
discriminated against. On June 28, 1969, the police raided the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich
Village, New York City, to oppress the LGBTQ community.104 In early US history,
homosexuality was illegal, and it was even punished under sodomy laws until 2003. The
Supreme Court of the United States holds that to outlaw homosexual activities is
unconstitutional.105 Bans against gay marriage were held unconstitutional in 2015, but there are
LESLIE VINCENT TISCHAUSER, JIM CROW LAWS 17-34 (2013).
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still state laws that allow companies to fire LGBT individuals because of their sexuality, showing
that there is still a level of oppression and discrimination against this minority group.106
The United States is a significant model of protecting freedom of speech. However, as
described above, the oppression of minorities has been rampant in the United States’ history.
Moreover, this persecution has taken place in a country ostensibly known for its liberty. The
Supreme Court of the United States has played a significant role in shaping the regulation of hate
speech in the country. The following section will introduce the decisions around hate speech
handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States.
2. Hate Speech Jurisprudence in the United States
The US Supreme Court’s judgments have guaranteed ample protections for the freedom of
speech. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. proposed that the best way to seek the truth was to
submit a statement to allow competition in the marketplace of ideas107 by not limiting speech at
all. From the traditional view of the First Amendment, even the most unpopular speech is
allowed expression. However, the Supreme Court creates some categories of unprotected speech,
such as obscenity, child pornography, fighting words, and false statements of fact with actual
malice. For example, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, fighting words were limited because they
had “no essential part of any exposition of ideas and were of such slight social value, and the
Court held that the social interest in order and morality is more important than any benefit
derived from them.”108 As a result, speech that includes fighting words has less protection in the
First Amendment.109
See FREEDOM FOR ALL AMERICANS, LGBTQ Americans Aren't Fully Protected From Discrimination in 29 States,
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In 1952, in the case Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, the Supreme Court allowed
the states to limit hate speech regarding group libel.110 In this case, the white group leader
directly linked the “Negro with the aggressions, rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana.”111
Group libel seems to have restrictions in the US legal system. However, the Court held its
approach to individual libel in New York Times v. Sullivan, and the libel is protected under the
First Amendment.112 The case for protecting individual libel also affects group libel issues even
though the Beauharnais case was not overturned. In the case, National Socialist Party of America
v. Village of Skokie, the National Socialist Party of America paraded with Nazi costumes and
intentionally passed by the Jewish community in Skokie, Illinois, where many members of the
community were survivors of the Holocaust. The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
protected the demonstration.113 That means the National Socialist Party of America’s speech
toward the Jewish community was protected, even though the expression may count as libel to
survivors of the Holocaust. The holding makes clear that the group libel should be protected by
the First Amendment as well.
Until the 1990s, in the case R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the US Supreme Court held that a
content-based restriction is not allowed even for racial hate speech. In R.A.V., the petitioner and
several other teenagers were accused of cross burning on a black family’s lawn.114 The Court
recognized that states could not limit speech based on “hostility, or favoritism, toward a nonproscribable message they contain.”115 The Court insisted that selectively restricting speech due
to its content cannot be supported, even by avoiding group hatred. The content-based
Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 250 (1952).
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discrimination could only be limited under two conditions as “secondary effects, and when the
basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech
at issue is prescriptible.”116 Therefore, the state statute restricted speech about specific topics as
viewpoint discrimination over protection against hate speech. The R.A.V. case showed that
freedom of expression holds the superior position by making it difficult for states to regulate hate
speech.
Along with hate speech, a similar concept is hate crime. Hate speech is allowed in the
United States. The country, however, punishes hate crimes. According to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), a hate crime is “a criminal offense committed against a person or property
which is motivated by the offender’s bias against a race, religion ethnic/national origin, sexual
orientation, or disability.”117 In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Court broadened the restriction of hate
crimes but maintained the freedom of speech protection established in the R.A.V. case. The
holding distinguished between hate speech and hate crimes. They held that the enhancing a
defendant’s sentence due to their intent or motive is different from limiting hate speech. As such,
the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Unlike hate speech, hate crimes focus on action
rather than speech itself. The Court stated that hate crime was different from the result in R.A.V.
v. St. Paul because it focused on “conduct unprotected by the First Amendment”118 rather than
speech. The Wisconsin v. Mitchell case separated hateful action from hate speech and allowed
for the punishment of offensive action. Nevertheless, the case maintained the restricted legal
structure of the R.A.V. case.119
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The cross burnings, like the one from R.A.V., still continue. In Virginia v. Black, three
defendants were accused of cross burning on a black family’s property.120 The US Supreme
Court had a different opinion but did not overrule the R.A.V. case. In Virginia, the holding only
limited the form of speech rising to the fear of bodily harm, not hate speech. First, the Court held
that a cross burning in the United States is strongly connected with the history of the Ku Klux
Klan and imposes a reign of terror, which depicts “whipping, threatening, and murdering
blacks.”121 Therefore, burning a cross is a symbol of hate in US history and represents true
threats to a specific racial group. The Supreme Court held that banning true threats is allowed
under the First Amendment. The state could therefore punish people for burning crosses intended
to create fear among victims. However, the Supreme Court held that the government could not
limit speech until those forms of intimidation rise to the fear of bodily harm. The court held that
the Virginia statute, which ruled that "Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence
of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons,"122 is unconstitutional because it created
prima facie evidence to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant and violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.123 Justice Thomas delivered a dissenting opinion in Virginia. He agreed
with the majority that banning cross burning was necessary. However, he stated that cross
burning was not an issue of freedom of expression, but a true threat. He argued that, in US
culture, cross burning always means “lawlessness and raises the grounded fear of physical
violence” in its victims.124 Virginia did not overrule the holdings suggested by the R.A.V. case,
but instead opened other paths for the state to regulate true threats, which constitute specific
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 343 (2003).
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categories of unprotected speech. However, the US Supreme Court has yet to balance the dispute
between the harm of hate speech and the guarantee of the First Amendment, since it still has not
overruled the R.A.V. case.
The R.A.V. case establishes the basic rules of freedom of speech theory, which allows hate
speech. Also, Wisconsin v. Mitchell limits hate crime. The principle in the United States was,
“Sticks and stones can break my bones, but words can never hurt me.”125 The US Supreme
Court has designed an essential structure for hate speech regulation since hate speech was
allowed in the R.A.V. case. Even though hate speech might be harmful, the Court deems that it
could not regulate it without prohibiting all negative speech. Moreover, in Virginia, the holding
only limits true threats that rise to the fear of bodily harm, not hate speech.
3. Current Hate Speech Issues in the US
A. Statistics, Data about Hate Speech
Hate speech is legal in the United States. The hate groups are therefore free to spread hate
speech. Many communities in the United States have long-standing animosity toward each other
from community history, and this manifests in hate speech between the groups. For example, the
cross burning and the hangman’s noose are symbols of racism that reflect the horrific acts of
lynching in American history, in which the victims were mostly African Americans. The
hangman’s noose has become an offensive symbol of threatening black people in the United
States because the country has a history of lynching African American men.126 In 2007, more
than 80 cases of hangman’s noose displays were used to threaten black people in the United
Henry Louis Gates, War of Words: Critical Race Theory and the First Amendment, SPEAKING OF RACE,
SPEAKING OF SEX, 18 (1994).
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States.127 On August 11th, 2017, in Charlottesville, Virginia, white supremacists and Nazis
clashed with counter-protesters. Their slogans were anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic and
communicated their hatred for these minority groups. They claimed that the First Amendment
guaranteed their right to hate speech.128
In addition, in 2018, the FBI recorded over 7,000 hate crimes, and anti-Semitic hate crimes
and hate speech were at near-historic levels. An estimated 70% of US adults claim that hate
speech and hate crimes are increasing and are targeting all minorities.129 The research also shows
that the American people believe the following reasons are behind this increase: first, the
encouragement or inspiration from politicians; second, the significant influence of social media
and the Internet; and third, the fact that US society has become sharply polarized.130
Racism has affected the political climate in the United States,131 and hate speech against
immigrants has become a serious problem. Reportedly, the anti-immigrant movement has
dramatically increased in the past ten years. Some hate speech even stems from high-level
government outlets. For example, US President Trump has stated that immigrants and refugees
were “an invasion and they carve you up with a knife” to incite hatred toward immigrants.132
Nowadays, hate groups use the Internet to send hateful messages. Research at the Simon
Wiesenthal Center found that an estimated 50 hate groups had accessed their website in 1995,
Id. at 335.
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and Klan Watch claimed that there were more than 400 hate groups and more than 800 hate
websites in the United States in 1997. Because of its widespread use, the Internet has become the
main path through which to spread hatred in the United States.133 Based on the online hate
speech issue in the US, Tsesis argues that the rules implemented in the private sector and the
social media filters are not enough to avoid hatred from spreading and hurting the victims. He
therefore advocates for the government to ban hate speech online.134
Moreover, the hostility toward people with different sexual orientations is a problem as
well. Anti-LGBTQ groups in the United States claim that they defend family values and
disseminate hate speech or hateful communication. For instance, a right-wing website distributed
the statement that “gay people are sexual bums who suffer from a preoccupation with sex and
seek excessive distraction through sex, drugs and other risk-taking behaviors.”135
Different minor groups in the United States that have been historically oppressed continue
to experience hate speech. The approach of the United States, which only punishes hate crime,
but allows hate speech, does not really fix or alleviate the hate speech problem.
B. Current Hate Speech Restrictions and Limitations
Generally, hate speech is protected in the United States. However, courts have offered
protection by distinguishing some actions from speech, such as hate crime and true threats.
Based on the decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States, the US legal system is
dominated by the R.A.V. structure, which did not outlaw hate speech. The Wisconsin v. Mitchell
case further separated speech and actions. The US lower courts follow this approach in making
their judgments. For example, in the case United States v. Stewart, the defendants were members
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of the Ku Klux Klan and performed a cross burning in a black family’s yard, which caused
mental injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the R.A.V.
case and the Wisconsin case to distinguish speech and action, and then it affirmed the
defendants’ conviction due to their unprotected conduct.136 In the case in re M.S., the defendant
used both hate speech and violence to attack LGBT victims. The Supreme Court of California
judged the same outcome as the Eleventh Circuit did. It affirmed the hate crime conviction for
the defendant due to the defendant’s harmful actions.137 After the case Virginia v. Black in 2003,
the lower court further used the Virginia case to outlaw true threats. In the case of United States
v. White, the defendant was the commander of the American National Socialist Workers' Party,
and he sent e-mails to threaten victims based on those victims’ race. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment to hold the defendant’s
speech as constituting an actual threat.138 In sum, judicial system in the United States followed
the rules of both the R.A.V. case and Wisconsin case, which punishes hate crime, but allows hate
speech. Also, if the form of speech rises to the fear of bodily harm, it would become a true threat,
and then it would be limited by the rules of the Virginia case.
Some schools in the United States ban campus hate speech with speech codes, but they
sometimes face a challenge from students or other individuals. For instance, in the 1995 Corry v.
Stanford University case, the Court’s decision favored the plaintiffs, who claimed that the school
code limitation on hate speech violated their First Amendment rights.139 Also, private companies
“The statutes under which the defendants were prosecuted also target unprotected conduct — willful interference
with housing rights, conspiracy, and the use of fire. So, although § 3631 specifically prohibits intimidation based on
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sometimes have their own rules for regulating hate speech. For instance, social media has some
regulations to limit hate speech in the country.140
The current system in the United States does not prohibit hate speech. However, hate crimes
are not allowed in the US legal system. The hate crime regulations have been instituted at both
the federal and state level. Forty-six states in the United States, plus Washington D.C., have laws
to limit hate crimes.141 According to research from the Department of Justice, hate crimes in the
United States are mostly related to racism and xenophobia, but hate crimes related to sexual
orientation, gender identity, and anti-Semitism are also prevalent.142 Although the United States
has hate crime laws, hate crimes in the United States still run rampant.
4. Conclusion
Allowing hate speech in the United States is based on freedom of speech reigning supreme.
However, hate speech is still a problem in the United States. The hate speech that exists in the
United States is addressed toward a variety of traits and identities, such as race, color, religion,
ethnic group, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, and severe disability or disease.
For example, the Ku Klux Klan, white supremacists, and neo-Nazis still use hate speech to
spread racism and xenophobia.143 In sum, the hate speech approach in the United States has not
worked very efficiently. The judicial system in United States has tried to rely on regulating hate
“An attack, such as a degrading generalization or slur. Targeting a ‘protected category’ of people, including one
based on sex, race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, and serious
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crimes to avoid people spreading racism and xenophobia, but that has failed. The minorities
continue to be oppressed and hate speech and hate crimes are not well controlled.
III.

GERMANY’S APPROACH
1. Overview
After World War II, Germany developed its legal system to remedy the failure generated by

the Weimar Constitution and the rise of Nazism. Germany prioritizes human dignity, leading to
more restrictions on hate speech. German Basic Law is designed as a human dignity-based legal
system with the jurisprudence of a militant democracy.
The Nazis believed that the Jewish people were inherently evil and therefore needed to be
extinguished from German society.144 The idea of anti-Semitism arose in Germany in the Middle
Ages, and the theory developed that Jews were the enemies of Jesus Christ. 145 The persecution of
the Jewish people thus became a religious obligation.146 When the Nazis came into power in
1933, they promoted collectivism and used the “people’s community” to distinguish the
Volksgenossen (National Comrades) and the Gemeinschaftsfremde (Community Aliens).147 In
doing so, they claimed they would save the valued group and eliminate the non-valued one. AntiSemitism, nationalism, and pseudoscience initially triggered the Holocaust.148 The Holocaust is
the most severe oppression in German history. Nazi Germany perpetrated genocide on six
million Jewish people and other non-Jewish victims, including the Polish people, the Romani
people, the African people, political dissentients, religious dissentients, and gay people. The total
victims numbered close to 11 million people.149
TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 33, at 15.
Id. at 11.
146
Id.
147
PETER FRITZSCHE, LIFE AND DEATH IN THE THIRD REICH 38-55 (2009).
148
TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 33, at 24.
149
UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, Introduction to the Holocaust,
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/introduction-to-the-holocaust (last visited Aug. 05, 2019).
144
145

35

An unfathomable onslaught against and abuse of human dignity characterized the Holocaust.
The victims suffered torture, degradation, discrimination, and cruel punishment because they
were seen as objects, not equal human beings. For example, the Nazis forced the Jews to endure
hard labor and then worked them to death.150 Nazi physicians subjected the prisoners in the
concentration camps to human experimentation in which the victims underwent medical
torture.151 Such were the unfathomable violations against human dignity.
Germany has had hate speech regulations throughout its history. The German Empire, the
government prior to 1918, had hate speech regulations. For example, the Criminal Code of The
German Empire, Section 221, punished speech inciting group hatred as breach of the peace and
public order.152 The act also applied in the Weimar Republic, the government that existed in
Germany between 1918 and 1933. Article 109 of the Weimar Constitution ruled “all Germans
are equal before the law, and Article 128 prohibits any discrimination to its citizens.”153 Under
the Weimar Republic’s government, many members of the Nazi party were found guilty of
defamation against Jewish people. However, the defamation regulation was still an individualbased crime, not applying to general group libel. Section 130 of the Criminal Code prohibited
“inciting different classes of the people to acts of violence against each other,”154 and Section
166 of the Penal Code punished people for offensive expressions against others’ religions.155
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Gesetz zum Schutze der Republik (the Act for the Protection of the Republic) in June 1922
enhanced the sentence to outlaw the Nazi leaders. Nevertheless, the punishment, which was
mainly a fine, rarely a prison sentence, was too light to alleviate the racial hatred.156 Therefore,
the hate speech laws in the Weimar Republic failed to prevent the Nazis from taking charge.
2. German Hate Speech Jurisprudence
The German experience contradicts the view of the “clear and immediately dangerous”
standard. The values of Nazism developed over hundreds of years, from hate speech to the
persecution system,157 and manifested during the Holocaust. This unparalleled historical
oppression triggered the legal jurisprudence of human dignity that emerged after the Second
World War in Germany.
From November 1945 to October 1946, the trials held in Nuremberg indicted and tried the
Nazi leaders for war crimes. The Allies of World War II believed that Germany should take
responsibility for the war. In September 1948, a Parliamentary Council was founded in Bonn to
develop a temporary constitution for West Germany. The Council comprised 70 representatives
from the western states in Germany. They were called state parliaments but were not elected by
citizens. The group contained scholars, government officers, and politicians under the Weimar
Republic, and most of them had suffered under the Nazis’ rule. In May 1949, the Council
enacted the Constitution called the Basic Law, rather than the Constitution, because it was a
temporary clause for the transitional period before the two Germanys were unified.158
The founding fathers of the Basic Law considered the lessons of history and aimed to modify
the mistakes made in the Weimar Republic. They followed the jurisprudence of militant
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democracy, which was proposed by the German scholar Karl Loewenstein in 1930. The theory
argues that democracy is fragile, and that extremism would invade a liberal democratic regime
by using its democratic system to go against democracy itself. For instance, Hitler used
democratic processes to destroy the Weimar Republic. When democratic governments are
threatened by anti-democratic groups, their response is to limit some conduct to avoid
extremism. However, such restrictions may be called into question under their legal systems. 159
The militant democracy argued that individuals could not use their freedom to abuse the free
democratic basic order, and a party that proposed otherwise was deemed anti-constitutional and
subject to banning by the constitutional court.160 Hate speech regulation is therefore
constitutional, as a tool of militant democracy, to avoid the potential harm induced by hate
speech.
The Federal Constitutional Court applied and interpreted the German Basic Law to
constitute a theory of fundamental rights in German jurisprudence.161 All rights are not equal in
the German Constitution.162 Article 1 of the German Basic Law states that “human dignity shall
be inviolable,”163 which means that human dignity is at the core of the German Constitution.
Human dignity is an absolute right in Germany, one that cannot be restricted and compromised
by any other rights.164 Human dignity is the essential constitutional value order of the Basic Law,
Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1046-1049(2007).
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which has become the formative principle for the definition and explanation of all other
constitutional rights.165 That is to say, all fundamental rights are recognized as “specific
manifestations of the human dignity principle.”166 In addition, the culture in Germany holds that
personal honor is superior to freedom of speech.167
Article 5 of the Basic Law of Germany undergirds the freedom of speech right in the
German Constitution.168 The German Constitution did not put freedom of speech in the most
significant position, but rather, human dignity. The Constitution therefore emphasizes human
dignity over liberty.169 The German Court does not set free speech rights as superior to the other
constitutional rights and interests. Article 1 is superior to the right indicated by Article 5, so the
limitation on freedom of speech is predictable in its constitutional structure, and thus freedom of
expression is not a superior right.170 The free speech claims under Article 5 do measure up
equally with the human dignity claims premised on Article 1.171 Hence, the purpose of the Basic
Law seems to be to balance human dignity and freedom of speech and to protect the institution
of democracy.172 For example, the Federal Constitutional Court has held that the ban on denying
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY PASSIM
359 (2D ED. 1997).
166
Guy E. Carmi, Dignity versus Liberty: The Two Western Cultures of Free Speech, 26 B.U. INT'L L.J. 277, 323-324
(2008).
167
Krotoszynski, A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment, supra note 162, at 1580.
168
Basic Law of Germany, Article 5: “Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by
speech, writing and pictures and freely to inform himself from generally accessible sources.” GRUNDGESETZ [GG]
[BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, art 5 (Ger.).
169
Carmi, Dignity Versus Liberty, supra note 166, at 323.
170
About the issue of constitutional structure, Winfried Brugger said: “One reason for the differences is attributable
to textual differences found in the Constitutions of the two nations: In the United States, freedom of speech is the
first right named in the Bill of Rights, whereas it does not appear until Article 5 of the German Constitution;
furthermore, there are explicit limitations to the German free speech clause, but no specific limitations to the First
Amendment in the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the German Constitution contains an entire cluster of rights that
seems to presuppose limits to absolute freedom of expression. These counter-vailing interests include the right to
personal honor in Article 5(2), the right to personality in Article 2(1), and the required respect for dignity in Article
1(1) BL. 16 These textual arguments are not the only ones affecting the resolution of hate speech cases.” Brugger,
Ban on or Protection of Hate Speech? ? supra note 21, at 7.
171
Krotoszynski, A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment, supra note 162, at 1553-1554.
172
Id. at 1555-1556.
165

39

the Holocaust is constitutional. The limitation on speech denying the Holocaust is to protect the
victims’ human dignity and also to prevent the speech from inciting hatred toward Jews and the
speech promoting National Socialism, which is harmful to the institution of democracy.173 The
German Constitutional Court has held some cases relating to the conflict between human dignity
and freedom of speech as follows: First, the Mephisto case: Klaus Mann was the writer of the
novel Mephisto. The story centered on a fictional actor working with the Nazi regime and
critiqued his loss of humane values. The character was based on a real actor, Gustaf Gründgens.
After Gründgens’ death, his adopted son sued Mann for an injunction to stop him from
publishing the novel. The Court held that Gründgens’ human dignity should be protected and
that the book could not be published.174 Secondly, the Princess Soraya case offers an example: a
media company, Die Welt, published a fictional interview with Princess Soraya, who was the exwife of the King of Iran. Soraya sued Die Welt. The Court rejected the newspaper’s freedom of
speech claim by protecting Soraya’s human dignity.175 Thirdly, the Strauss case: The magazine
Konkret portrayed a politician, Franz Josef Strauss, as a pig having sex with another pig.
Although the freedom of speech right protects satire and parody, the Court held the magazine
guilty of defamation to protect Strauss’s human dignity.176
One the contrary, in the United States, the holding of the case New York Times v. Sullivan
chose to protect First Amendment rather than public figures’ dignity, unless the speakers have
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actual malice in mind when they make false defamatory statements. The case also held that the
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, although sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials should be allowed.177 If the above
cases had happened in the United States, Princess Soraya may have needed to provide evidence
to show the speaker had actual malice, and the comments to Gründgens and Strauss would be
considered fair comments, although the comments were considered unpleasantly sharp.
The German constitutional commitment includes “militant democracy.”178 Militant
democracy is a significant characteristic of German jurisprudence and is ruled by Article 18179
and Article 21180 of the Basic Law. The German approach to hate speech is based on militant
democracy, which holds that individual rights should not destroy the free democratic basic
order.181 Modern democracy should protect both the constitution and human rights. Hence, a
compromise between a state and its citizens potentially constitutes a restriction on human rights.
In other words, human rights should not become the tools with which to destroy democracy.182
From the perspective of militant democracy, the constitutional court is the guardian of
democracy and the constitution. In the German system, constitutional activism is characteristic of
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the constitutional court,183 and the court could rule for the dissolution of parties184 that promote
or advocate against the institution of democracy.185 Hate speech regulation is therefore
constitutional, as a tool of militant democracy, to avoid the potential harm induced by hate
speech. The purpose of the Basic Law’s framers was to prevent a dictatorship, such as Hitler’s
under the Nazis, from arising again. The German legal system is “the most speech-restrictive
democracy in the Western world.”186 It restricts hate speech because of its potential damage.
Thus, German legal theory applies a “biased risk allocation philosophy” to restrict hate speech
and prevent injury because of it.187
Based on militant democracy, the German Constitution established an “objective ordering
of values” for the Federal Constitutional Court to declare and enforce those values.188 German
Constitutional Jurisprudence holds that a constitutional right could be limited by realizing public
interest or protecting another constitutional right.189 Compared to the jurisprudence of the United
States, the German Constitutional Court rejects the state action requirement. It can therefore
intervene in the rights conflict between private sectors. A famous case was the Lüth decision in
1958. Erich Lüth, a German writer and film director, advocated a boycott against the movie
Immortal Beloved. Veit Harlan directed the film, and he was a famous anti-Semitic activist in the
Nazi era. Harlan sued Lüth in a civil law injunction against Lüth’s boycott. In turn, Lüth claimed
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his freedom of speech rights against Harlan. The Court held that the German Basic Law is not a
value-neutrality system, but rather, it defends the objective ordering of values. The Court
intervened in the civil case and balanced Lüth’s freedom of speech right with Harlan’s economic
interest. Ultimately, the Court denied the injunction to the boycott.190 In this case, the Court
balanced these two parties’ constitutional rights by using an objective ordering of values.191
3. Legal Regulation and Courts’ Decisions
A. Criminal Law
Hate speech is a crime in Germany and can be prosecuted by the statutes. The German
approach regulates both “bias-motivated” crimes (Voruteilsdelikte) and “symbolic” crimes
(Botschaftsverbrechen).192 The “bias-motivated” crimes are enforced by Section 46(2) of the
Federal Criminal Code,193 and they relate to racist, xenophobic, and other inhumane or
contemptuous motives.194 If the crime targets “the political attitude, nationality, ethnicity, race,
color, religion, worldview, origin, sexual orientation, disability, external appearance or social
status,” it constitutes a “politically motivated crime.”195
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The bias-motivated crimes are similar to hate crimes in the United States. The “symbolic
crimes,” on the contrary, are aimed at their speech content. Section 86 of the Federal Criminal
Code prohibits disseminating propaganda material of unconstitutional organizations, 196 and
Section 86a limits using the symbols of unconstitutional organizations.197 Section 126 of the
Federal Criminal Code limits the breaching of the public peace by threatening to commit
offenses,198 which includes genocide, a crime against humanity, or a war crime.
Sections 130(1) and (2) of the Federal Criminal Code are significant as regulations against
hate speech.199 Sections (3) and (4) make National Socialism an illegal act of inciting hatred and
disturbing the public peace,200 which pertains to the Holocaust-denying crime. The German
Constitutional Court distinguishes the Holocaust-denying as two forms. The first one is “simple
Germany, Federal Criminal Code, Section 86(1): “(1) Whosoever within Germany disseminates or produces,
stocks, imports or exports or makes publicly accessible through data storage media for dissemination within
Germany or abroad, propaganda material 1. of a political party which has been Declared unconstitutional by the
Federal Constitutional Court or a political party or organisation which has been held by final Decision to be a
surrogate organisation of such a party; 2. of an organisation which has been banned by final Decision because it is
directed against the constitutional order or against the idea of the comity of nations or which has been held by final
Decision to be a surrogate organisation of such a banned organisation; 3. of a government, organisation or institution
outside the Federal Republic of Germany active in pursuing the objectives of one of the parties or organisations
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denying,” which includes a “blanket denial of the fact that genocide took place,” or “the denial of
one or more so-called essential characteristics of the Holocaust.” For example: “the Holocaust
never happened,” or “the number of Jews killed is inflated.”201 In contrast, “qualified denying” is
the simple form accompanied by “additional normative conclusions” or “calls to action.”202 An
example is, “something should be done about the use of extortion as a political tool against
Germany by Jews spreading lies.” The intention is not required, and the crime is an “abstract
endangerment offense,” which means that clear and present danger is not necessary. 203
In the following case, the constitutional court upheld “pursuing the truth, rather than the
harm.”204 The incident happened in 1994, when the revisionism scholar David Irving was invited
by the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), an extreme right-wing party, to give a
speech about Holocaust denial in München. The speech was banned by the city government,
based on Section 130. The court recognized that fact is different from opinion because the latter
cannot be testified to and proved. Also, the court stated that the untrue statement is unprotected
speech and pointed out that protecting truths and facts could “end at the point where they cease
to contribute anything to the formation of public opinion that is presupposed in constitutional
law.”205 Hence, the Holocaust denial law is constitutional, and the speech should not be
allowed.206
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The court, however, restricts the interpretation of Section 130 in specific circumstances to
add more space for freedom of speech. In 2011, an ultranationalism supporter was accused of
violating section 130 by criticizing a documentary on the Holocaust, in which he stated there
were “no gas chambers” and “no fair judgment to Nazi Germany after World War II.”207 The
court held that “only the manner of communication already tangibly gives rise to overstepping
the line to violating legal interests and crosses the threshold to an imminent violation of legal
interests.”208 That is to say, the court claimed that the term “dissemination” in Section 130 only
applies to “a group of individuals whose size becomes uncontrollable.”209 Therefore, the way the
disinformation is distributed, and the size of the audience, are vital factors to consider.
Nevertheless, the Court changed the holding in 2017. An article that stated that “since 1944
not a single Jew was deported to Auschwitz” was charged under Section 130.210 The court held
that “the specific meaning of the statement in question has been accurately established,” and
therefore, it was necessary to rule it as unprotected speech. 211 The question of “why other
possible interpretations were disregarded”212 is an important element for consideration in the
conviction. In other words, if research concludes that no Jew was deported to Auschwitz since
1944 and challenges Holocaust history, it should prove that the research has already considered
all the possible alternatives.
Section 185 of the Federal Criminal Code in Germany regulates the limitation of insults.213
The crime of insulting, however, may constitute hate speech because it applies not only to
part of the group, against him.” KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY, supra note 165, at 251-252.
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individuals but also to the group as a group-libel crime.214 For instance, in the Hedler Case of
1952, the court held that using “traitors to the nation” to target a specific group is a group-libel
crime under section 185.215 The hate speech stated, “a Jew is like a louse, crawling into fur and
remaining there” and thus, it constituted a group-libel crime.216
The court also tried to define what a group is under the term group libel. In the Tucholsky
case, a pacifist bumper sticker stated that “soldiers are murderers.” The constitutional court held
that the statement was a critique, not an insult or a group-libel crime.217 However, if the soldiers
were specifically concretized as a German or a person with another nationality, the holding may
be different. For instance, the group-libel crime would apply if the statement referred to “all our
soldiers.”218 The court balanced the soldiers’ human dignity and the civilians’ freedom of
speech. 219
In sum, hate speech is a crime in Germany. Sections 86, 126, 130 and 185 of the Federal
Criminal Code in Germany have strong limitations to regulate hateful expression. The German
Federal court has also provided its interpretation to the above statutes to balance freedom of
speech and human dignity.
B. Administrative Law and Civil Law
Some regulations in administrative law may rule on the hate speech issue as follows: the
Public Meetings Law does not allow assemblies to promote political parties aimed at abolishing
the free and democratic order as a tool of militant democracy. However, the constitutional
[Criminal Code] § 185.
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court’s holdings can veto the restrictions of the law. The court held that the lawsuits to dissolve
the unconstitutional parties are still based on whether the party caused the actual danger to the
democratic system and involved substantial political action to this end, as, for example, in the
dissolution of the Neo-Nazi Party in 1952 and the dissolution of the German Communist Party in
1956.220 In the 2017 case of the dissolved NPD, nevertheless, the court held that the NPD was
constitutional, even though the party’s stated intention was to abolish the basic order of free
democracy. Although the court recognized that the party’s political proposal might hurt human
dignity and violate the principle of democracy, it points out that “there is a lack of specific and
weighty indications suggesting that this endeavor will be successful.”221 The Law on
Associations has the same function as the Public Meetings Law, as, for instance, in relation to
the Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth).222 The holding balances the freedom of speech right and the
system of militant democracy.
The Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) was passed in 2017. The purpose of the Act is to
restrict hate speech, fake news, and propaganda on the Internet.223 Section 1(3) of the NetzDG
lists “unlawful content” that corresponds to the hate speech regulation in the criminal code.224
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The Act also gives the social networks an obligation to “report,225 remove, or block the unlawful
content.”226 Moreover, the Youth Protection Act prohibits the speech or material from causing a
negative influence on youth, including anything that is “immoral, brutal, glorif[ies] war, or
incite[s] others to violent acts, crimes, or hatred.”227
The German Civil Code also provides compensation to victims for the damages caused by
the crimes of hate speech. The tort to harm personality rights can be used for claim recovery,
including money and restored reputation. The 2006 General Act on Equal Treatment (AGG)
limits the discrimination based on “race or ethnic origin, gender, religion or belief, disability, age
or sexual orientation.”228 The 2002 Act on Equal Opportunities of Disabled People also protects
people with disabilities from hate speech.229
NetzDG, § 2(1): “(1) Providers of social networks which receive more than 100 complaints per calendar year
about unlawful content shall be obliged to produce half-yearly German-language reports on the handling of
complaints about unlawful content on their platforms, covering the points enumerated in subsection (2), and shall be
obliged to publish these reports in the Federal Gazette and on their own website no later than one month after the
half-year concerned has ended. The reports published on their own website shall be easily recognisable, directly
accessible and permanently available.”
226
NetzDG, § 3(2): “The procedure shall ensure that the provider of the social network: 1.takes immediate note of
the complaint and checks whether the content reported in the complaint is unlawful and subject to removal or
whether access to the content must be blocked; 2.removes or blocks access to content that is manifestly unlawful
within 24 hours of receiving the complaint; this shall not apply if the social network has reached agreement with the
competent law enforcement authority on a longer period for deleting or blocking any manifestly unlawful content;
3.removes or blocks access to all unlawful content immediately, this generally being within 7 days of receiving the
complaint; the 7-day time limit may be exceeded if a) the Decision regarding the unlawfulness of the content is
dependent on the falsity of a factual allegation or is clearly dependent on other factual circumstances; in such cases,
the social network can give the user an opportunity to respond to the complaint before the Decision is rendered; b)
the social network refers the Decision regarding unlawfulness to a recognised self-regulation institution pursuant to
subsections (6) to (8) within 7 days of receiving the complaint and agrees to accept the Decision of that institution;
3.In the case of removal, retains the content as evidence and stores it for this purpose within the scope of Directives
2000/31/EC and 2010/13/EU for a period of ten weeks; 4.immediately notifies the person submitting the complaint
and the user about any Decision, while also providing them with reasons for its Decision.”
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In sum, both administrative law and civil law in Germany have regulations to limit hate
speech. Those statutes show how the German government balances freedom of speech and
human dignity.
4. Current Hate Speech Issues in Germany
There are hate speech problems in German society even today. Offensive speech has
increased, possibly directed toward immigrants and refugees. This is, in turn, possibly due to
more than 60% of the applications submitted refugees and asylum seekers in the EU having been
made in Germany. As a result, tensions have increased between the German people and the new
immigrants, and this phenomenon has caused the German people to turn against the refugees and
asylum seekers. Right-wing parties in Germany, such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD),
have largely been responsible for the online hate speech toward immigrants and have used the
hatred to increase their public support and political strength.230 In 2019, the AfD had great
success in a regional election in the Free State of Thuringia.231
Moreover, anti-Semitic speech still exists in Germany, as the right-wing party has raised not
just anti-immigrant sentiment but also anti-Semitism. This anti-Semitic speech includes
Holocaust denials. For example, one of the AfD leaders, Alexander Gauland, mentioned the
Holocaust as a “speck of bird poo in over 1,000 years of successful German history,” and another
member, Bjoern Hoecke, said, “the Holocaust memorial in Berlin is a monument of shame.”232
Moreover, the other right-wing party, the National Democratic Party of Germany, keeps
Id. at 8-10.
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proposing to challenge the “free democratic order” and spread offensive speech in relation to this
principle.233
Moreover, NetzDG’s work also shows that hate speech on the internet is a severe problem in
Germany. In real practice, NetzDG’s influence existed before it was formally applied. It led to
251 suspensions and 11 removals on Twitter from April to May 2017. In 2018, a case showed
that Twitter removed a politician’s speech on behalf of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a
right-wing political party, but also eliminated the statement to critique the removal.234
5. Conclusion
Compared to the US approach to hate speech, the German approach is very different. The
German system is a model of human dignity-based jurisprudence. Karl Loewenstein framed the
German approach as a classic case of militant democracy. 235 The German approach includes the
strictest restrictions on hate speech in the world. Laws have been enacted and regulations are in
place to punish statements supporting the Nazis and denying the Holocaust. The principles of
human dignity and militant democracy are the central characteristics of German jurisprudence.
The German approach not only limits hate speech but also recognizes the denial of historical
oppression and challenges to the democratic order as hate speech.
IV.

SOUTH AFRICA’S APPROACH
1. Overview
The Constitution of South Africa rules that hate speech is not protected. The Equality Act is

the other relevant speech regulation at the law level. Furthermore, South Africa is drafting the
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Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill to restrict hate crimes and hate
speech. As in Germany, the approach toward hate speech in South Africa has human dignity and
militant democracy at the core of its constitution.
“Apartheid”236 was the segregation system in South Africa from the 1940s to the 1990s. The
National Party in South Africa proposed apartheid after World War II, and it became a formal
rule and practice in 1948. The National Party distinguished four primary racial groups: white,
black, Indian, and “colored,”237 and forced them to live in specific places.238 The white people
were the only citizens eligible to be political candidates at that time.239 A “Bantustan” was a
significant approach of apartheid. The Bantustan was a territory set aside as a black state or
homeland in order to implement racial segregation.240 Another problem that combined with the
black homeland policy was “forced removal,” a system based on the Group Areas Act in 1950.241
Under the apartheid system, “Grand Apartheid” means separating different races in diverse living areas. The
Population Registration Act of 1950 specified the formal classification of races through the Identification Card for
citizens of South Africa. The Group Areas Act of 1950 forced people to live in a specific area based on their race. In
contrast, “Petty Apartheid” separated the different public facilities based on race. The Reservation of Separate
Amenities Act of 1953 also separated the public facilities for different races. See GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE
SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981).
237
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Throughout South African history, hate speech regulations were used to oppress the black
groups and prevent them from spreading speech against “apartheid” or other unfair treatments.
For instance, the Native Administration Act of 1927 outlawed these groups from uttering “any
word or engaging in any other act or thing whatever with the intent to promote any feeling of
hostility between natives and Europeans.” In actual practice, the Act punished the black people
for using offensive speech toward white people. The punishment included fines, imprisonment
and forcible removal. The Publications Act of 1974 restricted “a publication of anything that
could incite racial hostility or could amount to an expression of ridicule or contempt for a section
of the population.” However, the Act was usually used to outlaw the anti-racial discrimination
point of view.242 The Internal Security Act of 1982 further prohibited people from critiquing
racial policies.243 After democratization, however, the legal system created human dignity rights
and militant democracy to correct the previous wrongdoing.
2. Constitution of South Africa and its Jurisprudence
The Constitution of South Africa is created to correct the wrongful discrimination based on
race and the apartheid system of the past. Its jurisprudence places an emphasis on the guarantee
Gilbert J. Marcus, Racial Hostility: The South African Experience, IN ARTICLE 19: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
AGAINST CENSORSHIP, STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
208, 208-13 (Sandra Colivar et al. eds., 1992).
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of human rights,244 equality,245 and dignity.246 However, freedom of speech247 is not the superior
right in the Constitution. Some unprotected speech is directly written into Article 16(2) as an
exception clause, which rules that the freedom of speech does not extend to (a) propaganda for
war, (b) incitement of imminent violence, or (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race,
ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.”248 Ryan F. Haigh
argued that “incitement to cause harm” in Article 16(2)(c) is an additional requirement for hate
speech directed toward race, ethnicity, gender, or religion.249
Human dignity is a prominent right in the South African Constitution, as it is in the German
system. However, compared to German Constitutional jurisprudence, human dignity in South
Africa is a “relative right.” It is not an “eternal right as well,” and also “not the only supreme
value.” The Constitutional Court of South Africa recognizes that human dignity is limitable
when it is proportional.250 It also could be amended.251 The importance of human dignity,
Constitution of South Africa, Section 7: “(1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It
enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and
freedom. (2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. (3) The rights in the
Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill.” S. AFR.
CONST. 1996 § 7.
245
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persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. (3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly
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equality, and freedom are at the same level.252 Hence, the jurisprudence of the South African
Constitution is “a web of mutually supporting rights to promote human dignity and social
transformation.”253 The principle of human dignity, however, guides the equality jurisprudence
of the constitutional court and has become an essential right in South Africa.254 In the case
Khumalo v. Holomisa, which was a defamation case related to a public figure,255 Justice Kate
O’Regan mentioned that the balance between human dignity and freedom of speech is necessary.
The freedom of speech right is significant and fundamental to democracy, but it should be
construed along with the values of human dignity and equality.256 Therefore, hate speech issues
in South Africa, as a balance between freedom of speech and human dignity, prefer neither the
freedom of speech nor human dignity.
One example is the case Islamic Unity Convention v. Independent Broadcasting Authority.
The constitutional court held that prohibiting hate speech is acceptable. The case involved an
employee in the Islamic Unity Convention who claimed that “Israel was illegitimate,” there was
“no gas chamber in World War II,” and there were “only one million Jewish victims because of
the Holocaust.” The Authority sued the Convention for violating the regulations regarding
broadcasting.257 Justice Langa stated that “the most speech restriction should be not allowed, and
offensive speech should be tolerated. However, the hate speech undermines human dignity,
However, The Human Dignity Clause in German Basic Law is superior than other constitutional values. Id. 252256.
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enhances discrimination and the unequal situation to divide the society.”258 The prohibition is
constitutional for the following reasons. First, to limit hate speech does not mean all racial
offenses are illegal. Second, only offensive speech with “real harms” would be banned by the
hate speech regulation.259 The holding balanced the rights’ conflict then found the middle ground
between freedom of speech and human dignity.
3. Statutory Interpretations of Hate Speech Regulations
A. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the
Equality Act) is the primary regulation that deals with hate speech issues in South Africa. The
Equality Act designs some agencies and special courts for its issues. The South African Human
Rights Commission (SAHCR) is the institution that handles hate speech claims. If SAHCR
recognized that further court action was necessary, the complaint might move to the Equality
Courts, which are based on the Equality Act and were established in 2003.260 The judgement of
the Equality Court could be appealed to The High Courts of South Africa. The High Courts may
deal with hate speech issues under the specific requirements met.261
Article 10 of the Act limits speech that is “hurtful,” intended to “be harmful or to incite
harm,” or “to promote or propagate hatred.”262 The Equality Act, however, applies more
Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others (CCT36/01) [2002] ZACC 3; 2002
(4) SA 294; 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (Apr. 11, 2002). available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/3.html.
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extensively than the ruling of the Constitution of South Africa, and includes “sex, pregnancy,
marital status, social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability, conscience, belief, culture,
language, birth, and any other similar discrimination.”263 Compared to Article 16(2) of the
Constitution, “the incitement to cause harm” is not necessary for Article 10 of the Equality Act.
The Article possibly overrides the protection of the Constitution. Also, the terms “hurtful” and
“harmful” are too vague. Hence, the Act might punish people on the basis of jokes and
sarcasm. 264 Critics find the act to be too expansive.
B. The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill
The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill is a specific law aimed
at reducing hate speech and hate crimes.265 The National Assembly of South Africa proposed the
bill in 2016, and it is sitting before the legislative assembly to date.266 The law is based on
section 7, section 8,267 section 9, section 10, and section 16 of the Constitution of South Africa,
plus the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and
it is directed against offensive speech and crime based on “any race or group of persons of
another color or ethnic origin.”268 The definition of hate speech is in Article 4 of the bill and
Ryan F. Haigh, South Africa's Criminalization of Hurtful Comments, supra note 243, at 200.
“The Equality Act extends this list to include sex, pregnancy, marital status, social origin, color, sexual
orientation, age, disability, conscience, belief, culture, language, birth, and any other ground where discrimination
based on that ground (i) causes or perpetuates systematic disadvantage, (ii) undermines human dignity or (iii)
adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person's rights and freedoms in a serious manner that is comparable to
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rules that the offensive expression must be harmful, incite harm, and promote and propagate
hatred, based on the following categories: “age, albinism, birth, color, culture, disability, ethnic
or social origin, gender or gender identity, HIV status, language, nationality, migrant or refugee
status, race, religion, sex, which includes intersex, or sexual orientation.”269 The bill also creates
the exception of hate speech as follows: “bona fide artistic creativity, performance or other form
of expression,” “academic or scientific inquiry,” “fair and accurate reporting or commentary in
the public interest,” or “the bona fide interpretation and proselytizing or espousing of any
religious tenet, belief, teaching, doctrine or writings.”270
Some critics of the bill point out that the hate speech definition in the bill may cause a
chilling effect on freedom of speech rights. For example, saying “white people are privileged or
stole land,” or “men are trash” might constitute hate speech based on this bill.271 Hence, the bill
has remained under debate in Congress for many years.
Republic of South Africa, 1996, commits the Republic of South Africa and its people to establish a society that is
based on democratic values of social justice, human dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism… and since the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, to which the Republic is a signatory, requires States Parties to Declare, among others, an
offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial
discrimination, as well as acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another
colour or ethnic origin.”
269
Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill, Section 4(1): “(1) (a) Any person who
intentionally publishes, propagates or advocates anything or communicates to one or more persons in a manner that
could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to—(i) be harmful or to incite harm; or (ii) promote
or propagate hatred, based on one or more of the following grounds: (aa) age; (bb) albinism; (cc) birth; (dd) color;
(ee) culture; (ff) disability; (gg) ethnic or social origin; (hh) gender or gender identity; (ii) HIV status; (jj) language;
(kk) nationality, migrant or refugee status; (ll) race; (mm) religion; (nn) sex, which includes intersex; or (oo) sexual
orientation, is guilty of an offence of hate speech.”
270
Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill, Section 4(2): “(2) The provisions of subsection
(1) do not apply in respect of anything done as contemplated in subsection (1) if it is done in good faith in the course
of engagement in—(a) any bona fide artistic creativity, performance or other form of expression, to the extent that
such creativity, performance or expression does not advocate hatred that constitutes incitement to cause harm, based
on one or more of the grounds referred to in subsection (1)(a); (b) any academic or scientific inquiry; (c) fair and
accurate reporting or commentary in the public interest or in the publication of any information, commentary,
advertisement or notice, in accordance with section 16(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996;
or (d) the bona fide interpretation and proselytising or espousing of any religious tenet, belief, teaching, doctrine or
writings, to the extent that such interpretation and proselytisation does not advocate hatred that constitutes
incitement to cause harm, based on one or more of the grounds referred to in subsection (1)(a).”
271
Krista Mahr, A South African law would make hate speech punishable by jail time, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Mar. 28,
2019). https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-south-africa-hate-speech-20190328-story.html.
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4. Current Hate Speech Issues in South Africa
A. Current Issues
There have been some hate speech issues in South Africa recently, which show that racial
hate speech still exists in the country. For example, a white Afrikaner nationalist group displayed
“the apartheid-era flag,” which was the old national flag of South Africa and was replaced by the
current flag in 1994. In 2019, the South African Equality Court held that the flag constituted hate
speech toward black people, based on the Equality Law.272 The Asian people in South Africa
have also claimed that they are under attack by hate speech. 273 Moreover, anti-immigrant hate
crimes have become a severe problem in South Africa, and research has shown that antiimmigrant sentiments might rise even further in the coming years.274 Further, offensive speech
aimed at homosexuality is another problem. For instance, a pastor, Oscar Bougardt, stated that
“we need ISIS to come to countries that are homosexual friendly. ISIS, please come rid South
Africa of the homosexual curse.” The Equality Court denied his defense of freedom of religion
and held that he violated the Equality Act.275
REUTERS, South African Court Rules Display of Apartheid Flag Constitutes hate speech (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-politics-flag/south-african-court-rules-display-of-apartheid-flagconstitutes-hate-speech-idUSKCN1VB1AF. Also, 61. NBC UNIVERSAL NEWS GROUP, South Africa Court:
Using Apartheid-Era Flag Is Hate Speech, Should Be Punished (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/south-africa-court-using-apartheid-era-flag-hate-speech-should-n1045086.
273
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Silent No Longer, South Africa's Chinese Fight Back against Hate Speech (Apr.
13, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/3006018/dagger-our-backs-racism-no-longer-just-blackand-white-south.
274
Steven Gordon, What Research Reveals about Drivers of Anti-Immigrant Hate Crime in South Africa, THE
CONVERSATION (Sept. 8, 2019), http://theconversation.com/what-research-reveals-about-drivers-of-anti-immigranthate-crime-in-south-africa-123097.
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COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, South African Court Delivers Blow to Religious Defense of Hate Speech,
https://www.cfr.org/blog/south-african-court-delivers-blow-religious-defense-hate-speech (last visited Sept. 15,
2019). Also, Ohene Yaw Ampofo-Anti, Court Rules That Religion Cannot Be Used as a Defence for Anti-Gay Hate
Speech, GROUNDUP NEWS (Jun. 15, 2018), https://www.groundup.org.za/article/court-rules-religion-cannot-be-useddefence-anti-gay-hate-speech/.
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B. Courts’ Decisions
In the case Afri-Forum and Another v. Julius Sello Malema, the defendant was accused of
singing the song “Dubula ibhunu, Dubula amabhunu baya raypha” to his son, which caused such
offense to a Boer farmer that he shot them, saying they were rapists. The Equality Court of South
Africa recognized the speech as hate speech under the Equality Act. However, the Court held
that while the issues touch “majoritarian or minoritarian positions,” the test to consider in
determining whether an action constitutes hate speech or crime “must always be whether the
measure under scrutiny promotes or retards the achievement of human dignity, equality, and
freedom.” 276 In this case, the Court examined whether the actual audience was substantially
impacted in determining whether the song was harmful.
The Equality Court further explained the standard in the case Human Rights Commission of
South Africa v. SABC, in which a Zulu song offended the Indian immigrants by accusing them
of being the reason for the Zulu people’s poverty. The Court held that the “incitement to cause
harm” was the element to consider in whether this act constituted hate speech.277 In the case
Ramesh Dharamshee Jethalal v. Mbongeni Ngema and Universal Music, in which the song
“Amandiya” caused offense to the Indians,278 the Equality Court once again stated that section
Global Freedom of Expression, Afri-Forum v. Malema,
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/afri-forum-v-malema/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
277
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION INSTITUTE, HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note
260, at 23.
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The lyrics of the song was “Oh men! Oh, virulent men! We need a courageous man to delegate to the Indians. For
this matter is complicated and now needs to be reported to men. Indians don’t want to change, even Mandela has
failed to convince them, it was better with whites we knew then it was a racial conflict . . . Indians are not interested
to cast their vote but when do so they vote for whites . . . Being turned into clowns by Indians, Zulus do not have
money and are squatting in shacks as chattels of Indians . . . I have never seen Dlamini relocating to India Yet here
is Gurmede in Durban being homeless. We struggle so much here in Durban, as we, have been dispossessed by
Indians who in turn are suppressing our people.” Cited from KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS,
supra note 254, at 209.
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16(2) of the Constitution required satisfying both the “advocacy of hatred based on race” and the
“incitement to cause harm” conditions. Then, the clause could be applied.279
In the case South African Human Rights Commission v. Jon Dubula Qwelane, the Equality
Court’s decision favored the South African Human Rights Commission. The issue was raised
because of Jonathan Dubula Qwelane’s article, which mentioned “call me names, but GAY is not
okay,” which was recognized as an offense to the LGBTQ community. The Court agreed with
the Commission’s claim that speech is harmful when it is intended to “incite harm or propagate
hate against a particular group.”280
Regarding religious hatred, the High Court of South Africa prohibited the publishing of
Danish cartoons that stated “the Prophet Muhammad wears a bomb-shaped turban with a lit
fuse.” The Court recognized that first, the cartoon constituted religious hate speech, and second,
the clear and present danger standard was met in this situation. 281
5. Conclusion
South Africa has designed its approach to hate speech based on the country’s history of
oppression. However, neither the Equality Act nor the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes
and Hate Speech Bill are too strict to balance human dignity and freedom of speech. In fact, they
make the freedom of speech right very limited. As a newly emerging democracy, South Africa
might have fixed some problems with its approach, but it has created others.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION INSTITUTE, HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note
260, at 23-24.
280
SAHRC, SAHRC Welcomes Judgment in Qwelane Matter – SAHRC: "Freedom of Expression Should Not Be
Used as a Veil for Hate Speech," https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news-2/item/808-sahrc-welcomesjudgment-in-qwelane-matter-sahrc-freedom-of-expression-should-not-be-used-as-a-veil-for-hate-speech (last visited
Aug. 22, 2019).
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KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS, supra note 254, at 203-205.
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V.

APPROACH OF EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
1. Overview
The hate speech regulation in international law could be ruled on the basis of different

treaties.282 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is an international court founded by
the European Convention on Human Rights.283 Forty-seven states have signed and joined the
Convention as members. The treaty has a binding effect on its all members.284 The ECtHR
accepts both Inter-State applications285 and Individual applications.286 The approach toward hate
speech regulation in the European Court of Human Rights provides an essential legal basis for
the members of the Convention as well as a legal standard to follow.
The approach toward hate speech espoused by the European Convention on Human Rights is
mainly designed under two articles: Article 10 rules on the freedom of expression right, and its
limitation is defined in Section 2 of the Article.287 Article 17 outlines the prohibition of the abuse
For examples, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) governs the
freedom of speech right and its limitation. Article 20 is the hate speech regulation. See International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. & International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 20, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.; Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) limits hate speech as well. International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 4, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 19; Another similar rule is Section 5, Article
13, of the American Convention on Human Rights, which also regulates hate speech. American Convention on
Human Rights, July 18, 1978, art 13. sec. 5, 1144 U.N.T.S. 128.
283
Article 19 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “To ensure the observance of the engagements
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a
European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as "the Court". It shall function on a permanent basis.”
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR] art 19.
284
Article 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the
Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” ECHR art 41.
285
Article 33 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court
any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the protocols thereto by another High Contracting
Party.” ECHR art 33.
286
Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “The Court may receive applications from any person,
non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties
undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.” ECHR art 34.
287
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 10: “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of
282
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of rights.288 Section 2, Article 10, constitutes the limitation of freedom of speech and defines that
it must be balanced under three elements: legal basis, causation, and the doctrine of
proportionality. In contrast, Article 17 is the exclusive clause and directly denies the guarantee of
freedom of speech289 in cases where the violation severely contradicts the fundamental values of
the Convention.290 To review the decisions from the European Court of Human Rights, I will
define different categories in the following sections.
2. Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights and European Court of
Human Rights’ Decisions
A. The Existence of Clearly Established Historical Events: The Discussion around Applying
Article 17 Is Unnecessary.
Article 17 is an exclusive clause and applying it directly denies that constituents are
guaranteed freedom of speech. The Holocaust Denying and Revisionism would directly apply to
Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights to deny the freedom of speech
protection. In the case of Garaudy v. France, the applicant published the book The Founding
Myths of Modern Israel, which denied the Holocaust. The Court held that the Holocaust is one
example of “the existence of clearly established historical events.” Thus, to deny the Holocaust is
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. (2)The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights
of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.” ECHR art 10.
288
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 17: “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
Convention.” ECHR art 17.
289
Fort Fu-Te Liao, What is Hate Speech? Shall and How to Regulate? Analysis of Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights, vol. 45, no. 4 EURAMERICA 464-467 (2015).
290
European Court of Human Rights claims: “There is no doubt that any remark directed against the Convention’s
underlying values would be removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17” See EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS PRESS RESOURCES, a factsheet on hate speech 2 (Mar. 2020),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf.
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to deny crimes against humanity with the aim of rehabilitating the National Socialist regime. The
Court used Article 17 to reject the defendant’s application.291
In the case M’Bala M’Bala v. France, the applicant awarded “the prize for infrequent ability
and insolence” to Robert Faurisson, a scholar of revisionism who denied the Holocaust.292 The
Court applied Article 17 to hold that the application was inadmissible. 293 Therefore, while
meeting “the existence of clearly established historical events,” the Court engaged in no further
discussion about Article 17 and immediately rejected the claim of freedom of speech.
B. Applying Article 17 after the Discussion around It
In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights rejects anti-Semitic speech, which does not
touch on Holocaust denial, to constitute “the existence of clearly established historical events.”
In the case Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, the applicant was a Russian who edited a newspaper written
to advocate the exclusion of Jewish people. The Court held that his speech was a violation
against the values of tolerance, social peace, and non-discrimination, and it applied Article 17 to
deny his application.294 The difference between Holocaust denying and other anti-Semitic speech
is that when constituting “the existence of clearly established historical events,” the discussion
around applying Article 17 is unnecessary, in the other words, Article 17 directly applies.295
Cases challenging democratic order also apply Article 17. In the case of the German
Communist Party (GCP) v. the Federal Republic of Germany in 1957, the European Court of
Garaudy v. France (Dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX. Cited from id.
Robert Faurisson was punished by French government in 1991. The United Nations Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) held that his speech constituted hate speech and was punishable in 1993. See case of Faurisson v. France,
Communication No. 550/1993 (Nov. 8, 1986). Cited from Friedrich Kübler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech?
Transnational Aspects of a Conflict of Human Rights, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 335, 373 (1998).
293
M’Bala M’Bala v. France (Dec.), no. 25239/13, ECHR 2015. Cited from EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PRESS RESOURCES, a factsheet on hate speech, supra note 290, at 3.
294
Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (Dec.), no. 35222/04, 20 February 2007. The same holding, see W.P. and Others v. Poland
(Dec.), no. 42264/98, ECHR 2004-VII. Cited from id. at 2.
295
Liao, What is Hate Speech? supra note 289, at 470-476.
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Human Rights rejected the freedom of speech claim from the GCP and applied Article 17 to
declare its inadmissibility. The Court stated that to challenge the democratic order contradicted
the values of the Convention.296 However, in the 2005 case, Partidul Comunistilor and
Ungureanu v. Romania, the Court ruled to allow the funding of the Communist Party. The
difference between the two holdings was whether the party promoted itself using violence.297
About the issues of racial hatred and ethnic conflicts, in the case Glimmerveen and
Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, the applicant spread leaflets with the statement “White Dutch
people” and “the others out of Netherland.” His account mainly targeted Surinamers, most of
whom were Dutch citizens.298 The European Court of Human Rights applied Article 17 to ban
the speech due to it directly violating the values of the Convention.299
About the issue of religious hatred, in the case Norwood v. the United Kingdom, the
applicant showed a picture with a statement, “Islam out of Britain. Protect British People.” The
UK government convicted him. The European Court of Human Rights held the application
inadmissible by Article 17 of the Convention. The Court pointed out that the speech went against
the values of tolerance, social peace, and non-discrimination.300
German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, no. 250/57, Commission Decision of 20 July 1957. Cited from
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRESS RESOURCES, a factsheet on hate speech, supra note 290, at 4-5.
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Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v. Romania, no. 46626/99, ECHR 2005-I. Cited from Liao,
What is Hate Speech? supra note 289, at 481-482.
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Kübler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech? supra note 292, at 373-374.
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Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, nos. 8348/78 et 8406/78, Commission Decision of 11 October
1979, DR 18. Cited from EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRESS RESOURCES, a factsheet on hate speech,
supra note 290, at 3.
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Norwood v. the United Kingdom (Dec.), no. 23131/03, ECHR 2004-XI. Cited from EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS PRESS RESOURCES, a factsheet on hate speech, id. at 4.
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3. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and European Court of
Human Rights’ Decisions
A. Apply Article 10 but not Violate it
Section 1 of Article 10 protects freedom of speech, and Section 2 of Article 10 balances the
freedom of speech with other rights and interests. Therefore, applying Article 10 but not
violating it means denying the guarantee of freedom of speech. For example, in the case BalsytéLideikiené v. Lithuania, which addresses racial hatred and ethnic conflicts, the applicant
published a calendar with an opinion that the territories of Poland, Belarus, and Russia all
belonged to Lithuania. Lithuania convicted her. The European Court of Human Rights held that
there was no violation of Article 10 because the speech proposed “aggressive nationalism and
ethnocentrism” and incited hatred to people in the above countries.301
In the case Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1), which addresses national identity, the applicant published
two letters that firmly blamed the Turkish government for oppressing the independence of the
Kurdish people. He was convicted due to incitement of hatred. The European Court of Human
Rights recognized that the applicant promoted using violence and seeking revenge. Turkey was
declared that it did not violate Article 10.302
Moreover, in the case Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, which addressed LGBTQ rights, the
applicant circulated homophobic leaflets in a high school to incite hatred toward homosexuals.
The leaflets claimed, “Homosexuality is a deviant sexual proclivity, a morally destructive effect
on the substance of society, and it was responsible for the development of HIV and AIDS.” 303
The European Court of Human Rights held that the statement made “serious and prejudicial
Balsytė-Lideikienė v. Lithuania, no. 72596/01, 4 November 2008. Cited from id. at 9.
Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, ECHR 1999-IV. Cited from id. at 5.
303
Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, no. 1813/07, 9 February 2012. Cited from EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS PRESS RESOURCES, a factsheet on hate speech, supra note 290, at 6-7.
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allegations.”304 Although the hateful actions had not been triggered, the Court agreed with the
Swedish government to punish the applicant.
B. Apply Article 10 and Violate it
Applying Article 10 and violating it means the Court prefers to guarantee freedom of speech.
If some historical oppressions of Nazism or Fascism are not related to Holocaust Denying and
Revisionism, the “the existence of clearly established historical events” will not apply. In the
case Lehideux and Isorni v. France, the applicants published their article in a newspaper to
support Marshal Pétain and tried to clear his name regarding his cooperation with the Nazis. The
Court, however, refused to use “the existence of clearly established historical events” to apply
Article 17. The holding pointed out that the speech in the article did not deny the Holocaust.
Moreover, the historical event occurred more than 40 years ago and was debatable. Speakers’
freedom of speech should be protected; consequently, the Court only recognized the punishment
of the applicants’ speech violating Article 10.305
Article 10 applies to cases of historical oppression against non-Jewish people. In the case
Perínçek v. Switzerland, the applicant was a Turkish politician. He mentioned that the Ottoman
Empire did not perpetrate genocide on the Armenians in 1915, based on a racist and nationalistic
perspective. The Swiss government punished him. However, the European Court of Human
Rights rejected Switzerland’s decision and held the violation of Article 10 because the
applicant’s statement was only a different viewpoint from the public opinion.306 Also, in the
case Fáber v. Hungary, the applicant brought the striped Á rpád flag, which was linked with the
However, whether “serious and prejudicial allegations” constitutes hate speech? It is still unclear. See Liao,
What is Hate Speech? supra note 289, at 504-506.
305
Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII. Cited from id.
at 7-8.
306
Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, ECHR 2015. Cited from id. at 11.
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totalitarian regime in Hungary, and displayed the flag in a parade aimed against racism and
hatred. The Hungarian government punished him for hate speech. Nevertheless, the European
Court of Human Rights disagreed with the decision and held that the violation of Article 10
because the applicant used no violence and proposed no threat.307
About racial hatred and ethnic conflicts, comparing to the case Balsyté- Lideikiené v.
Lithuania, in the case Jersild v. Denmark, the applicant was a journalist and made a documentary
to interview the racially based group, “Greenjackets.” In the film, Greenjackets made unfriendly
statements against immigrants and other races, including comparing Turks and other foreigners
with rats and advocating the expulsion and extermination of those groups.308 Denmark’s
government convicted the journalist. However, the European Court of Human Rights held that
the purpose of the film was not racism, but rather to introduce social issue from the perspective
of racists. Hence, the Court held the violation of Article 10.309
In the case Gündüz v. Turkey, which relates to religious hatred, the applicant was a member
of an Islamic sect. He made a comment promoting Sharia law rather than secular and democratic
principles, and the Turkish government convicted him. The European Court of Human Rights
supported the applicant’s freedom of speech claim and held the violation of Article 10. The
reason was that the speech did not incite violence and intolerance.310
Comparing the case Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) with the case Otegi Mondragon v. Spain
regarding national identity, a spokesman of a Basque separatist parliamentary group stated “the
supreme head of the Spanish armed forces, in other words, the person in command of the
torturers…defends torture and imposes his monarchic regime on our people through torture and
Fáber v. Hungary, no. 40721/08, 24 July 2012. Cited from id. at 8-9.
Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, Series A no. 298. Cited from id. at 9-10.
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Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, Series A no. 298. Cited from id.
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Gündüz v. Turkey, no. 35071/97, ECHR 2003-XI. Cited from id. at 6.
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violence.” He was subsequently convicted of insulting the King. The Court held that violation of
Article 10 occurred on the Spanish government. The holding pointed out that the applicant’s
speech might be unfriendly, but no incitement of violence was included in the statement.311
4. Conclusion
The European Court of Human Rights offers broad categories of hate speech cases. It has
collected hate speech incidents from different European countries and developed unification
rules and basic standards for hate speech regulation. This could further the discussion of hate
speech regulation by not only limiting it to a single country but approaching it from an
international perspective. It supports the view that although hate speech involves differences in
detail, it is a global problem for all human beings. The European view also reflects that the hate
speech approach in the United States might be one example of American exceptionalism. The
supporters of hate speech regulation tend to recognize the European countries’ success and
advocate changing the current situation of hate speech in the United States.312
VI.

CONCLUSION: WHY THE ABOVE APPROACHES ARE USEFUL TO TAIWAN
As discussed in Chapter Two, the nature of the historical oppressions of people in different

countries profoundly relates to the approaches toward hate speech each country has taken. The
United States, for example, is infamous for some extreme hate speech stances. As a traditional
liberal democracy, the United States is very different than most other democratic countries, but it
has many similarities with Taiwan in freedom of speech rights. Frederick Schauer argues that the
First Amendment is a typical example of American exceptionalism. 313 For Taiwan, considering
the US approach to hate speech could be very useful. First, freedom of speech is a supreme right
Otegi Mondragon v Spain, App No 2034/07 (ECtHR, 15 Mar. 2011). Cited from id. at 12-13.
Krotoszynski, A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment, supra note 162, at 1551.
313
See Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 94, at 57-89.
311
312

69

in US jurisprudence, and the Taiwanese political culture also emphasizes freedom of speech. In
addition, most Taiwanese freedom of speech doctrines were built on the US freedom of speech
theories. In comparing the Taiwanese political system with the German and South African
systems, the Taiwanese system is closer to the US presidential system. However, the drawback
of majority rule is that it may cause a negative outcome for minority groups. Besides, it is
apparent that the American culture has a strong influence over the Taiwanese culture.
Compared to the US approach to hate speech, the German approach is very different.
Contrary to the supremacy of freedom of speech in the US, the German system is a model of
human dignity-based jurisprudence. Karl Loewenstein framed the German approach as a classic
case of militant democracy.314 In this sense, the German system can provide Taiwan with some
reference value, as, first, the Taiwanese constitution also has the militant democracy
jurisprudence. Second, the principle of human dignity in Germany is prioritized more strongly
than the freedom of speech principle, and the Taiwanese Judicial Review has incorporated
human dignity as a constitutional value as well. Third, the previous dictatorship and authoritarian
rule by the Nazi Party and Socialist Unity Party of Germany were similar to the period of martial
law in Taiwan. Fourth, the Holocaust history in Germany is comparable to the February 28
incident in Taiwan. This similarity could be helpful in examining whether the Holocaust-denying
clause applies to Taiwan. Fifth, the speech promoting the Socialist Unity Party of Germany in
East Germany has been recognized as hate speech by the laws in West Germany because it
threatened the free democratic order in West Germany. Nowadays, in a similar way, speech
promoting the Chinese Communist Party may also be a threat to freedom and democratic rule in
Taiwan.
See Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I, supra note 235, at 417, and Loewenstein,
Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II, supra note 235, at 638.
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Like the German system, South Africa also built its human dignity-based jurisprudence after
the third wave of democracy, and South Africa is a militant democracy system. As an emerging
democracy, Taiwan could benefit by understanding the South African situation in the following
ways. First, in South Africa historically, the white minority ruled the black majority, similar to
the ethnic conflicts in Taiwanese history. Also, the legislatures of South Africa have passed
many Acts promoting racial, ethnic, and gender equality, some of which are highly controversial.
The comments and critiques related to these Acts could offer Taiwan valuable guidance in
reconsidering its Ethnic Equality Act. Finally, promoting war is also considered hate speech in
South Africa, and this could provide an example to Taiwan for dealing with this kind of
expression.
The different countries’ approaches to hate speech vary greatly due to their histories and
cultures. However, what is the possibility that they might influence each other? In this respect,
international law could provide a resource for developing an approach to hate speech regulation
from the perspective of transnational constitutionalism. Transnational constitutionalism, also
called world constitutionalism, is a phenomenon arising from both the internationalization of
constitutional law and the constitutionalization of international law.315 The internationalization of
constitutional law reflects the development of treaty-like constitutions in different countries, such
as the incorporation of international human rights treaties into domestic constitutions.316 The hate
speech regulations under international law and international courts have been developed as a
specific approach to countering hate speech as well. The development of international laws
around hate speech may offer useful materials for further analysis.
See, Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 771 (1997).
See Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Internationalization of Constitutional Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1166 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
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After introducing the above approaches, I will further discuss those approaches’ underlying
debates, from strong freedom of speech to strong human dignity and militant democracy.
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CHAPTER FOUR: WHAT LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON
HATE SPEECH?
I.

INTRODUCTION
At present, this historical debate about the levels of limitation in hate speech is occurring in

the United States. The current hate speech approach in the US is to keep freedom of speech
supreme, due to which only the hate crime is punished, but hate speech is allowed. Some
influential scholars in the United States have provided very significant theories to support
freedom of speech supremacy to justify the United States’ methods. Also, I will introduce the
counterarguments from the scholarship.
In addition, different democratic countries have various theories of limitations on what
constitutes hate speech. What are the reasons to restrict hate speech in other democratic
countries? There are two leading theories that are the basis of hate speech restrictions in different
democratic regimes. The first is human dignity. The second is militant democracy. The right to
dignity constitutes a significant foundation for hate speech regulation. The balance between
freedom of expression and human dignity presents a distinction of jurisprudence for some
European countries, such as Germany, that emphasize dignity rights over freedom of speech.
However, human dignity is less strongly emphasized in the United States compared to other
countries.
Secondly, from individualism to collectivism, the European countries have a specific theory
that has allowed them to limit hate speech: militant democracy, which was created by Karl
Loewenstein in 1937. Militant democracy means that democracy should protect itself by limiting
some individual rights. Militant democracy creates a duty for the constitution to protect the

73

institution of democracy—the free and democratic order—and freedom of speech should not
violate it. The theory makes hate speech further relate to preserving the institution of democracy.
Indeed, the United States seems to be an exception to the hate speech strategies across the
world. The United States has an incredibly distinct approach to freedom of speech based on its
First Amendment jurisprudence. Why is the approach to hate speech in the United States
different from the methods in other democratic countries? Frederick Schauer uses American
exceptionalism to explain the difference between the United States’ approach to freedom of
speech and other regimes’.317 The approach of balancing human dignity and freedom of speech is
also a part of methodological exceptionalism within American exceptionalism. I will analyze the
American exceptionalism theory below. The theory is useful in designing hate speech regulation
in Taiwan.
II.

THE ARGUMENT FOR STRONG PROTECTION TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH
1. Overview
Some influential scholars in the United States have provided very significant theories to

support the freedom of speech approach taken in the United States that limits bans on hate
speech. Ronald Dworkin claims that the United States allows hate speech because allowing
freedom of speech provides the United States with democratic legitimacy. Secondly, C. Edwin
Baker argues that the American First Amendment theory is built on guaranteeing its citizens’
autonomy. Thirdly, Robert Post claims that hate speech should not be banned in the United
States to protect the integrity of public discourse. This scholarship proposes that enforcing fewer
limitations on hate speech ensures the values of the United States.
317
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2. Ronald Dworkin’s Argument of Democratic Legitimacy
Scholar Ronald Dworkin acknowledges that hate speech might cause harmful consequences,
but he still proposes that we should tolerate it. His main argument is based on democratic
legitimacy.318
Dworkin agrees that some speech, such as pornographic images or racist speech, could not
offer any value or contribution to the marketplace of ideas, but those expressions are the basis of
the democratic legitimacy of a country’s policymaking. Dworkin insists that “each citizen has
not just a vote, but a voice and that is necessary for ‘a fair democracy.’”319 He also emphasizes
that free expression is the only way to justify the majority decision.320 In his theory, the right to
free expression is just like the right to vote, as these are essential functions needed to maintain a
working democracy. Freedom of speech justifies the government’s actions and provides
democratic legitimacy. Dworkin argues that the government should not use coercive powers to
impose a decision on dissenting individuals unless each individual was treated as a free and
equal member of the community.321
Dworkin points out that freedom of speech is the most significant method of protecting a
dissenting opinion, no matter how terrible the ideas are. He said a government could use
antidiscrimination laws to avoid racism or discrimination toward women and LGBT persons, but
to intervene further “upstream” by forbidding any unfairness or unequitable expression should
not be allowed. He warns: “If we intervene too soon in the process through which collective
opinion is formed, we spoil the only democratic justification we have for insisting that everyone
318

Ronald Dworkin, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY v, vi-vii (Hare, Ivan Hare & James
Weinstein eds., 2009).
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obey these laws, even those who hate and resent them.”322 Therefore, in his theory, freedom of
expression is a necessary condition for a state to achieve democratic legitimacy.
3. C. Edwin Baker’s Argument of Autonomy
Paralleling Dworkin’s point of view, C. Edwin Baker also supports freedom of speech
supremacy. His main argument in favor of freedom of speech is the value of autonomy.323 He
stated that a state’s legitimacy depends on respecting its civilians’ equality and autonomy.
People’s autonomy is based on their free expression to show their values, no matter how terrible,
disrespectful, or harmful those values present themselves from the content of their speech.
People only experience their dignity in the legal system, when it guarantees their equality and
autonomy. Baker insists that a country could not request that its civilians obey legal regulations
unless the legal system was built on people’s autonomy, meaning, unless those people have a
chance to make choices. That is so-called formal autonomy.324
Furthermore, Baker talks about people’s substantive autonomy. For him, substantive
autonomy means “a person’s actual capacity and opportunities to lead the best, most meaningful,
self-directed life possible.”325 To enhance some individuals’ substantive autonomy, nevertheless,
might oppress others. To respect everyone’s expression is a significant part of substantive
autonomy. For example, hate speech speakers perform their autonomy while showing their
unpopular opinions, although, in certain situations, their autonomy might offend others. Baker
Id. at viii.
About relationship between democracy legitimacy and autonomy, Baker said “Democratic legitimacy, I believe,
and certainly the civil libertarian commitment, requires that, in advancing people’s substantive autonomy as well as
in advancing substantive egalitarian aims and other proper policy goals, the legal order neither have the purpose to
nor use general means that disrespect people’s formal autonomy (or their formal equality).” see C. Edwin Baker,
Autonomy and Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 139, 143 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds.,
2009).
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argues that in this situation, a government should avoid having a preference for the collective
self-definitional or majoritarian values.326
Baker also worries that hate speech regulation might force hate speech underground. Thus,
different opinions will not have the chance to understand their enemy and to have an appropriate
opportunity to respond to it.327 Also, Baker mentions that the hate speech ban would cause
people to retreat into more extreme anger and stronger beliefs. They might foment more hatred
and choose to use violence or illegal approaches. Limiting hate speech could reduce a
democracy’s ability to deal with internal conflicts and to use political resolution, and the society
might fall into a violent struggle.328 The hate speech ban might advance the point of racism for
racists if they are deprived of the ability to express their hate speech. The hate speech ban might
become proof of the racist viewpoint.329
Besides, Baker also illustrates his concern that the government might abuse its power by
applying its hate speech ban. In some countries, such as Ethiopia, the hate speech regulation is
usually aimed at extreme dissidents who are under substantial historical oppression. Also, the
hate speech ban might enhance subordinate, weak groups.330
Moreover, Baker said that banning hate speech will weaken the challenging response to
extreme views such as racism. If nobody argues against a wrongful viewpoint, a truce could not
be achieved. People will lose the ability to provide evidence for harmful statements if the
Id.
Id. at 152.
328
Id. at 152-153.
329
Baker claimed: “a political program of enacting and enforcing hate speech prohibitions runs the danger of
diverting political energy from arguably more meaningful political responses to the underlying causes of racism.
Often the purveyors of racism have themselves experienced forms of social or material discrimination (or
deprivation)—and sometimes they even list their depressed material condition as evidence justifying their racist
views. Changing these material conditions is crucial. Though full consideration of the causes of racism is far beyond
the scope of this talk (and my understanding), social and material conditions, including those that generate feelings
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government outlaws those addresses. By way of illustration, if the US defeated communism by
disallowing speech to support it, people in the US might miss the chance to make a
counterargument against communism.331 To address racist speech, people should listen to it and
have a critical response against it.332
Furthermore, Baker challenges the view that prohibiting hate speech could stop systematic
persecution. He doubts that any claim of causation between hate speech and the abuse could be
efficiently proven. In contrast, he recognizes that the limitation of hate speech might be
counterproductive and result in adverse outcomes. A hate speech ban would oppress those
speakers and might trigger more hatred and extreme politics. Hence, officially restricting evil
would cause an evil consequence.333 He insists: “To allow people the option to express their
dreadful views is less dangerous than to attempt to outlaw this expression.”334
Finally, Baker concludes with the reasons that the hate speech ban might cause a poor
outcome, which are:335 First. allowing and then combating hate speech is the best choice to
understand hateful thought. Secondly, limiting hate speech reduces the ability to socially respond
to it. Thirdly, banning hate speech might encourage more violence. Fourthly, not restricting hate
speech could enhance the possibility of resolving a conflict through politics rather than violence.
For Hate speech debate, speech supporting Communism may be not a parallel example. But for Baker, the two
kinds of speech are both extreme speeches. Baker claims “Nevertheless, Douglas illustrates the logic of a view that
favouring free speech provides a central aspect of the best response to a major evil to which objectionable speech is
said to contribute. Crucially, nothing in Douglas’s argument for allowing the expression of evil views counsels
neutrality toward or even social toleration of those objectionable revolutionary views. The same lack of social
toleration even more obviously applies to the expression of racial hatred. Nothing about legally allowing the
speech—either in the Dennis case or in the hate speech context—suggests that the views expressed do not present a
serious threat to the existence of an acceptable world. Rather, the pragmatic claim is that to allow people the option
to express their dreadful views is less dangerous than to attempt to outlaw this expression.” Id. at 146-147.
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Fifthly, governments might abuse their power by limiting speech. Therefore, in his theory,
freedom of expression is a necessary condition of people’s autonomy.
4. Robert Post’s Argument on Protecting the Public Discourse
Beyond Dworkin’s and Baker’s arguments, Robert Post provides another perspective on
supporting freedom of speech supremacy. Post emphasizes protecting the public discourse such
that a state should allow hate speech. In his argument, the First Amendment is a shield for
processing democracy by defending essential communication, the so-called “public
discourse.”336
Post recognizes that continuing public debate is a practice of self-determination that
constitutes a collective will. The process is democracy. Without this structure, the majority
decision will lose its foundation on self-determination and become a majority that rules
minorities through heteronomous submission. Under this theory, the function of public discourse
is to coordinate everyone’s will. Accordingly, public discourse becomes respect between each
free and equal person. Thus, public discourse is “a communicative medium through which the
democratic ‘self’ is itself constituted.”337
Post’s theory, in addition to self-determination, proposed another concept: a community.338 A
community works based on civility rules that protect its members’ personal integrity and ensure
the community’s identity. Post’s civility rules connect with human dignity.339 He argues in
336

Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 278 (1991).
Id. at 284-285.
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dignity based on the communal norms between the members of a community. Dignity rights are
not subjective but are objective norms founded on members’ claims.340
Post emphasizes the tension between a community and democracy: “Democracy seeks to
open the space of public discourse for collective self-constitution; community seeks to bound
that space through the enforcement of civility rules.” 341 The public discourse aims to achieve
reconciliation through public reason, but a community’s civility rules will outlaw some speech as
both irrational and coercive. Post defines the situation as “a paradox of public discourse: the first
amendment, in the name of democracy, suspends legal enforcement of the very civility rules that
make rational deliberation possible.” 342
Robert Post instead argues that the public discourse should protect all forms of
communication, as public discourse might lose its function by excluding any conversation.343
Post responds to the argument of limiting hate speech in the interest of preventing individuals’
harm. He mentions that punishing hate speech would confuse the distinction between individual
and collective identity. The damage to an individual in hate speech simultaneously hurts the
community identity. Therefore, the government should choose to execute the rules from the
communities to avoid harmful results, but it should not use legal mechanisms to perform specific
civility rules. He said individual injury is “an unavoidable cost of the political constitution of
community identity.”344 The antiracist movement, however, is precisely raised by selfdetermination. Hence, if the purpose is to make the public discourse self-guided, using speech
rejecting hatred and discrimination is a more appropriate method than using legal regulations.345
Post, Hate speech, supra note 34, at 129.
Post, Racist Speech, supra note 336, at 286.
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Post further replies to the argument about rejecting the marketplace of ideas, which stated
that irrational and hateful expressions would exclude minorities’ opinions. Once again, Post
emphasizes the importance of the public discourse. He still prefers protecting freedom of speech
because limiting hate speech undermines the principle of autonomy and protecting irrational
speech would not automatically deny the possibility for rational discussion.346
Moreover, Post recognizes that people would always communicate with one another by
considering those people’s understanding of social context. Hence, the public discourse, under
his perspective, could not be responsible for minorities’ silence. Rather, the reason for
minorities’ silence was a consequence of racism and social structure, not freedom of speech. 347
Finally, Post discusses the theory of symbolic cultural oppression. He rejects limiting some
people’s autonomy in a speech to protect others’ autonomy. He claimed that to restrict the public
discourse is one of many strategies to result cultural oppression. He also proposes that the other
way to achieve this goal was through “anti-discrimination laws, affirmative action programs,
redistribution of economic resources, and restraints on racist forms of nonpublic speech.” 348
To fix the paradox of public discourse, Post insists the government should guarantee the
idea of content neutrality. He elaborates by stating that democracy is a structure of
communication and prohibiting hate speech would have a negative influence on the value of selfdetermination, which requires the public discourse to be open to everyone. Hate speech
regulation violates the value of self-rule and the function of the First Amendment.349 Therefore,
the hate speech law might exclude people from the political procedure and keep them from
Id. at 302-304.
Id. at 306-311.
348
Id. at 312-318.
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Id. at 290-292.
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challenging certain norms of civility.350 Therefore, in Robert Post’s theory, freedom of
expression is a necessary condition to fix the paradox of public discourse.
5. Conclusion
In my view, Dworkin’s and Baker’s arguments are both correct: democratic legitimacy and
people’s autonomy constitute the difference between a democratic country and an authoritarian
regime.351 More speech regulation means that the government has less democratic legitimacy and
the people have less autonomy. In addition, Post’s theory concerning public discourse is a
procedure of democracy to achieve democratic legitimacy and people’s autonomy. Therefore,
public discourse should be open to all members of society, who are thereby able to engage in
self-rule and provide legitimacy to their government.
An authoritarian regime may have a hate speech law on the basis that some speech hurts
oppressed groups in the country. However, if a state does not have democratic legitimacy and its
people have no autonomy to design its politics, the hate speech law is simply a way of enabling
the government to abuse its power and to deprive people of their autonomy.352 Thus, debating
hate speech law means nothing to an authoritarian government since, without the guarantee of
freedom of speech, the government does not have democratic legitimacy, and the people do not
have autonomy. Hence, if there are no strong reasons to limit hate speech, a democratic country
However, Steven J. Heyman responded to Post’s theory by mentioning that hate speech refuses to recognize other
members in society, and the public discourse only works without this rejection. Heyman disagreed that hate speech
regulations would be “imposing the norms of community on democratic deliberation,” but rather, “the duty to
respect others can be understood as an integral feature of public discourse itself.” To recognize one another is
characteristic of a community. Without its essence, the community would not exist. Steven J. Heyman, Hate Speech,
Public Discourse, and the First Amendment, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 123, 173 (Ivan Hare & James
Weinstein eds., 2009).
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should allow them. The Taiwanese political system is open and free rather than closed and
autocratic. Democratic legitimacy, people’s autonomy, and open public discourse are significant
in Taiwan. They are the most useful for creating a new model of hate speech for Taiwan.
Another disadvantage of limiting hate speech is the overlapping and confusing line between
hate speech and dissent. Nevertheless, if there is no rule for separating the two concepts,
oppression may rise from having banned some speech. Robert Post recognizes that it is
challenging to distinguish hate speech and dissenting opinions. He thinks disagreement could not
justify regulating hate speech and punishing different points of view.353 With the same point of
view, Edwin Baker worries that hate speech regulation might be misused to describe pure
disagreement as hate speech as well.354 That is, hate speech regulation may be used to oppress
the extreme members of the oppressed groups, who use extreme speech to express their
disagreement.355
I agree with Baker’s concern. Should hate speech be defined relatively by the relationship
between the speaker and object? As the above discussion explains, hate speech targets a discrete
and insular minority, or the group has been historically oppressed. However, if there is a case:
Group A, which is a majority group, oppresses Group B, a minority group; Group B oppresses
Group C (more minor than B), is there any difference between Group A and Group C while each
of them is applying the same hate expression to B? For example, does a situation involving
Palestinians using anti-Semitic speech to protest the oppression from Israel still count as hate
speech? Furthermore, the hate speech regulations in South African history were the other
Post, Hate Speech, supra note 34, at 126-127.
Baker said: “that labor agitators ferment class hatred and, potentially, class violence; lesbians ferment hatred of
and violence against men; black nationalists make racist attacks on whites; Algerians insult the French.” Baker,
Autonomy and Hate Speech, supra note 323, at 154.
355
Id.
353
354

83

instance to prove my point. The regulations were used to oppress the black groups and prevent
them from having any dissent against “apartheid” or other unfair treatments.
Another example is the question surrounding whether using the term “the Wuhan virus” or
“Chinese virus” is discrimination.356 Some comments have said that the term constitutes hate
speech aimed at the Chinese American community or other Asian communities.357 In contrast,
some people have used this term to hold Beijing accountable for the Coronavirus outbreak in
2020.358 The term in the United States may be hate speech while the white majority uses it
attaching Chinese Americans. However, the term from the other perspective may also be a way
for people to protest the Chinese Communist Party in covering up the information and the other
faults in the global pandemic of COVID-19.359
Matsuda recognizes that historical oppression is a factor in making a distinction between
dissent and hate speech. Dissenting opinion criticizes the powerful institutions or government.
But hate speech targets weak communities. Therefore, she focused on “the historical contexts of
subordination.”360 For example, she compared racial hate speech with Marxist speech. She
recognizes that Marxist speech is only an “unpopular political expression,” but racism is wrong
by virtue of the history of slavery, the Holocaust, and apartheid.361 Also, Matsuda recognizes
Josh Rogin, Don’t blame ‘China’ for the coronavirus — blame the Chinese Communist Party, WASHINGTON POST
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/dont-blame-china-for-the-coronavirus-blame-the-chinese-communist-party/2020/03/19/343153ac-6a12-11ea-abef020f086a3fab_story.html?fbclid=IwAR27JjvffjtiPQB6LmKyMHlIa_pdnMmeIL8iML_q2Oc-qd6DYWox-EOynHk.
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SCHOOL OF MEDICINE (Mar. 12, 2020). https://medicine.yale.edu/news-article/23074/. The same point of view, the
editorial board, Call It 'Coronavirus, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020).
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/opinion/china-coronavirus-racism.html.
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offensive speech between two subordinated groups as hate speech based on specific historical
factors.362 For example, this encompasses offensive speech between Jews and African
Americans. Matsuda agreed that anti-Semitic literature that defames the victims of the Holocaust
is hate speech.363 However, a statement promoting Zionism could be recognized as either a
“reaction to historical persecution” or “white dominance over brown and black,” based on the
specific condition. The victim privilege will be denied if the Zionist speech promotes white
supremacy.364
Yet, could the “historically oppressed groups” change to the point that they do not need
protection someday in the future? Matsuda also agreed that time might change the historical
oppression. She said, “Should history change course, placing former victim groups in a dominant
or equalized position, the newly equalized group will lose the special protection suggested here
for an expression of nationalist anger.”365 However, although sometimes the group’s status may
improve, the subordination and harm may continue to exist. For instance, the Jewish people or
Asian-Americans may change their economic situation now while anti-Semitism and race
discrimination against Asians persists.366
In sum, we should be careful with hate speech and dissent because they are sometimes
overlapping and confusing terms. The same term may sometimes be used for different purposes
and targets. To ban the word would deprive speakers’ rights to go against persecution or
injustice. Therefore, without considering the historical contexts of subordination, the hate speech
regulation might cause new oppression.
Id. at 2364.
Id. at 2366.
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III.

THE ARGUMENT FOR STRONG LIMITATION OF HATE SPEECH
1. Overview
In contrast to the argument of supporting freedom of speech supremacy, the

counterarguments are also notable. Scholars of Critical Race Theory (CRT) argue that American
society is still rife with racism and white supremacy. They challenge the theories of neutrality
and color blindness and, thus, recognize that hate speech is part of the oppression of minorities in
the US. Their point could apply to any country with racist viewpoints. Further, Jeremy Waldron
points out that hate speech undermines democracy. He uses the idea of assurance to support his
thoughts on limiting hate speech. In contrast to the preceding section that suggests that limiting
hate speech impedes democracy, these scholars argue that not limiting hate speech is worse for
democracy.
2. Introduction of Critical Race Theory (CRT)
What is Critical Race Theory (CRT)? CRT scholars367 emphasize that American society is
still full of racism and that they would like to fix it. Racism is a common phenomenon in
American society and CRT focuses on how traditional values became tools of racial
subordination, rather than maintaining the current situation. 368 CRT’s purpose is to end
oppression.369 CRT challenge the legal system’s traditional views, such as “equality theory, legal
reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law.”370 CRT
rejects the theories of neutrality and color blindness.371 Its proponents contend that the legal
CRT scholars include but are not limited to Derrick Bell, Alan Freeman, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Angela Harris,
Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, and Richard Delgado. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra
note 39, at 5-6.
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system’s neutrality may repress minority groups.372 The majority would lack the motivation to
end racism because they benefit from it.373 Racial oppression is only one type—gender, class,
and sexual orientation are also included.374
In the legal field of freedom of speech, CRT challenges the traditional view of racial hate
speech and protect the rights of minority groups. I will introduce some of the CRT scholars’
opinions in the following sections.
3. Mari Matsuda’s Critical Race Theory
Matsuda rejects protecting racial hate speech because of wrongful acts against minorities in
history. Slavery, the Holocaust, and apartheid are all morally wrong. This is a general rule and a
sign of progressive human beings. Therefore, no justification could excuse hate speech. 375
Matsuda proposes that hate speech should be disallowed as an exception to the First
Amendment. She mentions that the current legal scholars recognized hate speech as protected
speech, which they did not for other offensive statements. The double standard of white
dominance is a part of interest convergence theory. Although they knew certain rights should
balance with freedom of speech in creating some unprotected speech, they refused to ban hate
speech and ignored the minority’s suffering.376
In addition, CRT scholars believe that “racism has contributed to all contemporary manifestations of group
advantage and disadvantage along racial lines.” CRT insists on including the real experience of minorities’ lives to
have “critical reflection on the lived experience of racism.” CRT is cross-disciplinary, involving liberalism, law and
society, feminism, Marxism, poststructuralism, critical legal theory, pragmatism, and nationalism. CRT’s final goal
is to end “all forms of oppression.” MATSUDA, LAWRENCE III, DELGADO & CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND, supra
note 40, at 6-7.
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Matsuda claims that hate speech undermines the values of freedom and equality. She states
that freedom of speech supremacy constitutes an unfair treatment of minorities and burdens the
cost of speech promoting.377 The distribution violates equal protection under the 14th
Amendment and undermines the duty to fix this historical mistake. 378
Matsuda further points out that banning hate speech should be recognized as a “state action.”
She says that if a racist group promoting violence, persecution, and hatred was allowed and had
protection from a government power, the meaning would be that the state supports racism, for
example, in the case of the National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie.379Without
this state’s support, hate groups would become weak. A lack of hate speech regulation showing
that the government does not ensure minorities’ safety might cause secondary harm to the
victims. Therefore, in this situation, the government should recognize hate speech as a state
action and allow victims to claim a remedy.380
In conclusion, Masuda advances her efforts to resolve the hate speech issue. She suggests
using criminal liability rather than civil liabilities to prosecute hate speech messages. She states
that if “a narrow, explicitly defined class of racist hate speech” was submitted as a crime, it
would prevent “the most serious harm.” She narrows the regulation and the prerequisites for
Matsuda said: “In making typical legal concessions to the first amendment, we burden a range of victims. In the
case of flag-burning, we force patriots, veterans, and flag-lovers of all races to tolerate flag desecration as part of the
price of freedom. In contrast, when victims of racist speech are left to assuage their own wounds, we burden a
limited class: the traditional victims of discrimination. This class already experiences diminished access to private
remedies such as effective counterspeech, and this diminished access is exacerbated by hate messages. Debasing
speech discredits targets, further reducing their ability to have their speech taken seriously. 274 The application of
absolutist free speech principles to hate speech, then, is a choice to burden one group with a disproportionate share
of the costs of speech promotion.” Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2376.
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prosecution as follows: “[t]he message is of racial inferiority; the message is directed against a
historically oppressed group; the message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.”381
4. Richard Delgado’s Critical Race Theory
Distinct from Matsuda’s criminal law approach, Richard Delgado proposes his approach by
applying torts law. Richard Delgado is another CRT advocate. He points out that liberal, moral,
and legal rights could be on opposite sides of their original functions. He recognizes that when
rights contradict the interests of the powerful, minorities always face repression.382
Delgado says that hate speech causes feelings of humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred in
the victims. Although some oppressed groups have high social or economic conditions, the
psychological harm cannot usually be fixed.383 This leads to psychological harm, negative
influence and physiological effects. Oppressed groups are more likely to experience
hypertension, hypertensive disease, and stroke.384 The worst effect of racial hate speech and
discrimination is a negative influence on parenting practices toward children. According to
Delgado, this situation perpetuates a tradition of failure.385
In addition, Delgado points out that hate speech violates the constitutional value of equal
protection. He suggests that hate speech represses other people’s opinions, so victims do not
participate in the government’s decision-making processes.386 Hate speech causes “badges and
Id. at 2357.
Delgado’s examples are “hate speech, which targets mainly minorities, gays, lesbians, and other outsiders, is
almost always tolerated, while speech that offends the interests of empowered groups finds a ready exception in
First Amendment law. Think, for example, of speech that insults a judge or other authority figure, that defames a
wealthy and well-regarded person, that disseminates a government secret, or Deceptively advertises products, thus
creating a large class of middle-income consumers.” DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note
39, at 23-24.
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incidents of slavery,” and political power to belong only to some people. Racism goes against the
idea that “all men are created equal.” 387 Delgado also critiques the marketplace of ideas as a
reason to protect hate speech. He said victims usually lack enough ability to go against the harm
from hate speech. More speech is useless because minorities would be afraid of further
offense.388
Delgado’s approach limits hate speech by utilizing civil liability. He proposes constituting
civil liabilities caused by racial hate speech, such as some causes of action to assault and battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of constitutional and statutory
provisions.389 However, he also notes that the difficulties of using civil liability to limit racial
hate speech are measuring damages, apportioning damages, and avoiding fraudulent claims.390 I
may choose to use the civil liability approach rather than the criminal one. If criminal liability is
used to regulate hate speech, it risks encouraging the governmental abuse of power. The method
will be more suitable for Taiwanese society, which has had historical oppression against freedom
of speech in the Martial Law period.
5. Charles R. Lawrence’s Critical Race Theory
Like Delgado, Charles R. Lawrence also emphasizes the power structure of white
supremacy and the mental harm of hate speech. Lawrence suggests that “white privilege and
white supremacy” are the foundation of “the power structures” of society.391 He claims
individual racial discriminations as a whole totality, the institutionalization of the ideas of white
Delgado said: “Racism and racial stigmatization harm not only the victim and the perpetrator of individual racist
acts but also society as a whole. Racism is a breach of the ideal of egalitarianism, that “all men are created equal”
and each person is an equal moral agent, an ideal that is a cornerstone of the American moral and legal system.” Id.
at 140-141.
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supremacy. He contends that some racist acts were recognized as neutrality because the status
quo keeps maintaining racism.392
Lawrence proposes banning hate speech. Like Matsuda, Lawrence critiques the state action
doctrine. He argues that the court system should consider intervening in the constitutional issues
between private individuals.393 He said that hate speech is harmful because it might affect silent
minorities who would keep silent or run away due to the threat. He contradicts freedom of
speech supremacy and posits that the First Amendment only causes domination rather than being
a vehicle of liberation. He advocates against underestimating the harm of hate speech and
listening to the victims of hateful expression.394
Instead, Lawrence emphasizes psychic injury as well. He stated that the victims of hate
speech usually suffer everything from “rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, to nightmares,
post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, and suicide.” 395 Moreover, Lawrence discusses the
marketplace of ideas. He claims the hate speech would reduce the total amount of expression in
the marketplace of ideas because the minority would not speak when met with hate speech. 396
CRT provides a methodology to challenge the traditional view of the First Amendment
theory, as well as a positive perspective on understanding the harm of hate speech and finding a
way to restrict it.
392
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6. Jeremy Waldron’s Argument of Assurance
Jeremy Waldron proposes banning hate speech because hate speech undermines the dignity
of vulnerable minorities and denies their equal positions; therefore, it is harmful. A state ban on
hate speech is an assurance to protect vulnerable minorities’ dignity.397
For Waldron, hate speech regulation is a concept of group libel, which does not relate to an
individual’s reputation. In contrast, it is an understanding of a group’s social position. For him,
human dignity is defined as: “dignity, in the sense of these persons' basic social standing, of the
basis of their recognition as social equals, and of their status as bearers of human rights and
constitutional entitlements.”398
Thus, Waldron keeps insisting that protecting dignity is not the same as safeguarding from
the pure offense. He recognizes that the hate speech issue is about individuals’ and groups’ social
positions rather than their feelings.399 For example, hate speech regulation should avoid the
defamation of Christian communities’ social standing but not prohibit critiquing their religious
figures and tenets, such as any pope, saint, or doctrine. 400 He emphasizes that: “they are
organized to protect the dignity and reputation of the persons themselves, not to impose an aura
of untouchability around their convictions.” 401
Therefore, Waldron rejects an individual’s subjective aspects of feelings, such as hurt, shock,
and anger, as the harm in hate speech. In contrast, he recognizes that these feelings would
“naturally accompany an assault on dignity.” 402 Waldron cites Stephen Darwall’s theory. He
separated “appraisal respect,” which states that “one’s estimation of people varies by their
WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH supra note 12, at 1-6.
Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at 1610.
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merits, their virtues and vices, their crimes, their views, and so on” and “recognition respect,”
which is “fundamental to the dignity of persons and invariant in the face of differential merit,
even commanding how people are to be treated when they are guilty of terrible crimes.”403
Consequently, in his view, hate speech regulation is a protection for individuals not from the
offense or a painful feeling, but from an assault on the dignity and social cohesion of their
communities.404 Waldron proposes that hate speech regulation is aimed to protect groups’
objective social positions,405 an essential difference between CRT scholars and Waldron’s
theory. His view differs a great deal from the perspective of victims’ experience. For instance, in
his book, critiquing the idea of Islam is not the same as abusing Muslims. Comments about
Muslims’ beliefs might cause Muslims to feel bad. However, only assaulting their objective
social position constitutes hate speech.406 The speech is not a hateful expression at all. Hence,
hate speech regulation should only focus on protecting the basics of a community’s social
standing, not people’s feelings.
Waldron analyzes the relationship between a well-ordered society and hate speech.407 The
purpose of a state was to ensure that every member of the community could enjoy equal
treatment. Based on Rawls, Waldron introduces his theory of hate speech regulation: assurance.
He further elaborates on the idea, stating that a member of a well-ordered society could
reasonably expect not to be discriminated against, humiliated, or terrorized. Thus, society
Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at, 1628-1629.
Id. at 1609-1613.
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406
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cohesion of their communities. See Chapter Two, section VI. Hate Speech and Offence. Id. at 105-143.
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members feel safe and are willing to face social interactions. 408 Hate speech, however,
undermines this public good. It destroys assurance and rejects vulnerable minorities’ equal
position as members of the society. The government banning hate speech would prohibit these
destructive actions.409
Further, Waldron responds to the theory of freedom of speech supremacy. He critiques
Dworkin’s opinion of hate speech, which was a democratic legitimacy argument. Waldron
claims that democratic legitimacy is just the support from the public, not a normative property.410
But how should the destruction of democratic legitimacy be defined? Waldron lists several
hypotheses: first, hate speech might violate the legitimacy of some downstream laws and not
others.411 The second possibility is that the law’s legitimacy is about a matter of degrees. Hate
speech reduces the legitimacy of downstream laws but does not destroy them.412
Waldron emphasizes that if democratic legitimacy is not “an all-or-nothing matter,”413 a hate
speech regulation is aimed to protect vulnerable minorities’ basic social standing or so-called
elementary dignity. It will not seriously damage democratic legitimacy.414 Thus, Dworkin’s
argument is unconvincing.
Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at 1627.
Id. 1626-1630 (2009).
410
A normative property is either “the existence of a political obligation to obey the laws” or “the appropriateness of
using force to uphold them.” Id. at 1642.
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hatred. There are also laws forbidding racial discrimination, not to mention laws forbidding racial and ethnic
violence and intimidation, and laws against criminal damage protecting mosques and synagogues from desecration;
these are the downstream laws, the laws whose legitimacy Dworkin believes is hostage to the enforcement of hate
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Waldron also responds to Edwin Baker’s theory of autonomy. Baker insists that freedom of
speech is a way to show people’s value, so hate speech is an expression of a speaker’s value, no
matter how bad it is. However, Waldron notes that the harm and damage in hate speech would
not disappear. Hate speech still undermines the public good and the state’s assurance. Baker’s
attitude toward this self-discourse constitutes the destruction of the state’s assurance to
vulnerable minorities. As a result, Baker’s claim that “to allow the dreadful expression is less
dangerous than to outlaw it” is considered wrong.415
Last but not least, Waldron contradicts Robert Post’s public discourse argument. Waldron
recognizes that hate speech regulation would not exclude people from the political process or
avoid challenging certain norms of civility. He mentioned that to challenge a hate speech
regulation without using hate speech is possible. Although the norms of civility might be the
target of a democratic challenge, they might still work until they are overturned. That is, if the
challenge’s only problem is the expression’s mode and manner, using norms of civility will
regulate a debate on these norms. On the contrary, norms of civility are significant for assuring
vulnerable minorities.416
7. Hate Speech and Assurance
With regard to the issue of hate speech, my idea falls closest to Jeremy Waldron’s assurance
theory: The reason that a state regulates hate speech is to provide an assurance to its civilians and
to ensure the equal position of oppressed groups.417 Under the assurance, vulnerable minorities
would not be excluded from public discussion.
WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 144-172.
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Dworkin’s and Baker’s arguments are both correct: freedom of speech is important to
democratic legitimacy and people’s autonomy in democratic nations. However, as Waldron
argues, democratic legitimacy is not “an all-or-nothing matter.”418 European countries do not
allow hate speech, but most of them are still democracies. They would not lose any democratic
legitimacy purely because of a hate speech law. Moreover, European people have autonomy,
even though they may not be able to express and spread hatred due to the restrictions on hate
speech. Thus, Dworkin’s and Baker’s views cannot explain how European countries still work as
functioning democracies while having hate speech laws.
However, if the issue of democratic legitimacy is a matter of degree, not all-or-nothing, is
there a line dividing legitimate and illegitimate regimes? Presumably, if it is a matter of degree,
there are degrees of democratic legitimacy between democracy and non-democracy. Post argues
that the term “democratic deficits” is intended precisely for this situation: European countries
prefer to tolerate some “democratic deficits” to reduce violations of the norms of civility, which
relates to human dignity.419 By contrast, people in the United States insist that the norms of
civility should not intervene in the marketplace of ideas in order to undermine individuals’
autonomy. Hence, freedom of speech is superior to the value of human dignity in the United
States.
There is a tension between individual autonomy and collective human dignity. Hate speech is
aimed at protecting dignity at the expense of freedom of speech, at surrendering democratic
legitimacy to defend human dignity. A state deploying hate speech laws would thus carry a
greater democratic deficit.
418
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Too large a democratic deficit could turn a democratic country into an authoritarian one. If a
state has too many limitations on speech, it may finally lose its freedom due to the reduction in
democratic legitimacy and the people’s autonomy. In sum, a country can restrict hate speech but
the limitations on hate speech should be only enough to provide assurances to oppressed groups.
8. Giving up the Content Neutrality in Freedom of Speech Theory
Since hate speech regulation should provide “enough assurance” to oppressed groups, the
corresponding approach cannot not treat all contexts of speech as equal. Additionally, all groups’
autonomy in a state should not be treated as equivalent. Freedom of speech protection should
reject content neutrality. American First Amendment jurisprudence insists that a government
should not support any value or ideology. In the case R.A.V. vs. Saint Paul, Justice Scalia denies
hate speech regulation because of the “content neutrality” of all speech regulation.420
Some support theories are based on the above argument. For example, Baker says that
limiting hate speech could reduce the ability of a democracy to deal with internal conflicts and
use political resolution.421 In his view, political resolution should be open to a complete range of
opinions. I do not agree with this. In reality, allowing hate speech sometimes makes a situation
worse. Critical Race Theory (CRT) highlights this: hate speech can lead to the silencing of
vulnerable groups because they do not want to participate in communication at all.422
Baker also argues that banning hate speech could lead to more violence, with the hatred
being driven underground.423 I argue, however, that hate speech causes more destruction. Some
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
Baker, Autonomy and Hate Speech, supra note 323, at 155.
422
Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 391, at 472-473.
423
Baker, Autonomy and Hate Speech, supra note 323, at 152-153.
420
421

97

hate speech not only spreads hatred but also directly incites violence, and because of the fear of
violence, minorities sometimes choose to remain silent.424
Indeed, content neutrality should only apply where everyone is genuinely equal. If a legal
system or social structure is not equal for every member, content neutrality will cause an unequal
outcome. For example, in a white supremacist society, where a government maintains content
neutrality in freedom of speech, it is strengthening and extending an unfair situation. Interest
convergence makes things worse. The more powerful and influential groups will not be likely to
defend the vulnerable because they can enjoy the benefits of the unequal social structure.
The CRT argument is correct: the legal system’s neutrality may repress minority groups in
the US. We cannot insist that the government retain content neutrality and ignore oppressed
groups.425 Nevertheless, I argue that excessive limitations on speech will lead to a state losing
democratic legitimacy and its people their autonomy; thus, only sufficient assurance should be
provided for oppressed groups.
On this point, I propose two understandings of the idea to reject “content neutrality.” First,
rejecting “content neutrality” means that not all kinds of speech are equal. A hate speech law can
be constitutional because the law does not constitute viewpoint discrimination under the
perspective of rejecting “content neutrality.” This idea is the same as that advanced by CRT.
Second, under my proposal, rejecting content neutrality means that a state is not required to
maintain neutrality with regard to “hate speech.” On the contrary, a government should consider
the degree of harm caused by different categories of hate speech and the different levels of
assurance required for distinct oppressed groups. For instance, Matsuda proposes to ban the most
harmful racist speech, namely, that concerning racial inferiority, directed against a historically
424
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oppressed group as prosecutorial, hateful, and degrading.426 Her proposal is aimed to balance the
harm of hate speech and First Amendment protections. In my sense, she also implies that the
different forms of hate speech could be separated and could receive various treatments. I agree.
The issue of regulating hate speech is also not an all-or-nothing matter. Not all hate speech
should be limited, but the most serious ones should be. No oppressed groups would thus be
excluded from public discussion, including the most fragile.
9. Offense, and Human Dignity
To find the most balanced point between human dignity and freedom of speech, it is also
necessary to consider the difference between offense and human dignity. CRT emphasizes
individual harm. I do not agree. I argue Waldron’s view to be correct: dignity is not the same as
individual harm. Waldron thought that protecting dignity meant supporting vulnerable
minorities’ social standing, not their feelings or beliefs. 427
Indeed, hate speech regulation does not aim to create an untouchable zone for specific
groups. It is intended to encourage them to participate in public discourse and to accept criticism
from others even though the criticism might be strong and sharp. A state should make sure that
everyone can debate and discuss in a reasonable manner, without anyone being untouchable.
Therefore, hate speech law should only outlaw speech that denies a group’s social standing.428
A similar point comes from Robert Post’s theory. Post argues that dignity is not merely
subjective but based on the claims of a community’s members. Hate speech regulations are
community norms for Post. The norms are also objective, to some extent, because they belong to
people who share the same characteristics.429 Therefore, individual harm may happen without
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2357.
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directly injuring human dignity. That said, individual injury is still essential to the issue of hate
speech. Sometimes harm to individuals can be evidence proving the violation of human dignity.
That is, hate speech can offend a group’s community norms and sometimes can also cause harm
to individuals.
The advantage of separating individual harm and harm to human dignity is that it creates a
more objective standard for hate speech regulation. The assurance it provides gives protection
that could apply to all members in a community and is based on not only an individual’s feelings,
but shared norms. The distinction makes both the offense and human dignity easier to identify
and more foreseeable.
IV.

HUMAN DIGNITY VS FREEDOM OF SPEECH
1. Overview
While the United States has freedom of speech supremacy compared to the hate speech

strategies across the world, the other democratic countries have two leading theories for hate
speech restrictions. The first is human dignity. Human dignity constitutes an important right for
supporting hate speech regulation. The second one is militant democracy. Some of the countries
are using both theories, such as Germany. I will introduce human dignity in the following
section.
2. Human Dignity in Different Countries
One significant distinction between the US approach and the other approaches, including the
German method, the South African strategy, and the European Court of Human Rights’ plan, is
the importance of human dignity and freedom of speech. Freedom of speech supremacy is
unique to the US approach and an example of American exceptionalism. In contrast, other
methods emphasize human dignity.

100

The United States Constitution does not include text regarding human dignity. Although both
Justices Brennan430 and Justice Kennedy431 discussed the value of human dignity in a Supreme
Court decision, the value of human dignity has not been upheld as a constitutional right.432
Aharon Barak claims that human dignity in the US was an underlying constitutional value and a
tool to explain the rights in the Constitution. The underlying value is growing in importance but
not in across-the-board recognition.433
In contrast, the German Constitution holds that human dignity shall be inviolable.434 Human
dignity is an absolute right in Germany. No other rights are higher than dignity rights. An eternal
right, human dignity exists even after people die. Further, it constitutes the supreme value in the
entire Constitution and is used to explain all constitutional rights.435 Dignity-based jurisprudence
is also the core of the South Africa Constitution.436
3. Robert Post’s Argument
Why is human dignity superior to freedom of speech in the German approach? Robert Post’s
theory provides the first path to reaching an explanation. Post recognizes human dignity as a
communal norm.437 Dignity is not merely subjective but based on the claims of members in a
community. Post points out that cultures would establish institutions such as schools and laws to
offer authoritative interpretations of norms. Thus, the hate speech regulation is a kind of
“I have always thought that one of this court’s most important roles is to provide a formidable bulwark against
governmental violation of the constitutional safeguards securing in our free society the legitimate expectations
of every person to innate human dignity and sense of worth.” Paul v. Davis, 424 US 693, 734 (1978). Cited from
BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 164, at 200.
431
“Adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and
still retain their dignity as free persons.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 567 (2003). Cite from id. 202 (2015).
432
Id. at 186-187.
433
Id. at 205-206.
434
See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, art. 1 (Ger.).
435
BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 164, at 226-232.
436
See Chapter Three.
437
Post, Hate Speech, supra note 34, at 129.
430

101

authoritative interpretation of a norm. Human dignity, under Post’s definition, is based on a
cultural or group-based communal norm.
Post compares the US approach to those of the European countries. He claims that European
countries’ attitudes tend toward banning hate speech because their legal systems are very
comfortable using the law to enforce “hegemonic community norms” in their societies. 438 In
contrast, the US prefers protecting democratic legitimacy and the public discourse. The
guarantee of freedom of speech in the US created a “marketplace of communities,” or a so-called
“marketplace of ideas.”439 The main reason is concern about the government abusing its power to
oppress speech. Post argues that the other countries’ approaches, based on human dignity, suffer
from enormous democratic deficits, with concern from their civilians due to the culture of
trusting the political elite.440 The US has chosen another way due to the preference for populism.
4. Guy E. Carmi’s Argument
Guy E. Carmi criticizes Post’s theory, arguing that Post’s view was based on US
constitutional theory but was not applicable to other countries. People in Germany, France, and
Canada would not recognize their systems as illegitimate or nondemocratic due to hate speech
bans.441 Carmi provides his comparative approach as follows.
Carmi first compares the different historic developments of freedom of speech approaches
between the US and the other democratic countries. He claims that the First Amendment theory
was developed from libertarianism and the Enlightenment. The founding fathers’ perceptions of
Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
440
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liberty affected the freedom of speech doctrines in the US. Classical libertarian understandings
give rise to the main guarantee of negative rights442 in American jurisprudence.
In contrast, the other democratic countries developed their freedom of speech doctrines in the
past decade. Those countries abandoned pure and classical libertarianism and added the idea of
socialism. They recognize positive rights and became welfare states. They emphasize human
dignity, the concept of which was based on Hegelian, Kantian, and even on theological JudeoChristian perceptions of rights.443 Kant’s view of human dignity was based on
communitarianism. Kant denies the violation of human dignity and asked the government to
intervene in rights conflicts and to protect dignity. Dignity becomes a duty for all members in
society under Kant’s theory.444
The diverse perspectives on freedom of speech are the outcome of the above differences. US
freedom of speech scholars focus on autonomy. They insist that a state cannot paternalistically
teach its citizens which point of view is correct or incorrect.445 Also, the idea of dignity in the
First Amendment would relate to the autonomy justification. For example, Ronald Dworkin
emphasizes that a state could not have a viewpoint of discrimination toward individuals, or it
might undermine those speakers’ human dignity.446
In the United States, the discussion of autonomy mainly focuses on the individual speaker,
not the audience.447 Further, autonomy is also recognized as “dignity” in US freedom of speech
theory. In contrast, the other democratic countries’ idea of dignity would be significant different
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s proposed Second Bill of Rights as a basis of Positive rights, but the Bill is not in the
US Constitution. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees? in
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from that of the US. Consequently, Carmi said: “for an American, human dignity may seem like
a justification for protecting speech whereas for a European, human dignity may seem like a
justification for limiting it.”448
In the United States, human dignity is a value but not a right that is enforceable.449 The US
academics have conflated human dignity and autonomy, but the other democratic countries
separate them.450 Therefore, a human-dignity-based democracy might limit freedom of speech to
protect and promote the value of communities.451
Carmi provides three variables to analyze the human dignity and freedom of speech model:
individualism versus communitarianism and paternalism; the speaker versus audience focus; and
negative rights versus positive rights.
The first variable, as mentioned above, is individualism versus communitarianism and
paternalism. In his theory, the First Amendment jurisprudence presents a substantial commitment
to individualism. The government must maintain neutrality toward free expression and avoid
viewpoint preference. However, other countries, especially the European countries, designed
freedom of speech rights with the idea of communitarianism and paternalism. The government
would not maintain content neutrality toward statement rights but would impose some specific
value on speech regulation. Carmi explains that European countries might have more
homogeneous societies than the US, so that these countries built unified communities more
easily than in the US. Also, the historical experience with autocracy caused the European
countries to be more willing to use communitarianism against group defamation.452
For example, Germany uses human dignity as a justification for limiting freedom of speech. Id. at 986-989.
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The other variable is the speaker versus audience focus. Based on Dworkin’s perspective, the
US approach to human dignity focuses on the speaker’s autonomy. The benefit of the rights
guarantee belongs to the speaker, not to the audience. Carmi uses “a vertical balancing” to
explain this methodology: “only substantial harm to interest may trump a certain right, such as
the Clear and Present Danger Test.”453 In contrast, the other democratic countries’ methodology
is “a horizontal balancing.” That is, “if the harm infringes upon a right, then two rights are
conflicting: [the] speaker’s freedom of speech undermines the audiences’ human dignity.”454
Therefore, excepting the US approach, the other democratic countries’ plans focus on both the
speaker’s and the audience’s rights.
Thirdly, negative rights versus positive rights are important variables in Carmi’s theory. The
First Amendment is a typical negative right, which only goes against an invasion of government
power. Contrastingly, the other democratic countries developed their jurisprudence to create
positive rights and to require that a government further intervenes in rights conflicts.455 For
instance, German hate speech regulation represents a balance between human dignity and
freedom of speech. Freedom of speech in Germany is a positive right to allow the government to
apply the hate speech regulation and exclude the invasion from private actors.
Beyond Post’s theory of human dignity, Carmi tried to explain human dignity in the US and
in the other democratic countries. Carmi claims that the difference is an example of American
exceptionalism.456 Carmi follows Frederick Schauer’s approach regarding American
exceptionalism.457
Id. at 992-995.
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5. Balancing the Conflict of Rights
Were I to propose treating various oppressed groups differently, I would be inclined to accept
the non-US methodology in the conflict of rights: the balancing approach. I argue that a system
design for hate speech regulation should balance human dignity and freedom of speech.
However, how do we deal with this dilemma between human dignity and freedom of speech?
Steven J. Heyman’s and Waldron’s arguments may offer a hint.
Heyman’s theory is based on a balancing approach, which is the same as the German
approach. In his view, freedom of expression is an external right in contrast to the freedom of
conscience. When speech becomes an attack, it might violate others’ rights, such as human
dignity and equality. His theory is built on the rights conflict, which includes personal security,
rights of personality, and the right to recognition.458
Heyman uses the case of Collin v. Smith as an example to explain his argument. In the
incident, the targeted group’s personality rights were injured by the parade, which brought up
painful memories of historical oppression.459 Here, the right to recognition depended on
everyone respecting one another, but hate speech undermined this will.460 Post recognizes that
for a community to impose a limitation on public discourse meant undermining its members’
autonomy. By contrast, Heyman argues that the imposition was an inherent duty for public
discourse,461 as does Waldron’s theory.462
The government should provide assurances to minorities that they will be protected. Waldron
says that if the only problem of hate speech is the mode and manner of the expression, norms of
Heyman, Hate Speech, supra note 350, at 161-162.
The historical oppression was the Holocaust. See National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432
U.S. 43, 43 (1977).
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civility could be used to regulate the debate over norms of civility. However, norms of civility
are important in assuring vulnerable minorities.463
Nevertheless, is hate speech regulation only assurance or is it necessary to introduce the idea
of hate crimes to provide enough assurance? Post said that hate speech regulations are not the
right way to end symbolic cultural oppression. He prefers to use several alternatives, such as
anti-discrimination laws and education, to achieve the same goal.464
Does this mean that it is important to identify “the Minimization Requirement”?465 I think the
answer is yes. The guaranteeing of rights, if it means the people in a state have autonomy, should
not have too many limitations that would reduce the functioning of those rights. However, where
there is a conflict between rights, as in the case of freedom of speech and human dignity, the
state’s mission is to balance those rights in such a way as to maximize both sides’ rights. If
limiting one side’s rights is unavoidable in order to protect the other side’s rights, the state
should choose the option that minimizes the restrictions on those rights.
Therefore, I recognize that the government should provide assurances to vulnerable
minorities, but the strategy may not have to be a speech ban. The approach taken should
minimize the limitations on freedom of speech and balance the conflicting rights.
V.

MILITANT DEMOCRACY VS FREEDOM OF SPEECH
1. Overview

As the above introduction in the last chapter stated, typical examples of militant democracy
are Article 18 and Article 21 of the German Basic Law, which are designed due to the
Id.
Post, Racist Speech, supra note 336, at 312-318.
465
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breakdown of the Weimar Republic in Germany.466 Today, many European countries have
adopted antiterrorist legislation and the theory of militant democracy, against both extreme rightwing and left-wing politics. This jurisprudence was also imported to international treaties
protecting human rights, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination of 1969.467 Robert A. Kahn recognizes that the most European countries
apply militant democracy theory to limit hate speech.468
The most important example to freedom of speech with militant democracy is the Federal
Criminal Code of Germany, sections 130(3)&(4), which outlaw National Socialism as an action
of inciting hatred and disturbing the public peace, which is (in turn) the crime of Holocaust
Denying. The clause is a mechanism to prevent National Socialism from arising and destroying
German democracy again.469
2. The Origin of Militant Democracy
Other than human dignity, Militant Democracy is another underling theory to explain hate
speech regulation in Europe. In 1937, Karl Loewenstein, a German political scientist and
philosopher, emigrated from Germany to the US because the Nazis came into power.
Loewenstein was anxious about the wave of Fascism in Europe. He considered a new political
approach to counter Fascism and wrote two articles, “Militant Democracy” and “Fundamental
Rights One and Two,” to propose his theory: militant democracy.470
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Loewenstein advocates that democracy should not destroy itself. Hence, “democracy must
become militant.”471 He argues that Fascism was not a political ideology with any content, but a
technique. In Loewenstein’s description, Fascism is a parasite attached to the institution of
democracy.472 He also insists that a democracy should not tolerate intolerance. In the transitional
stage, disciplined authority should be applied to realize human dignity and freedom.473
Loewenstein is the father of militant democracy. After him, some scholars have further
developed his theory. Aharon Barak points out that modern democracy should protect both the
constitution and human rights. Hence, a compromise between a state and its citizens constitutes a
restriction of human rights. In other words, human rights should not become tools to destroy
democracy.474
Two justifications support militant democracy. The first of these is the idea of “principled
democracy,” which allows the democracy to abandon neutrality and incorporates some specific
values into the institution of democracy.475 For example, a democracy should guarantee freedom
of conscience and equality, and if a political party denies those values, it should be banned.476
The second justification is “democracy as self-correction,”477 an idea similar to the concept of
procedural democracy. The institution of democracy must maintain its framework to ensure that
people can revoke their decisions. That is, “there will always be the next elections, always a next
moment at which the people can express their views.”478
Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I, supra note 235, at 423.
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Some analyses challenge militant democracy. First, militant democracy goes against an
internal enemy that threatens the institution of democracy from the interior. However, that means
a state might deprive some citizens’ fundamental rights. The deprivation of rights needs strong
justification.479 Second, Loewenstein’s theory presents his unconditional trust in political elites.
The strong tendency toward elitism contradicts civilians’ autonomy and raises the possibility of
triggering a government to abuse its power,480 such as in a speech limitation or a party ban.481
3. The Role of Militant Democracy in Hate Speech Issue
I accept the European approach to balancing the conflict of rights, which was described in the
discussion above, as part of my modeling for Taiwan. I also agree with the idea of militant
democracy. However, in my view, militant democracy is not just a justification for hate speech
laws; it is also a system of self-correction. From this perspective, a hate speech law has another
function: a guarantee of permanent assurance. It is a norm of civility to continue using norms of
civility to regulate the debate over norms of civility.
So, what is the assurance that provides the basis for the theory of militant democracy? The
assurance is that it is a free and democratic order. A free and democratic order is the core value
of militant democracy. This means that some values cannot be changed in a democracy, and
democracy must have a self-correcting system: democracy always survives.
The free and democratic order has rarely been discussed in debates over hate speech in the
United States. However, I have still gained some inspiration from scholarship discussing the
United States. For instance, Matsuda rejects racial hate speech by referring to history. Slavery,
the Holocaust, and apartheid are all seriously wrong. Matsuda argues that such a belief is now a
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 30.
481
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general rule and a sign of progress among human beings. 482 Like a free and democratic order of
militant democracy, if a constitution483 rejects racial hate speech, the limitation will constitute a
non-content-neutral value in a constitution. However, while a view, like a free and democratic
order, may be regarded as correct today, does it mean we can use this value to define other
periods in human history, including the future? The answer may be yes if a country’s system can
be described as “universal acceptance of the wrongness;” 484 the state should at least know what
is right and what is wrong.
However, the drawback of militant democracy is exactly that: what is right and what is
wrong. David Richards points out the difference between American and German Constitutional
Law regarding hate speech in the context of their governmental orders. He said the duty
Germany imposes for human rights protection by including limitations to offensive discussions is
a misunderstanding of freedom of speech. Richards insists that “the central concern of free
speech is not protected by the state but from the state.”485 Furthermore, he argues that the
meaning of protecting human rights is not only for people supporting constitutional order
government. He concludes the German theory would facilitate “the return of the repressed.” 486
The counterargument from David Richards connects to the above discussion about hate
speech and dissent. If a government could decide what is absolutely wrong, the government
rejects the dissent to its decision at the same time. The decision is dangerous because today’s
Matsuda said: “This knowledge is reflected in the universal acceptance of the wrongness of the doctrine of racial
supremacy.” Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2359.
483
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political correctness might have been absolutely wrong in the past. New oppression would arise
when an ideology is set into an unchangeable value in a constitution.
Another risk happens when a government could decide what is absolutely wrong; that is,
what content should be included in the political correctness. A dissent might not challenge what
is wrong but might reject the content included in this wrong. Matsuda rejects racial hate speech
because racism is seriously wrong. I agree with her claim. However, who can decide which
content constitutes racism? If a government, a powerful side, a majority, or an authorized unit
could determine what kind of expression is racism, the authority in power may recognize any
dissent against it as racism. For instance, the Chinese Communist Party accuses its opponent
using a racism claim to stifle the discussion of its political actions and criticism. The comments
are usually not characterized by racism.487 Moreover, following a government’s, a powerful
side’s or a majority’s racism claim may encourage new oppression against real victims of
racism.488
Indeed, Ruti Teitel emphasizes that the struggle of militant democracy is in using the name of
democracy to protect it. Defining a threat to a free and democratic order using a legal
interpretation will be difficult.489 Also, Teitel mentions that while freedom of speech rights fall
under militant democracy, this freedom would tend to balance the other rights and present a
Stephen Dziedzic, Racism Claims Could Stifle Debate about Chinese Interference, Academics Warn, ABC NEWS
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preference toward communitarianism.490 She recognizes that militant democracy should be a part
of transitional constitutionalism, which means that constitutional developments would happen in
specific periods immediately after periods of substantial political change.491
Therefore, while democracy has to become militant at a particular time, it does not need to be
militant in a well-ordered democracy. This connects with Peter R. Teachout’s convergence
analysis: the Holocaust Denial clause should be abolished after several decades. 492 Thus, militant
democracy should be designed as a solution of last resort: it only applies if no other remedy is
available.
VI.

THE THEORY OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
1. Overview
While the other democratic countries have above two leading theories, human dignity and

militant democracy, for the restriction of hate speech, why does the United States have an
incredibly distinct approach based on its First Amendment jurisprudence? Frederick Schauer
uses American exceptionalism to explain the difference between the United States and the other
countries.493
2. What is American Exceptionalism?
American exceptionalism is a theory that describes the massive differences in history,
culture, and politics between the United States and other democratic countries.494 The US is
unique, and its national ideology includes liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and
Teitel, Militating Democracy, supra note 14 at 52 (2007).
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the laissez-faire philosophy,495 compared to socialism, authoritarianism, communism, or
monarchy in other countries.
In the field of international human rights law, Harold Hongju Koh emphasis that the US is
the only superpower country with the ability and willingness to promote democracy and human
rights based on its outstanding global leadership and activism.496 On the other hand, Michael
Ignatieff points out that American exceptionalism displays at least three elements, as follows:
first, the United States does not want to obey all the duties on the international human rights and
humanitarian law conventions and treaties. The US sometimes signs them but has had many
reservations at the same time. For example, the US ratified the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1991 but reserved the power of the death penalty on juveniles at
the same time. Secondly, the US applies double standards on human rights to itself, its allies, and
its enemies. For instance, the US condemned the fact that Iran and North Korea abused their
people but ignored the same situation when it happened in Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and
Uzbekistan. Thirdly, the US works on its own human rights theory by denying the application to
international law, as it believes its domestic law is better than the international standard.497 This
third element is also called “legal isolationism.”498 The US justices and judges are not willing to
apply international law or foreign jurisprudence while they make judgments. In contrast, other
democratic countries have done so. By way of illustration, judges in Israel applied Canadian
precedents on minority rights cases, and the South African Constitutional Court interpreted
social and economic rights by using German cases.499
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 31-52 (1997).
The term could track back to Alexis de Tocqueville’s book, Democracy in America in 1835. See Koh, On
American exceptionalism, supra note 494, at 1487.
497
Michael Ignatieff, Introduction: American exceptionalism and Human Rights, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 3-4 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
498
Id. at 10.
499
Id. at 5-11.
495
496

114

3. Substantive Exceptionalism
Hate speech is allowed in the United States. Frederick Schauer claims that this approach is
part of American exceptionalism.500 The First Amendment is a significant part of American
exceptionalism. According to Schauer’s claim, more than any other country, the US protects the
speaker under the First Amendment theory. Schauer further distinguishes American
exceptionalism in freedom of speech using two different subtypes: substantive and
methodological exceptionalism. The former is “actual outcomes and actual doctrines,” and the
latter is the “methods and approaches to create the former.”501 A hate speech approach is an
example of substantive exceptionalism. Although many democratic countries in the world have
come to a basic consensus to limit hate speech, the US still intentionally chooses a different path.
The US has refused to execute Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination by insisting on its First Amendment theory. It extended the discrimination
viewpoint to protect racial hate speech in the R.A.V. case as well.502
A variety of reasons could explain substantive exceptionalism in hate speech doctrines. The
first reason for a considerable distinction between the US and other countries might be history.
Nazi history caused the European countries to strongly restrict hate speech. The US, however,
emphasizes the freedom of speech due to the Red Scare of the 1910s and the McCarthy era from
the 1940s to the 1950s. Because of the American exceptionalism view, the US has not made any
changes to follow other countries’ experiences.503
Schauer explained the reasons for the differences between the US and other countries through American
exceptionalism. However, he did not suggest a better approach of hate speech. See Schauer, The Exceptional First
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The second reason is the text in the Constitution.504 The protection of rights in the United
States mainly regards negative rights, based on the following statement in the US Constitution:
“Congress shall make no law.” No positive rights, such as socioeconomic and welfare rights,
exist in the US Constitution.505
The third possible explanation is the cultural factors: first, the culture of liberty—the US
emphasis on individualism rather than collectivism. The lack of socialist or social-democratic
traditions in the US political culture have also contributed to this outcome.506 Also, the people in
the US do not trust political elites compared to the civilians in the European countries. 507 The
culture of distrust presents in the issue of whether to abolish the death penalty.508 Michael
Ignatieff argues that the reason most European countries abolished capital punishment was not
because of a majority decision, but due to the political elites’ moral concern.509
Further, the body politic in the US is usually connected with freedom of speech and freedom
of the press, for example, in campaign finance and commercial advertising, to reinforce its
importance.510 Another point is legal isolationism. The US justices, judges, and lawyers refuse to
apply international law or foreign jurisprudence.511 The US legal profession prefers to export its
legal theory but rarely imports international law or foreign law.
Id. at 44-45.
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4. Methodological Exceptionalism
Methodological exceptionalism displays a difference in legal methodology and constitutional
theories. The American approach could be categorized as rule-based rather than as a balancing
approach but, in other countries, the balancing approach of the proportionality principle is
mainstream.512 The human dignity model in other democratic countries, such as Germany or
South Africa, is combined with a balancing approach, and the US does not do this.513 A
balancing approach include some features, as follows:
First, state action is not required under balancing formulas. As a state action, the court could
intervene in private individuals’ rights conflicts, based on external rights and values, without
recognizing one side.514 While the court applies the constitutional rights or value between two
private parties, the German legal system provides a doctrine of secondary effects, which means
“the Basic Law not only works to disallow civil law provisions that transgress its guarantees, but
it also informs the substantive meaning of the civil code itself.”515 The civil law is supposed to
promote public policies. One the contrary, the state action doctrine is the principle of the US
Constitution, which means that the rights guarantee and equal protection apply only to the state,
not private sectors.516
A typical example is the Lüth decision in Germany in 1958. The court balanced the two
parties’ constitutional rights using an objective ordering of values. 517 Therefore, German theory
argues that “the real threats to expression in German society come from private actors and social
forces, and not from the state.”518
Id. at 31-32.
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Besides, a balancing approach allows rights and values to extend into the freedom of speech
area and reject the content neutrality in the First Amendment theory. German Basic Law is not
neutral at all but is aimed to protect “an objective value system in its section on fundamental
rights.”519 Further, the German system built a militant democracy system as an objective value
system, a so-called “free democratic order,” to protect itself by limiting some individuals’
rights.520 Balancing formulas also combine the principle of proportionality.521 These
constitutional techniques cause human dignity to unavoidably restrict freedom of speech in
particular situations.
5. Criticism to American Exceptionalism as an Explanation
Robert A. Khan argues that American exceptionalism could explain the cultural and legal
institutions of freedom of speech in different countries. However, he claims that the theory has
its limitations. While states in the world are now connected to one another via the internet or
other technology, there are speech rules across the national boundaries. For instance, the
Community Standards of Google or Facebook apply to all nations that use those services. The
theory of American exceptionalism cannot explain this pragmatic limitation: do American rules
only apply in the territory of the United States? In contrast, the Community Standards are usually
stricter than the freedom of speech approach in the US. Why is this not American
exceptionalism? 522
Diverse systems might interact with and influence one another. Convergence analysts
recognize that those systems would be more similar to one another regarding constitutions and
broad protection in the future, and they might consequently move to more unified rules. For
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example, American exceptionalism might be changed to a general principle, and German
Holocaust denial was proposed to end in a few decades.523 However, Khan disagrees with this
point as a way to explain the coming compromise. He says that different views might conflict
with each other and it is not yet known which is correct.
Therefore, Khan rejects both exceptionalism and convergence models and has turned to the
underlying debate itself.524 He uses militant democracy theory to explain the differences between
the approach in the US and that in other countries. However, he rejects American exceptionalism
as a reason why European countries employ militant democracy.
6. Why Does Taiwan Need to Consider American Exceptionalism?
According to the theory of American exceptionalism, the United States is an exception to
freedom of speech rights in democratic countries. However, as an emerging democracy, Taiwan
has received substantial influence from the United States. Although Taiwan also imports its legal
theories from some European countries, it prefers to use the doctrines of the American First
Amendment theory as its leading legal resource to deal with freedom of speech issues. Hence, if
freedom of speech in the United States is an example of an exception under American
exceptionalism, Taiwan should be included in the exception. American exceptionalism provides
me with a method to compare Taiwan and the other democratic countries before designing a hate
speech law for hate speech issues in Taiwan.
X.

CONCLUSION
All the approaches to hate speech described in this paper are the specific outcomes of

different countries based on their unique politics, history, and culture. Considering these factors
in evaluating and choosing a hate speech approach is valuable. First, the history of conflict
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between social, political, or ethnic groups may trigger different methods in diverse countries.
The second is the cultural factor, which includes the individualistic or group focus on rights.
Third, different democratic patterns may lead to different hate speech approaches, such as the
vision of democracy as militant or liberal. However, the questions that remain are: which
approach is more appropriate for Taiwan? I will address these topics in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DESIGNING AN ARGUMENT FOR HATE SPEECH
REGULATION IN TAIWAN
I.

INTRODUCTION
Chapter Five will focus on three main themes: first, current hate speech problems in Taiwan;

second, the cultural historical background in Taiwan; and third, the current structures in place
that fail to address hate speech. The first section will present the problem list to classify some
patterns of hate speech issues in Taiwan by citing actual instances. The second section will focus
on Taiwan’s historical background to analyze the historical factors leading to these instances of
hate speech. This section will discuss significant events from throughout Taiwan’s history,
especially the historical oppression after World War II. The background discussion offers
information needed to understand the following points in Taiwan: past persecutions of
authoritarianism, ethnic tensions and conflicts, and the oppressive history of freedom of speech
limits in Taiwan. Finally, the third section will outline the development of the Taiwanese legal
system and will point out how the current system could not resolve hate speech problems in
Taiwan.
II.

CURRENT HATE SPEECH PROBLEMS IN TAIWAN
1. Overview
The common patterns of offensive speech in Taiwan are as follows: first, speech directed

toward ethnic groups; secondly, speech denying, downplaying, or justifying historical
oppression; thirdly, speech promoting a war or speech threatening freedom and democratic
order; and fourthly, speech discriminating against sexual orientation minority groups. Identifying
likely and frequent patterns of hate speech in Taiwan can help determine the best model for
regulation. The United States values freedom of speech more strongly, as laid out in the First
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Amendment of the Constitution. Germany’s method of regulation is influenced greatly by the
Holocaust and South Africa’s by apartheid. As Taiwan develops its own regulation, cultural
considerations should be taken into account. Though these countries may have different
historical backgrounds and present manifestations, they can be referenced to create a cohesive
model to, in turn, address and regulate these frequent instances.
2. Offensive Speech Directed toward Ethnic Groups
The first problem is the tension and conflict among the different ethnic groups in Taiwan
that trigger the offensive speech: for example, the ethnic conflict between the Hoklo
Taiwanese525 and mainlanders. The ethnic conflict turned into the national identity conflict after
Taiwan became a democracy. This example is one of many cases in which ethnic and identity
conflicts cause hatred. The hate speech spreads among these different groups through either an
ethnicity-based or identity-based method.
One example of the inter-ethnic group conflict is the case of Kuo Kuan-Ying. On July 25,
2006, a Taiwanese government officer, Kuo Kuan-Ying, posted an online article discussing
Taipei’s Jiancheng Circle market. He used some offensive terms in his commentary to criticize

One thing is necessary to point out: the term “Taiwanese” could be diverse meaning, depending on specific
circumstances. On nationality-based, Taiwanese usually means Taiwanese citizen. Taiwanese are the citizens of
Taiwan, or citizens of the Republic of China, comparing to a Chinese citizen, which means citizens of the People's
Republic of China. However, on ethnic-based, Taiwanese are two meanings. First, it means both Hoklo Taiwanese
and Hakka Taiwanese, comparing to Mainlanders. The classification is based on the end of World War Two. The
Han people who lived in the Japanese Period were Taiwanese, or “Islanders,” “Benshengren.” But Mainlanders were
not. The Article will use “Ethnic Taiwanese” to describe both Hoklo Taiwanese and Hakka Taiwanese. And second,
the narrowest meaning “Taiwanese” are specific as “Hoklo Taiwanese,” except Hakka Taiwanese. The article will
use “Hoklo Taiwanese.” Further, on Language-based, “Taiwanese” means the “Taiwanese language,” or “Hoklo
language,” compared to the Modern Standard Mandarin. The article will use “Taiwanese language.” Also, the term
“Mainlanders,” or “Chinese Mainlanders” need to be clarified. This Article uses “Mainlanders,” not “Mainland
Chinese” because the “Mainland Chinese” is sometimes a specific term for people living in Hong Kong or Macau to
describe the people come from their “Mainland China.” See Chang-Cheng Yang, Ethnic Conflict Since 228, in
WORKSHOP IN COMMEMORATION OF THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 228 INCIDENT, ASIA RESEARCH CENTRE, LSE
(Lin Cho-Shui & Chang-Cheng Yang eds., Feb. 9, 2007),
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Taiwanese people in his writing.526 For instance, he described the Taiwanese as taibazi (台巴子,
“Taiwanese rednecks”) and wokou (倭寇, “Japanese pirates”). He called Taiwan a “ghost
island” (鬼島) as well. Kuo further mentioned in his article: “the imposition of martial law had
been a benevolent act of the then government,” and “the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
should spend many years suppressing people in Taiwan instead of granting any political freedom
to them once it has taken Taiwan by military force.” From his perspective, he and his ethnic
group are “high-class Mainlanders.”527 This article was also posted in the China Times, a leading
Taiwanese newspaper, on August 2, 2006.528 The report triggered strong disagreements and
critiques from the Taiwanese public.529 Society recognizes his language as an expression of
extreme hatred from mainlanders sometimes exhibited toward ethnically Taiwanese people.
Another example of hateful speech toward ethnic minorities happened on June 9, 2016. A
self-styled citizen journalist, Hung Su-Chu, posted an interview on YouTube and talked to a
mainlander, also a retired soldier. Hung Su-Chu asked him, “why don't you go back?” then
stated, “Taiwanese people cannot afford to support Chinese refugees like you,” and finally
yelled, “Go back! Go back to your own country.”530 The video also triggered controversy in
Taiwanese society. Notably, the mainlanders’ community sharply critiqued Hung’s speech. The
video constituted offensive speech aimed at mainlanders from the Hoklo Taiwanese. 531

In his writing, “Taiwanese” looks like both an ethnicity-based and identity-based label because he is a mainlander
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Regardless, the two biggest political parties in Taiwan, the Kuomintang (KMT), known in
English as the Chinese National Party, and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),532
condemned Hung’s extreme speech publicly.533
Additionally, offensive speech that targets the Taiwanese Aboriginal people is still a
problem. For example, some Hoklo Taiwanese may use “hoana,” which is similar to “nigger” in
the Taiwanese language, to refer to the indigenous Taiwanese. 534 The term shows discrimination
aimed at Taiwanese Aboriginal people from the other ethnic groups in Taiwan.535 Unfriendly
expressions to “new immigrants,” including immigrants and migrant workers, is also a problem.
Therefore, offensive speech that targets ethnic groups and creates ethnic tension and conflict
constitutes a problem in Taiwan.
3. Speech Discriminating against Sexual Minority or Sexual Orientation Minority
Groups
The LGBTQ population is small in Taiwan, and members of this group usually find it hard to
have enough representational power to affect politics. They sometimes face offensive speech.
Taiwan’s Constitutional Court held that the right to same-sex marriage should be guaranteed in

The KMT is a mid-right, conservative, and Chinese identity-embracing party. In contrast, the DPP is mid-left,
progressive, and embracing of Taiwanese identity.
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Insulting of “waishengren,” TAIPEI TIMES (Jun. 11, 2016).
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/06/11/2003648341. Further, Brian Hioe, The Debate
Provoked by Hung Su-Chu’s Online Videos and Questions of Identity in Taiwan, NEW BLOOM MAGAZINE (Jun. 12,
2016), https://newbloommag.net/2016/06/12/hung-su-Chu-videos/.
534
The report said: “Aboriginal legislators charge that some DPP legislators have referred to them as hoan-a, which
translates roughly as “nigger” in the Minnan Chinese dialect.” See Mark Munsterhjelm, The First Nations of
Taiwan: A Special Report on Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples, CULTURAL SURVIVAL (Jun. 2002),
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/first-nations-taiwan-special-report-taiwansindigenous.
535
On Aug. 1, 2016, the Taiwanese president, Tsai Ing-wen, formally apologized to the Indigenous people for the
100 years of “national discrimination” and “injustice.” Austin Ramzy, Taiwan’s President Apologizes to Aborigines
for Centuries of Injustice, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 01, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/world/asia/taiwan-aborigines-tsai-apology.html.
532

124

2017.536 Two years later, the Congress in Taiwan made a law to legalize same-sex marriage, and
this took effect on May 24, 2019. However, hate speech and hate communication against
LGBTQ people and same-sex marriage still exists.537 Some hate communications spread online.
For example, some disinformation from social media platforms has claimed that legalizing samesex marriage is connected with HIV. It stated that Taiwanese healthcare would experience larger
burdens because the HIV-positive homosexual men were going to “flock to the country” and
“marry a Taiwanese man to use the health-care system.”538
4. Speech Denying, Downplaying or Justifying the Historical Oppression
Speech denying the historical oppression is an issue of hate in Taiwan. This pattern of
speech might be closer to the German model and Holocaust denying. Under the Martial law in
Taiwan, every incident with serious human rights violations has triggered the hatred between
groups with different historical memories, such as the February 28 incident and the White Terror
period from 1949 to 1987. The February 28 incident involved an uprising in Taiwan in 1947. The
Kuomintang’s government suppressed the rebellion by military force. An estimated 28,000
civilians died in March 1947, connected to the uprising stemming from the February incident.
Social division in Taiwan has since deepened, and unity has deteriorated. The people who
support the former dictator, Chiang Kai-Shek, would try to approve, deny, or to downplay the
human rights violations before the democratization and further glorify or justify the dictatorship.
Such speech may trigger hatred and harm toward the victims and their families.

Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 748 (司法院大法官第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] (May
24, 2017) (Taiwan).
537
Isabella Steger, Taiwan’s LGBT Groups Fought Fake News before Marriage Vote, QUARTZ (Nov. 24, 2018),
https://qz.com/1471411/chat-apps-like-line-spread-anti-lgbt-fake-news-before-taiwan-same-sex-marriage-vote/.
538
Id.
536

125

On February 21, 2012, a retired politician, Hau Pei-Tsun, who was the Premier of Taiwan in
the 1990s and the Chief of the General Staff of Armed Forces in the 1980s, mentioned the
February 28 incident having been included in a Taiwanese high school history textbook. He
stated that “the Kuomintang government killed only a little more than 500 people in that
incident,” which was far lower than the number given in Taiwanese history textbooks, which
recognizes that more than 10,000 people died during the incident because of the Chinese military
force.539 His reason was that just a few hundred people claimed the damages for state
compensation. His claim was inaccurate, according to most academic research in Taiwan by
Taiwanese historical scholars.540 Hau also said, “Taiwan’s fate has never been, and will never be,
determined by the Taiwanese.”541 The speech shows his strong Chinese nationalism and bias
toward the Taiwan independence movement.
Another case happened on February 21, 2013. A businessman, John Peng, who is the
Chinese Maritime Transport Ltd. chairman, wrote an open letter to President Ying-Jeou Ma to
request cleaning the name of his father, Meng-Chi Peng. Meng-Chi Peng was the former
commander at the Kaohsiung Fortress, and he was accused of killing a lot of Taiwanese people
during the February 28 incident, and was called the “Kaohsiung Butcher.” John Peng claimed
that the people killed by his father were “thugs” so that his father “did not do anything wrong.”
Prompted by the letter, President Ma started to relaunch the research into the February 28
incident. However, the DPP legislators recognized that Ma’s actions aimed to justify
Kuomintang’s massacre and rewrite the history, and they proposed to instead integrate the
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German Criminal Code 130, the Holocaust Denying Law,542 into Taiwanese law, to deal with
denials of the February 28 incident.
Taiwan experienced more than 30 years of dictatorship, and the pressure under the
dictatorship also fueled the hate between the oppressing and oppressed groups. How to face the
historical tragedy and deal with the historical oppression and human rights violations in the past
has become an argument and point of conflict inside Taiwanese society. Because the transition to
a democracy for Taiwan was peaceful but compromising, the society has not experienced
historical justice, or so-called “transitional justice.” The former oppressing group joined the
democratic system and constitutes a political power in Taiwan. The authentic experiences of
each group trigger a deeply held hatred between them, and these create an enormous conflict in
Taiwanese society.
5. Speech Promoting a War or Speech Threatening Freedom and Democratic Order
Because of the national identity division, some people in Taiwan with strong Chinese
Nationalism even supported the PRC’s military invasion to unify Taiwan. Therefore, some
speech is not just denying the past human rights violations but also promoting the attack from an
enemy, thereby challenging Taiwanese democracy and promoting a dictatorship to threaten the
“free democratic order.”543 This kind of speech becomes the other specific issue in Taiwan,
because the statement is based on the hatred of Taiwanese people. Similarly, encouraging
invasion by an enemy would be hate speech under South Africa’s model. But Taiwan does not
have a solution in the legal system for this yet.
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On April 12, 2019, a visiting academic from the PRC, Yi Li, who was also famous in
promoting the PRC’s use of military force to unify Taiwan, was expelled from Taiwan by the
Taiwanese government. The reason that the Taiwanese government forced him to leave was “his
intention to conduct political activities on travel permits,” and that his speech may threaten
national security because of “promoting a war:” achieving the same effect as “a terrorist.”544 The
issue also raised questions about whether the communicated expression spread hatred between
Taiwan and China, and whether promoting the war and threatening freedom and democratic
order in Taiwan should be allowed.
In this case, the Taiwanese government had a smart way of dealing with the issue: Yi Li is
not a citizen of Taiwan, and so the Taiwanese government did not allow him to enter. However,
if Taiwanese citizens urge war to threaten the free and democratic order, especially in relation to
the issue of China and Taiwan, should promoting Chinese militant invasion be a crime in
Taiwan? Taiwan does not have a way to deal with this speech if it were to come from its
citizens.545
6. Conclusion
Classifying the patterns of hate speech would be useful for system design, especially as
Taiwan chooses between different countries’ approaches to create its own. The United States’
scholars define hate speech as speech targeting “minority groups.” However, some methods,
such as those used in Germany and South Africa, are not limited to minority groups. The German
approach restricts the speech denying the historical oppression—the Holocaust denying and the
Taiwanese Premier Tseng-Chang Su pointed out: “Taiwan is a free, democratic, and open country. We welcome
all to visit Taiwan... However, if you come here to advocate unification through armed invasion under the pretext of
sightseeing, you are no different from a terrorist,” Staff writer, with CNA, Unificationist Li Yi Put on Plane after
Deportation, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019),
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decisions of European human rights courts—as well. The United States legal system does not
have corresponding regulations on speech denying historical oppressions. Similarly, the German
approach also does not allow speech that threatens freedom and democratic order, but the United
States does. Speech promoting war is protected in the United States unless it exceeds a clear and
present dangerous standard; however, South Africa and the European human rights courts have a
more aggressive approach toward this type of speech. Speech promoting war is a kind of hate
speech in both South Africa and the European human rights courts. In order to design a new
model of hate speech regulation, the current legal system in Taiwan and how it regulates and
fails to resolve hate speech must be examined.
III.

TAIWANESE HISTORY AND HUMAN DIGNITY
1. Introduction
Like how Germany and South Africa have codified the value of human dignity into their

motivations of their hate speech regulations, Taiwan has a history that indicates that this value is
held strongly in their present culture. Taiwan is an island located at a conflict point among
several countries and it is also a former colony of multiple countries.546 These conflicts have led
to incidents of violence and oppression, including the February 28 incident and the period of
martial law following World War II. Additionally, Taiwan’s colonial past has led to ethnic
conflict that must be resolved by protecting the dignity of oppressed groups, even after Taiwan’s
democratization and independence were established. The importance of human dignity extends
to considerations about other minorities, like the LGBTQ community. All of these factors in

The shadow of colonialism has never left Taiwan. Spain, the Netherlands, Japan, and China all colonized Taiwan
during different periods. The United States also plays an essential role in Taiwanese history, culture, and politics. Wu
Rwei-Ren believes that “the Modem Taiwanese nationalism” is the outcome from the influence of the following
historical empires: the Qing Empire, Japanese Empire, United States, and the raising modern China. Rwei-Ren Wu,
Fragment of Empires: The Peripheral Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism, in TAIWANS STRUGGLE: VOICES OF THE
TAIWANESE 27 (Shyu-tu Lee & Jack Francis Williams eds. 2016).
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Taiwan’s history and culture indicate how human dignity must be considered as a value when
developing a hate speech regulation.
In Alexander Tsesis’ argument, systematic persecution, which undermines human dignity,
includes genocide, unfair and inequitable subordination, and separation. Tsesis mentioned that
Germany used all three methods and US used subordination, and separation.547 I will address
systematic persecution in Taiwanese history to show the historical oppression to human dignity.
2. February 28 Incident and its Influence
The Taiwanese society is an immigrant society. Diverse ethnicities include Taiwanese
Indigenous people,548 the Hoklo Taiwanese, the Hakka Taiwanese,549 mainlanders,550 and New
Immigrants. The above groups, except New Immigrants, are identified as the “Four Main
Ethnicities.” After World War II, the Chinese government occupied the island and led the new
immigrants, so-called mainlanders, to move to Taiwan. Compared to mainlanders, people whose
ancestors migrated from southeastern China to Taiwan around the end of the 16th century or
lived under the Japanese colonial period before World War II were the so-called “Taiwanese,”551
including the Hoklo Taiwanese and the Hakka Taiwanese. In 2018, the population of ethnic
groups of Taiwan was 70% Hoklo Taiwanese, 14% Hakka Taiwanese, 14% mainlander, and 2%
Taiwanese Indigenous and New Immigrants.552
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As World War II ended, Japan surrendered on October 25, 1945. At this time, the Republic
of China began a military occupation of Taiwan.553 Japan abandoned any claims to sovereignty
over Taiwan by signing the Treaty of San Francisco on September 8, 1951.554 The ROC
government, which was led by the Kuomintang distrusted the people who lived in Taiwan under
the Japanese period, as such most officers of the Taiwan Provincial Government were from
China.555 Also, the second phase of the Chinese Civil War, between the Kuomintang and the
Communist Party of China, started in August of 1945. The Kuomintang government used
Taiwanese natural resources and food supplies to support its military force against the
Communist Party’s troops.556 Furthermore, unemployment, inflation, and corruption problems
made people suffer. People in Taiwan fell under the economic crisis and experienced poor public
security.557 The tension between the mainlanders and Taiwanese was rising.558
The February 28 incident, or so-call February 28 Massacre, occurred in 1947. In the
beginning, the agents of the Monopoly Bureau559 targeted a vendor that sold private cigarettes.560
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The law enforcement officers beat the vendor and shot an innocent bystander. The shooting
triggered huge protests throughout the entire island going against the Chinese government, which
rejected handing over the officers.561 The Kuomintang leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, recognized that
there was an uprising and sent his troops to Taiwan from China. On March 8, 1947, Chinese
soldiers landed in the northern and southern parts of Taiwan; then they started the killing. After
one month of killing across all of Taiwan, more than 20,000 Taiwanese civilians died, and an
even greater number of people were imprisoned or missing without any due process or fair
judgment.562
The February 28 incident was not just a tragedy, but also a strong violation of its victims’
human dignity. The scholar Stefan Fleischauer points out that the February 28 incident enhanced
the animosity between both Taiwanese people and mainlanders.563 The military killed numerous
highly educated Taiwanese people in this incident. It was a systematic massacre. A generation of
Taiwanese elites died, were imprisoned, or were exiled. It forced ethnic Taiwanese people “into
submission.” The surviving groups were scared “away from politics.”564 Ethnic Taiwanese
people recognize that they were oppressed and massacred by a powerful minority group, the
mainlanders,565 and compare the incident with the Holocaust in Germany.566 In contrast, for
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mainlanders, especially conservatives in Kuomintang, insist on claiming that they were the actual
victims because of the Taiwanese people’s random ethnicity-related assaults on mainlanders in
the protest.567 The different understanding of the incident triggered bias and hatred between the
Taiwanese and the mainlanders.
3. Inequitable Subordination: Taiwanese Ethnic Tension and Conflicts
Mainlanders controlled the political power and financial resources in the martial law period.
A minority in a population could not reflect the real political and economic power in a
Taiwanese society. Most of the mainlanders568 could speak Mandarin, but the Taiwanese did not.
In contrast, most mainlanders could not understand the Japanese and Taiwanese languages. The
different language skills of the two ethnicities gave an advantage to the mainlanders in their
education because schools focused on Mandarin education. Moreover, the Taiwanese did not
have equal opportunities for political participation under the martial law period. mainlanders had
more of an opportunity to obtain jobs in the government.569
The education and culture under the martial law period focused on Chinese nationalism and
justification for the Kuomintang’s ruling. The Taiwanese people experienced strong
“Sinicization.”570 The teaching of geography and history defined Taiwan as being part of China,
and the ROC is the only legal China. The other apparent phenomenon was that the military
department was set inside the school to supervise the faculty, staff, and students.571 Just like
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scholar Shelley Rigger said, “schools were the number one tool of political socialization.”572
Mandarin is still the only official language in Taiwan. Speaking Taiwanese or the other local
languages was not allowed in government facilities and schools. Students were given punishment
by “fining” or “wearing humiliating placards” when they did so.573 As Shelley Rigger pointed
out: “The regime promoted the view that Taiwanese (Taiwanese language) was a second-rate
dialect: primitive, ugly, and low class.”574 The above unequal treatment caused harm to the
Taiwanese people’s human dignity and triggered ethnic hatred in Taiwan.
Besides, the Indigenous people lack political power and economic benefits in the Taiwanese
society. They have been a discrete and insular minority under ethnic and economic bases,
regardless if they were in the Japanese period, Kuomintang’s martial law period, or after
democratization. The Qings’ territory did not include Taiwanese Indigenous people’s’ lands.
Japan conquered the Indigenous with their military, and the Japanese forced them to adopt the
Japanese, then the Kuomintang forced them to adopt the Han culture.575 After democratization,
the Taiwanese have begun to give the Indigenous people’s rights and culture a new importance.
Additionally, after democratization, “new residents” and “new immigrants” became the other
minority groups in Taiwanese society. They are mainly from China,576 Vietnam, Indonesia,
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Thailand, or the Philippines through either marriage with Taiwanese citizens or employment in
Taiwan.577
The ethnic tensions and conflicts between the mainlanders and Taiwanese were one of the
original social conditions under the martial law period, because of the Kuomintang’s unequal
policies. The whole history of Taiwan’s ethnic politics presents a systemic injustice under the
martial law period, although there was no concrete slavery and racial segregation. Still, cultural
bias and unequal opportunities for different ethnicities have existed. Those problems constitute
violations of human dignity. In addition, Taiwanese Indigenous people and New Immigrants lack
social and political power even today. The bias against the vulnerable minorities in Taiwan also
undermines the guarantee of human dignity.
4. Inequitable Subordination: Sexual Minority or Sexual Orientation Minority Groups
in Taiwan
Before Taiwanese democratization, the oppression originated mainly from the Kuomintang
government, and the leading human rights issues were political rights and freedom of speech
rights. After democratization, the Taiwanese people enjoyed a great progression of political
rights and free expression, then the rights of equality started to attract the attention of the public
and develop.
LGBTQ rights have progressed quickly as well. Taiwan has never seen any crimes for
same-sex relations or same-sex sexual activity, even under the martial law period.578 After
democratization, the issue of LGBTQ rights has focused on discrimination protections and samesex marriage. The Taiwanese Constitutional Court held that same-sex marriage should be

Jermyn Chow, New Immigrants Putting down Roots in Taiwan, THE STRAITS TIMES (May 29, 2017),
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/new-immigrants-putting-down-roots-in-taiwan.
578
See HSING FA [Criminal Code] (Taiwan).
577

135

allowed in March 2017, and the Congress in Taiwan made the law to legalize it two years after
that. The Act of Gender Equality in Employment was applied in 2002 and the Gender Equity
Education Act was applied in June 2004 to make sure the Taiwanese LGBTQ group would not
face discrimination in workplaces and schools.579
However, there is some dissent behind Taiwan’s progressive LGBTQ rights. Conservative
voters and the anti-LGBTQ group proposed a referendum to oppose same-sex marriage and saw
a tremendous victory in 2018.580 Therefore, the dissenting opinion still has enormous political
power and potential to cause setbacks in the future. Moreover, concerning hate speech or hate
crimes in Taiwan, they still exist but do not have specific data or research tracking them because
the Taiwanese government agencies do not make a sufficiently accurate distinction to address
crimes based on race, ethnicity, or gender.581 Those offensive speeches and actions undermine
the assurance of human dignity.
5. Conclusion
Historical factors are significant for understanding the reasons for the current state of hatred
and hate speech in Taiwan. The historical oppression provides the context for hate speech in
Taiwanese culture. The historical oppression undermines oppressed groups’ human dignity, and
oppressed groups have become the victims of hate speech. This influence still exists today. On
the other side, I will address freedom of speech in Taiwanese history to explain why freedom of
speech has become a superior right in Taiwan.

English versions of both acts are available on the Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic of China
(Taiwan), available at https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/Index.aspx.
580
Agencies, Taiwan Votes down Same-sex Marriage as China Welcomes Midterm Results, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.
24, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/24/anti-gay-marriage-groups-win-taiwan-referendumbattle.
581
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor United States Department of State, 2016 Human Rights Report
(Taiwan Part), AIT (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.ait.org.tw/2016-human-rights-report-taiwan-part-2/.
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IV.

TAIWANESE HISTORY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
1. Introduction
After the February 28 incident, the Kuomintang used highly political oppression to control

Taiwan, including enacting the “political arrests” and “detentions” of dissenting people.582 The
government announced the martial law period in Taiwan on May 19, 1949. It started the oneparty-led dictatorship in Taiwan. Kuomintang used “Temporary Provisions against the
Communist Rebellion” to replace the Constitution of the ROC.583 The martial law period in
Taiwan continued on for 38 years.
The Kuomintang brought highly “centralized and authoritarian” political institutions from
China to Taiwan.584 The Constitution was frozen during the martial law period. The “Temporary
Provisions” excluded the limitations in the Constitution regarding the President. That meant that
the presidential power was unlimited. Without checks and balances, the president was essentially
a dictator.585 Under the “Temporary Provisions against the Communist Rebellion,” the ROC
Constitution’s bill of rights was frozen. That means some fundamental rights, such as habeas

While the KMT government lost the Chinese Civil War and its officials escaped from China to Taiwan in 1949,
many more Chinese immigrants followed the KMT government from China. The People's Republic of China (PRC)
was founded in Beijing at that time. For countering PRC, KMT claimed its ROC government was the only legal
China in the world rather than the PRC in Beijing. RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 58.
583
About “Temporary Provisions against the Communist Rebellion,” See TAIWAN DOCUMENTS PROJECT, History of
Constitutional Revisions in the Republic of China, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/constitution07.htm (last visited
May 28, 2019).
584
KMT directly brought the institutions from its “mainland,” and the government structure was suitable for all of
China. The Constitution in Taiwan, which is titled the “Constitution of the Republic of China,” was brought from
pre-PRC China by the National Government of the ROC, dominated by KMT, while losing the Chinese Civil War
around 1949. Id. at 8.
585
Tay-Sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward a Liberal and Democratic
Country, VOL. 11 NO. 3 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL 531, 540-545 (2017). Also, RIGGER, POLITICS IN
TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 7. One instance demonstrating this was when KMT’s leader, President Chiang Kai-shek
led the Legislators of ROC from China to Taiwan after 1949. However, he did not hold the elections for the
Legislators because he recognized they represented the “whole China.” He only held the vote for the represents of
“Taiwan Province.” The 43-years-long legislature made sure they could always elect Chiang and his son, due to the
fact that the presidential election was not directly elected by all citizens. Moreover, the Taiwanese government kept
the two levels of government in the same area, which were the government of ROC and the government of the
Taiwan Province. RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 6.
582

137

corpus, freedom of speech, and procedures for due process of the law did not apply to Taiwanese
people.586 The Kuomintang regime used its influence in the military, education, and media to
oppress opposition. The right to freedom of speech was greatly repressed. The government
continued to suppress political dissidents and protesters. 587 Taiwan’s history of oppressing its
citizens’ freedom of speech impacts how the Taiwanese view and react to potential limitations on
that freedom today, including potential hate speech regulations.
2. Freedom of Speech under Oppression
Political activities were highly restricted under the temporary provisions and martial law.
Speeches, assemblies, and parades to protest the government were considered criminal activities.
Except for Kuomintang, no political parties were allowed.588 The media, including newspapers,
magazines, television, and radio, were controlled by the government. The owners of the above
media had to hold various permits from the regime.589
The most severe political censorship was the former Article 100 of the Criminal Code of the
ROC. Article 100 was the act of sedition.590 Even people with only the intent to destroy the
organization of the State, seize State territory, or using illegal means, change the Constitution or

Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century, supra note 585, at 537-538.
RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 70-74.
588
“Outside the Party,” or so-called “Dangwai (黨外)” in the Chinese Language, refers to the groups of political
activists that do not support the KMT under Martial Law Period. At that time, “Dangwai” was illegal or in the gray
zone in politics. The regime prohibited the opinions from dissidents, but it could not stamp them out. The members
of “Dangwai” suffered political repression. Their collaborative goal was against the KMT’s ruling, but their political
purposes sometimes were diverse. Some of them proposed a free China by changing the ROC into a liberty state,
while others demanded an independent Taiwan from ROC, which meant subverting the regime. However, the Feb.
28 incident and the White Terror period became symbols of killing and enslaving Taiwanese by a dictator in the
appeal of “Dangwai.” “Taiwanese consciousness” was raised through “out of party movement” under the
oppression. Fleischauer, The 228 Incident and the Taiwan Independence Movement’s Construction of a Taiwanese
Identity, supra note 563, at 381-383.
589
RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 70-74.
590
The former Article 100 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of China: “Any person with the intent to destroy the
organization of the State, seize State territory, or, using illegal means, change the Constitution or overthrow the
Government shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than seven years; the ringleader shall be sentenced to
life imprisonment.” HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 100 (Taiwan).
586
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overthrow the Government could elicit punishment by this code. Article 100, plus Article 2(1) of
the Act for the Control and Punishment of Rebellion, increased the “life imprisonment” into the
“sole death penalty.”591 The Kuomintang regime used Article 100 to mainly target two thought
crimes: the “Taiwan independence” and “PRC support” crimes. The law became an essential root
of the White Terror period. The real practice of temporary provisions and Criminal Code 100
were administered by the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC), which was a military organization.
It supervised civilians and enacted the censorship of the publishing and media platforms. It also
authorized criminal jurisdictions without any due process. According to research, “An estimated
ten thousand cases involving civilians were decided in military trials from 1950 to 1986.”592
Another severe type of self-censorship among people living in Taiwan was caused by “the
spies,” i.e. those people who were informers and served the Kuomintang. This behavior existed
in all areas in Taiwanese society, including executive offices, schools, and even private
companies. Although Taiwanese international students studied abroad, they still needed to worry
about these punishments because of the government agency’s supervision. 593 The “chilling
effect” of speech was deeply inside the Taiwanese people’s mindset. The pies’ actions also
resulted in the “Blacklisting.” The dissidents overseas would be prohibited from going into
Taiwan, or their visas would be dismissed so that they could not go back to their hometowns.594

The Act for the Control and Punishment of Rebellion was made on May 24, 1945 and abolished on May 22,
1991.
592
RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 70-74.
593
Id.
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Chris Fuchs, Documenting Taiwan’s Blacklisted Dissidents, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2017/04/03/2003667971. A short Documentary about Blacklisting in
Taiwan during the Martial Law filmed by Christina Hu could be found on the Youtube website. Christina Hu,
Blacklist by Christina Hu, BROOKLYN FREE SPEECH (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=if2jyerVjHI.
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3. Important Events and Social Movements for Freedom of Speech
People that lived in Taiwan kept fighting against the authoritarian regime, no matter if they
were mainlanders, Taiwanese, or other ethnicities. In the 1950s, a mainlander liberalist
intellectual, Lei Chen, lead the movement to pursue political reform in Taiwan during the martial
law period. In 1960, he proposed to fund a new opposition party, the China Democratic Party,
against the Kuomintang and requested that Chiang Kai-Shek should not take the next term of
office since he had been the President since 1948.595 Lei was put in prison and charged with
sedition, and he received a 10-year sentence.596 The “Free China Journal” was banned. It was
banned a symbol of their control over free speech and became a heavy oppression tactic against
Freedom of Speech at that time.597
On December 10, 1979, during the Human Rights Day, the Formosa Magazine, which was
founded by members outside the Kuomintang, held a parade to demand Taiwanese
democratization in Kaohsiung City. The parade finally became the conflict point between riotcontrolling law enforcement and civilians—hundreds of people were injured in the incident.
After the event, the military department started to arrest dissidents. Most of the arrested
protestors were charged with severe crimes.598 The government imprisoned and tortured the
opposition leaders.599

As a former presidential adviser for Chiang Kai-shek, he published the “Free China Journal” against PRC’s
propaganda in 1949 with the sponsorship by KMT. However, when Chiang began his dictatorship in Taiwan, the
“Free China Journal” started to critic the Taiwanese politics, especially the KMT government. In 1953, Chiang fired
Lei’s position in Presidential Hall and dismiss his membership of KMT in 1954. See Taiwan Today, President Ma
Opens Lei Chen Memorial Museum, Research Center, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(TAIWAN) (Mar. 08, 2012), https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,23,45&post=2255.
596
In May 2019, the Taiwanese Transitional Justice Commission overturned his conviction. Yu-Fu Chen & Jonathan
Chin, Justice Commission Plans to Exonerate 1,505 People, Taipei Times (Dec. 2, 2018),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/12/02/2003705352.
597
Nevertheless, although the “Free China” Journal had healthy “mainlanders’ perspectives,” it certainly inspired
some opposers, the members outside the party, to publish and spread some prohibiting information through
disallowed media.
598
SHELLEY RIGGER, FROM OPPOSITION TO POWER: TAIWANS DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY 20-21 (2001).
599
One of the opposition leaders, Lin Yi-Hsiung, a human right’s lawyer in Taiwan, was jailed due to the 1979
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In the 1980s, a democratic activist, Cheng Nan-Jung, founded several magazines.600 He was
continuing to write articles to criticize the politics in Taiwan, including Chiang’s family, the
Kuomintang’s ruling, the February 28 incident, and the human rights violations under martial
law, which were all deemed illegal speech at that time. His main proposal was “Taiwan
independence” and “100% freedom of speech.” His speech and publications were recognized as
a threat by the Kuomintang regime. In 1988, Cheng was charged with sedition due to his
magazine and its articles. He refused to appear before the court, rejected the arrest by the police,
and stayed in the press building. He said: “The Kuomintang will only take my body; they will
never take me alive.”601 Finally, he burned himself and committed suicide to protest against the
Kuomintang’s oppression of freedom of speech.602 Cheng’s death sparked the Taiwanese society
into discussions against the oppression of freedom of speech. The act of sedition was modified603
on May 18, 1992.604

Kaohsiung Incident. His 60 years-old mother and two daughters, who were nine and seven-years-old, were
murdered by an unknown criminal, even though his family was under watch by intelligence agencies. The murder
happened precisely on Feb. 28, 1980. The government has still been unable to find the murderer. See Iok-sin Loa,
The 228 Incident: Lin I-hsiung’s Family Tragedy Commemorated, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 1, 2013),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/01/2003555993; Matthew Strong, Taiwan President
Attends Mass to Mark Lin Family murder, TAIWAN NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3105068.
600
He registered 18 permits for different names of publications, which was a strategy to go against the publicizing
censorship by governmental agencies. If one license was invalid, he would just switch to another one.
601
Hui-lin Hu, Nylon’s Life, NYLON CHENG LIBERTY FOUNDATION,
http://nylonenglish.blogspot.com/2017/05/nylons-life_18.html#more (last visited Jun. 06, 2019).
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Id. Also see: Rich Chang, Twentieth Anniversary of Activist’s Death Is Marked, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 30 2009),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/03/30/2003439755.
603
The act was modified by adding “by violence or threats committing an overt act.”
604
On May 9, 1991, the Investigation Bureau, which is one of the intelligence agencies in Taiwan, arrested five
students at the National Tsing Hua University in Taiwan. The agency claimed those criminals proposed for the
Taiwan Independence Association. However, the five students only read some prohibiting books. Although the
democratization started and the Martial Law Period ended, “the conspiracy to act sedition” crime still applied in
Criminal Code 100 of ROC, which included a death penalty crime. The intellectuals and college students protested
and demanded to abolish “the code 100.” After the movement, the crime was modified on May 18, 1992. AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, Taiwan: Amendment of Article 100 of the Criminal Code (Mar. 31, 1992),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa38/003/1992/en/.
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4. Conclusion
After amending Article 100 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of China, the act of
sedition, and abolishing the Act for the Control and Punishment of Rebellion, people in Taiwan
no longer needed to worry about severe punishment because of their speech. Under the martial
law period, however, some activists had never stopped confronting the oppressors. The social
movements for freedom of speech continued to rise. The activist Cheng Nan-Jung became a
symbol of a freedom fighter.605 His “seeking 100% freedom of speech” was respected by
Taiwanese society.606 Because of the specific historical oppression in speech, the freedom of
expression became the most important individual right after democratization. The Freedom of
Speech supremacy had now found its position in Taiwanese political culture.
V.

DEMOCRATIZATION, NATIONAL IDENTITY CHANGE, AND MILITANT
DEMOCRACY
On Oct 25, 1971, United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which

recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the only “legitimate representative of China
to the United Nations” and expelled Chiang Kai-Shek’s representatives and the Republic of
China from the position.607 The Republic of China, based in Taiwan, became isolated from the
political world. The Republic of China is not “legal China.” People in Taiwan with Chinese

Some comments may challenge that Cheng’s death did not directly change politics immediately. However, his act
is recognized as one of the key reasons to end the Martial Law Period. An argument said: “in 1999 Time magazine
named Britain’s radical feminist movement leader Emmeline Pankhurst one of 100 major figures of the 20th century.
Her selection was not so much because she achieved "real" democratic reforms, said editors, but because she took
extreme measures such as hunger strikes that sparked the feminist community into discussions and public outcries.
This is precisely what Deng Nan-jung helped bring about in Taiwan’s democracy movement.” Staff Writer of
Taiwan News, Students See Deng Nan-jung as the Hero He Was, TAIWAN NEWS (Jan. 21, 2014),
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/2395406.
606
April 7, on which Cheng Nan-Jung died, is as a national holiday in Taiwan, the Freedom of Speech Day. See
Wendy Lee, Taiwan Marks Freedom of Speech Day, TAIWAN NEWS (Apr. 07, 2017),
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3135498.
607
In 1978, President Jimmy Carter ended the diplomatic relations between the United States and the Republic of
China, then started diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1979. Glaser & Green, What Is the
U.S. “One China” Policy, supra note 554.
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identity face robust challenges. Under the martial law period, the only legally political identity
was “the ROC Chinese,” which means that neither “Taiwan independence” nor “PRC Chinese”
identities were allowed at that time.608 After democratization, the rapid change in national
identity is the other important character in Taiwanese society. The national identity reflects the
different outcome of the colonialism at the beginning of the democratization.609 Taiwanese
national identity is rising, but the Chinese national identity is declining.610
The conflict of national identity combines, surpasses, and replaces the ethnic conflict after
democratization. Therefore, Taiwanese identity is not only an introspection of reality from
people who live in Taiwan, but also an extension of protesting the historical oppression of Feb
28 incident and the martial law period.611 This triggers hatred between people with different
national identities. National identities constitute a bias that can cause hateful speech and actions
in Taiwan, consequently.
Moreover, the national identities in Taiwan is related to militant democracy. PRC claims its
sovereignty over Taiwan, and it is not a democratic country. Hence, in Taiwan, militant
democracy justifies hate speech regulation. The justification is not based on the harm to specific
Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 644 (司法院大法官第 644 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 644] (Jun.
20, 2008) (Taiwan).
609
Nowadays, more than 60% of Taiwanese citizens insist they are Taiwanese, not Chinese. The examples show the
identity transition as following: According to the researching from National Chengchi University’s Election Study
Center, the Taiwanese identity is 17.6% in 1992, 43.7% in 2008, and 59.3% in 2016, on the contrary, Chinese
identity is 25.5% in 1992, 4.1% in 2008, and 3.4% in 2016; “the both,” which means dual-identity, is 46.4% in 1992,
44.7% in 2008, 33.6% in 2016. See J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwanization” in Taiwan’s Politics, BENTUHUA, CULTURAL,
ETHNIC, AND POLITICAL NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY Taiwan 17, 46-47 (2016).
610
See SHIAU-CHI SHEN, DEMOCRACY AND NATION FORMATION: NATIONAL IDENTITY CHANGE AND DUAL IDENTITY
IN TAIWAN, 1991-2011 (2013), http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/item/ac:161971.
611
“The turning point occurred when Taiwan Independence went from a revolutionary movement to a position on
the political spectrum of a democratic society. In the 1990s, Taiwan Independence traded its original strategy of
violent protests for a strategy of electoral competition. The DPP and the KMT reached a grand compromise over the
life and death of the ROC: the former could have its democracy and self-rule, while the latter got to keep state
institutions intact. The battleground moved from the streets to the ballot box. Instead of overthrowing the ROC
outright, the Taiwan independence movement instead began “Taiwanizing” the ROC.Instead of overthrowing the
ROC outright, the Taiwan independence movement instead began “Taiwanizing the ROC.” See Chieh-Ting Yeh,
“Taiwan Independence” Doesn’t Mean What You Think, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 11, 2016).
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/11/taiwan-independence-china-republic-huadu-taidu/.
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groups, but to the institution of democracy. That is, the guarantee to protect human dignity also
needs to defend itself. The basic democratic order is the core of any democratic system and
cannot be changed.
This theory makes sense in Europe because of the historical reliance on militant democracy,
but would it work in Taiwan? The Taiwanese legal system has applied militant democracy in
banning a political party opposed to a free and democratic order, but the rule has never been used
in freedom of speech jurisprudence. The Taiwanese Judicial Review has preferred instead the
Clear and Present Danger Test, found in the United States, in this area.
VI.

WHY DOES THE CURRENT SYSTEM FAIL TO FIX PROBLEMS?
1. The Current Taiwanese Legal Land Space for Freedom of Speech
A. Current Legal Structure of Freedom of Speech in Taiwan
Democratization made the Bill of Rights in the Constitution “revive” and become applicable

again. Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of China rules on the guarantee to freedom
of speech,612 stating that it provides the guarantee for “freedom of speech” in Taiwan. The
structure of the legal system in Taiwan relies on the idea of “reception,” which means receiving
and applying Western laws.613 After the democratization in Taiwan, the judiciary interpreted
freedom of speech rights and adapted American First Amendment theory to the Taiwanese legal
system.614 Therefore, on the constitutional level, Taiwanese freedom of speech jurisprudence is

Article 11 of Constitution of Republic of China rules that: “the people shall have freedom of speech, teaching,
writing and publication.” Minguo Xianfaart art. 11 (1947) (Taiwan). An English version of the Republic of China
Constitution is available on Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan of the Republic of China (Taiwan), available at
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0000001 (last visited Jun. 06, 2019).
613
This phenomenon was not, however, only beginning from Taiwanese democratization, but also happened at the
Japanese period and KMT’s Authoritarian. For example, Meiji Japan transferred Western law to Japan. However,
Taiwan did not fully apply the Japanese system, Japanese imported some modern legal terminology for civil law
matters in Taiwan. Also, the ROC government brought its constitution and legal system to Taiwan, and the system
was created and based on the German and Japanese systems. Tay-Sheng Wang, Translation, Codification, and
Transplantation of Foreign Laws in Taiwan, 25 WASH. INT'L L.J. 307, 307-318 (2016).
614
For examples, Interpretation 407 held that obscenity is unprotected speech. See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No.
612
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highly similar to the First Amendment jurisprudence in the United States. Also, Article 7 is the
“equal protection clause” in the Taiwanese legal system.615 Article 23, however, is the
“proportionality clause” under Taiwan’s Constitution.616 It provides the same function as the
“proportionality test” that originated from the balancing approach of Germany. Taiwan has a
history of borrowing freedom of speech law from Western countries and it follows that Taiwan
would continue to look to those countries when considering hate speech regulations.
B. Statues of Regulating Freedom of Speech in Taiwan
After democratization, the government’s power was required to follow the legal regulations
with accuracy and foreseeability, which means some laws under the martial law period would
not apply again, such as “the conspiracy to act sedition” in Criminal Code 100 of the ROC. The
principle about rights guarantee is “all is freedom unless the specific limitation was met.”

407 (司法院大法官第 407 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 407] (Jul. 5, 1996) (Taiwan); Interpretation
617 narrowed the crime to only include content such as “violence, sexual abuse or bestiality but is lacking in artistic,
medical or educational value, or an average person will either find it not publicly presentable or find it so intolerable
as to be repulsive;” See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 617 (司法院大法官第 617 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 617] (Oct. 26, 2006) (Taiwan); Interpretation 414 imputed the “the two-level theory” from the
United States to divide high-level speech and low-level speech for different scrutinizes, as similar to Chaplinsky vs.
New Hampshire case. See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 414 (司法院大法官第 414 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 414] (Nov. 18, 1996) (Taiwan); The low-level speech could be naturally limited by the
government, like unprotected speech in the US. Interpretation 577, which holds that commercial speech is low-level
speech and could also be banned by the government. See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 577 (司法院大法官第 577
號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 577] (May 7, 2004) (Taiwan); Interpretation 445 held that the government
has the right to prohibit speech advocating communism or secession as being unconstitutional. Also, it applied the
“two-track theory” from the US legal system to divide “the restriction to speech” and “the restriction to time, place
and manner.” Furthermore, it imported “clear and present danger” doctrine speech. See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi
No. 445 (司法院大法官第 445 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 445] (Jan. 23, 1998) (Taiwan);
Interpretation 509 is vital to explain Criminal Act Article 310—the defamation clause. The court attributed the
“actual malice clause” in New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan. See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 509 (司法院大法官
第 509 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 509] (Jul. 7, 2000) (Taiwan); Interpretation 656, Justice Tzu-Yi
Lin’s dissent in part explained that the “public figures” should have a higher burden of proof in their defamation
complain. The opinion has been broadly used in all levels of courts in Taiwan. See See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi
No. 656 (司法院大法官第 656 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 656] (Apr. 3, 2009) (Taiwan).
615
Article 7 of Constitution of Republic of China rules that: “all citizens of the Republic of China, irrespective of
sex, religion, race, class, or party affiliation, shall be equal before the law” Minguo Xianfaart art. 7 (1947) (Taiwan).
616
Article 23 of Constitution of Republic of China rules that: “all the freedoms and rights enumerated in the
preceding Articles shall not be restricted by law except by such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon
the freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to advance public welfare.”
Minguo Xianfaart art. 23 (1947) (Taiwan).
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Freedom of speech rights only have restrictions under limited regulations, such as the
following: first, the torts law617 rules on the wrongfully damaged reputation.618 Article 195 is the
special rule for Article 184 to protect the reputation of other speech. Secondly, criminal
threatening is not allowed by the Criminal Code. Articles 151619 and 305620 prohibit threatening
speech or acts to both the public and individuals. Thirdly, Article 234 of the Criminal Code621
and Article 235622 prohibit the spread of obscene speech and publication, including pornography.
Interpretation 617 narrowed the crime so it would only include violence, sexual abuse, or
bestiality that has no artistic, medical, or educational value, or something an average person
would recognize as being intolerable. Fourthly, Chapter 27 of the Criminal Code is aimed at
dealing with “offenses against reputation and credit.” Article 309 identifies “insults” as being
similar to “the fighting words” in the US legal system. 623 The “fighting words” in Taiwan also

Article 184 of Civil Code of the Republic of China rules that: “A person who, intentionally or negligently, has
wrongfully damaged the rights of another is bound to compensate him for any injury arising therefrom. The same
rule shall be applied when the injury is done intentionally in a manner against the rules of morals. A person, who
violates a statutory provision enacted for the protection of others and therefore prejudice to others, is bound to
compensate for the injury, except no negligence in his act can be proved.” Min Fa [Civil Code] art. 184 (Taiwan). An
English version of the Republic of China’s Civil Code is available on the Laws & Regulations Database of the
Republic Of China (Taiwan), available at https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0000001
(last visited Jun. 06, 2019).
618
Article 195 of Civil Code of the Republic of China rules that: “If a person has wrongfully damaged to the body,
health, reputation, liberty, credit, privacy or chastity of another, or to another's personality in a severe way, the
injured person may claim a reasonable compensation in money even if such injury is not a purely pecuniary loss. If
it was reputation that has been damaged, the injured person may also claim the taking of proper measures for the
rehabilitation of his reputation.” Min Fa [Civil Code] art. 184 (Taiwan)
619
Article 151 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China rules that: “A person who endangers public safety by
putting the public in fear of injury to life, body, or property shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than
two years.” HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 151 (Taiwan).
620
HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 305 (Taiwan).
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Article 234 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China rules that: “A person who for purpose of exhibition
publicly commits an obscene act shall be sentenced to imprisonment for less than one year, short-term
imprisonment; and, in addition thereto, a fine of not more than three thousand yuan may be imposed.” HSING FA
[Criminal Code] art. 234 (Taiwan).
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Article 235 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China rules that: “A person who distributes, broadcasts, sells,
publicly displays, or by other means to show an obscene writing, picture, audio record, video record, or any other
object to another person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years, short-term imprisonment,
in lieu thereof, or in addition thereto, a fine of thirty thousand yuan may be imposed.” HSING FA [Criminal Code]
art. 235 (Taiwan).
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HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 309 (Taiwan).
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have unprotected speech. Furthermore, defamation624 is criminally illegal in Taiwan. Unlike in
US law, defamation in Taiwan is regulated by criminal law rather than civil law. Fifthly, Article
311625 provides the exceptions clauses for both Article 309 and 310. It includes “the Fair
Comment doctrine.” The third is the Social Order Maintenance Act, 626 which is a specific
criminal law in Taiwan. The act is applied to actions that spread disinformation to harm society.
But the above statutes all target the crimes against individuals, not against groups.
Last but not least, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR),the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) are treaties
signed by members of the UN. Although Taiwan is not a member of the UN and did not sign the
ICESCR and ICCPR, the Taiwanese legislature passed the “Act to Implement the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights” and “Enforcement Act of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women” as a bridge to apply the three Covenants. 627 The Act may be a

HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 310 (Taiwan). About the defamation, Interpretation 509 requires that the crime
would affect only the “actual malice clause” found. The courts also apply Justice Tzu-Yi Lin’s dissent in part in
Interpretation 656, which pointed out the “public figures” should have a higher burden of proof in their defamation
complain.
625
Article 311 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China rules that: “A person who makes a statement with bonafide intent under one of the following circumstances shall not be punished: 1. Self-defense, self-justification, or the
protection of legal interest; 2. A report made by a public official in his official capacity; 3. Fair comment on a fact
subject to public criticism; 4. Fair report on the proceedings of a national or local assembly, court, or a public
meeting.” HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 311 (Taiwan).
626
Article 63 of Social Order Maintenance Act rules that: “People engaged in any of the following behaviors shall be
punishable by detention of not more than three days or a fine of not more than of NTD 30,000: 5. Spreading rumors
in a way that is sufficient to undermine public order and peace.” SHE HUI CHIH HSÜ WEI HU FA [Social Order
Maintenance Act] art. 63. An English version of the Social Order Maintenance Act is available on the Laws &
Regulations Database of the Republic Of China (Taiwan), available at
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0080067 (last visited Jun. 06, 2019).
627
See “the Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” as a bridge to apply the two Covenants” and “Enforcement Act
of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.” English versions of both acts are
available on the Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic of China (Taiwan), available at
https://mojlaw.moj.gov.tw/LawContentE.aspx?LSID=FL048731;
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0050175.
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tool to meet the speech regulation in the three Covenants. However, not all courts followed the
act because it lacked provisions for substantial punishment.
C. The Judgments from District Courts, Appeals Courts and the Supreme Court in Taiwan
The Constitution of the ROC remains the basic structure of the legal system in the ROC
before World War II. Judicial Yuan is the highest judiciary in the Republic of China. It includes
the Constitutional Court and “the Supreme Court.” The Judicial Review is the exclusive power
for the Constitutional Court.628 The Supreme Courts were designed to serve each province in
China as the appeals courts629, not like the US Supreme Court. Therefore, the court’s system in
Taiwan has Four-level courts: District Courts, Appeals Courts, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitutional Court.630 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Taiwan has the power to unify the
interpretation of laws and orders. It has created some precedents and cases for applying the
above regulations of limitation for freedom of speech. The precedent has a substantial binding
effect on the low-level courts.
After amending Criminal Code 100, “the conspiracy to act sedition” crime on May 18, 1992,
the sedition has been very rarely applied in court. The general court saw cases about speech
limitations that invoked Article 309, “the insults,” and Article 310, “the defamation.” The insult

Same as in the German legal system, the judicial review is an “abstract review,” and only carried out by Justices
of the Constitutional Court in the Judicial Yuan. The “abstract review” means the Court would only focus on
whether the regulation violated the Constitution, but not the facts in the case. In contrast, the judicial review in US is
a “concrete review” and authorized to all level courts to apply the Constitution. The judicial review in the US
reviewed the whole case appealing from the appeals court. To use “interpretation” is appropriate because the judicial
review of the Republic of China’s Constitution was not originally designed as “judgement form” but as “legal
consult” to the president. After democratization, Taiwanese Justices have tried to make it a judgement.
629
The Supreme Court in Taiwan is an appeal court for trial of Law (not Trial of Facts), and the highest appeal court
for a specific case. The Supreme Court has the power to unify the interpretation of laws and orders. An appellant
only can appeal an issue of the regulation violated the Constitution, from the Supreme Court to the Constitutional
Court, not his or her case because of the “abstract review.” (an issue of law appeals, but the case, that bring the issue,
does not). Relative information can be found in the Judicial Yuan and Supreme Court websites, available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/en/, and http://tps.judicial.gov.tw/english/.
630
An appellant only can appeal an issue of the regulation violated the Constitution, from the Supreme Court to the
Constitutional Court, not his or her case, because of the “abstract review.”
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means offensive words or fighting words. However, the language must precisely aim at an
individual in a public place.631 It is not a group of libel crimes. The “defamation” means a
misleading statement intended to cause substantial injury to an individual. The individual also
cannot aim this statement at a group. The courts in Taiwan have limited the application area for
the insult crime and the defamation crime. For example: if the offensive words came with
another factual comment and were not pure offense, after considering the whole sentence, the
insult might not apply.632 Also, the victims’ reputation must have been injured.633
Moreover, the court also gives enormous space for “the Fair Comment doctrine” in Article
311 of the Criminal Code. If the defendants could prove that their insult or defamation speech
was based on a comment for public events, the statement is still a fair comment, although the
language can still be considered harsh, ironic, or extremely offensive. 634
D. Conclusion
That Taiwan still does not have strong speech regulation may be due to the freedom of
speech supremacy because the historical oppression under the martial law period was too intense,
so freedom of speech became a superior right in Taiwan, held more highly than all other rights in
the Constitution. After democratization, the guarantee in the bill of rights in the ROC
Constitution has been revived for the Taiwanese people. The rights protection shows that the
main principle is that all is freedom until the specific restriction is met. The Judicial Review, or

T'ai Wan Kao Têng Fa Yüen Kao Hsiung Fên Yüen 103 Nien Tu Shang I Tzu Ti 612 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh
(臺灣高等法院高雄分院 103 年度上易字第 612 號刑事判決) [Taiwan High Court Kaohsiung Branch Court 2014
Appeal-I No. 612 Decision] (Jan. 15, 2015) (Taiwan).
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T'ai Wan Kao Têng Fa Yüen 103 Nien Tu Shang I Tzu Ti 2447 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh(臺灣高等法院 103
年度上易字第 2447 號刑事判決) [Taiwan High Court 2014 Appeal-I No. 2447 Decision] (Jan. 13, 2015) (Taiwan).
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T'ai Wan Kao Têng Fa Yüen 103 Nien Tu Shang I Tzu Ti 1795 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh(臺灣高等法院 103
年度上易字第 1795 號刑事判決) (Taiwan High Court 2014 Appeal-I No. 1795 Decision) (Dec. 4, 2014) (Taiwan).
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T'ai Wan Kao Têng Fa Yüen 105 Nien Tu Shang I Tzu Ti 1533 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh (最高法院 105 年度
上易字第 1533 號刑事判決) [ Taiwan High Court 2016 Appeal-I No. 1533 Decision] (Oct. 5, 2016) (Taiwan).
631

149

all courts in Taiwan, usually provide ample space for people to comment on public affairs or
issues. Moreover, many constitutional law theories were also imported from the United States by
Taiwanese scholars. 635 After the Justices of the Constitutional Court issued its interpretations and
the Taiwanese Supreme Court provided its judgments, the right to Freedom of Speech has been
applied in a way very similar to the US legal system.
2. Regulating Hate Speech is an Unfinished Work
A. Legal Regulation of Hate Speech
In Taiwan, the limitation on freedom of speech mainly applies to protect an individual’s
rights, not the groups’ dignity. There is no law or court case about limiting hate speech. Some
specific acts may relate to the hate speech issue as follows: first, the Sexual Harassment
Prevention Act,636 the Gender Equity Education Act,637 and the Act of Gender Equality in
Employment638 rule that “sexual harassment” may relate to gender-based hate speech. However,
the expression may constitute “sexual harassment” but not become “hate speech.”

The majority of the first generation of legal scholars were Mainlanders. Their scholarships were mainly from
Chinese Law, and also had profound influence from Japan. After 1960, the majority of the second generation
became ethnic Taiwanese. Most of them studied in Western Germany. Furthermore, the US law imputed to Taiwan
after 1945 was not because of scholars, but the relationship between the ROC government and the US. For example,
the mortgage on moveable property and securities exchange system translate to Taiwan in the 1960s. After
democratization, the second and the following third and fourth generations of legal scholars strongly imputed the
foreign law as the modern legislation model, mainly from Japan, Germany, and the US. The foreign laws from
democratic countries became a tool for scholars to criticize KMT's Authoritarianism. They argue imputing those
foreign laws could better than KMT's legislation. The right of Freedom of Speech as part of the imputing foreign
law. See Wang, Translation, supra note 613, at 318-323.
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The Article 2(2) of Sexual Harassment Prevention Act, “sexual harassment,” includes “languages of
discrimination.” HSING SAO JAO FANG CHIH FA [Sexual Harassment Prevention Act] art. 2(2) (Taiwan). An
English version of the Sexual Harassment Prevention Act is available on the Laws & Regulations Database of the
Republic Of China (Taiwan), available at https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0050074
(last visited Jun. 06, 2019).
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The Article 2(4) of Gender Equity Education Act includes: “Unwelcome remarks that carry explicitly or
implicitly a sexual or gender discriminating connotation.” HSING PIEH P'ING TENG CHIAO YÜ FA [Gender
Equity Education Act] art. 2(4) (Taiwan). An English version of the Gender Equity Education Act is available on the
Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic Of China (Taiwan), available at
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=H0080067 (last visited Jun. 06, 2019).
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The Article 12(1) of Act of Gender Equality in Employment defined the “Sexual harassment” includes “verbal
with an intent of gender discrimination.” HSING PIEH KUNG ZUÒ P'ING TENG FA [Act of Gender Equality in
Employment] art. 12(1) (Taiwan), An English version of the Act of Gender Equality in Employment is available on
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Secondly, the draft of the Ethnic Equality Act was proposed mainly by Kuomintang
legislatures. The purpose of the act is to promote the equality of different races and ethnicities.
The draft was discussed by the Internal Administration Committee of the Legislative Yuan on
June 24, 2016, but it had not yet become law. The draft uses the precise term to describe
“discrimination,”639 including the “speech with bad intention.” It includes “discrimination speech
by media”640 and “discrimination by advertisement,”641 and it prohibits public figures and
government employees spreading “hate speech.”642 Furthermore, the “hate speech” to incite
ethnic conflict or tension is not allowed.643 Covering the hate speech is restricted as well.644
The Ethnic Equality Act incited arguments in Taiwan. Scholar Bruce Y.H. Liao strongly
supports the Act. He mentions that the purpose of the act should be specific for protecting
minority groups, such as indigenous people, new immigrants, or LGBTQ members because of
other ethnic groups in Taiwan, such as the Hoklo Taiwanese, the Hakka people, and mainlanders,
have abilities to rule against the hate speech from each other.645 However, those with counteropinions recognize that the act aims not only to stop the extreme hate speech but also to promote
the ideas and discussion about ethnic history and national identity. DPP politician Wen-Chieh
Liang mentions that the act was an approach intended to silence the criticism aimed at the
mainlanders.646

the Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic Of China (Taiwan), available at
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=N0030014 (last visited Jun. 06, 2019).
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Draft of the Ethnic Equality Act, art. 2(1), available at
https://lci.ly.gov.tw/LyLCEW/agenda1/02/pdf/09/01/02/LCEWA01_090102_00013.pdf (last visited Jun. 06, 2019).
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Draft of the Ethnic Equality Act, art. 17.
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Draft of the Ethnic Equality Act, art. 21.
645
Bruce Y.H. Liao, Hate Speech, Ethnic Equality, and Anti-discrimination, No. 127 TAIWAN L. J. 1, 1-11 (May 1,
2009).
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Wen-Chieh Liang, Kuo Kuan-Ying and of the Ethnic Equality Act, No. 12 REFLEXION J. 255, 255-263 (Jun.
2009).
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B. Courts’ Decisions about Hate Speech
The Taiwanese legal system has not addressed either hate speech or hate crime yet. Thus, the
courts could not punish the hate speech until the hate speech breached Article 309, which
criminalizes insulting individuals. By reviewing the Judicial Yuan Law and Regulations
Retrieving System, the term hate speech in Chinese (仇恨言論) could only rarely appear in
judgments. However, in those cases, the court used hate speech as a tool to narrow the concept of
insulting an individual. The Taiwan Changhua District Court held that the defendants were not
guilty because only the hate speech may cause a painful feeling in the victims.647 The hate
speech, however, became the defense in those cases. The other case was the criminal threatening
case. The defendant was accused of making a threat to the public and violating Article 151 of the
Criminal Code. He threw eggs at the Taipei Japanese School and used red spray paint to write
“Japanese are devils” and “kill Japanese.” The court used hate speech, but connected with Article
19 of the ICCPR and the Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as reasoning to
hold the defendant guilty of a criminal threatening crime. Nevertheless, the defendant’s speech
had already reached the criminal threatening threshold. Thus, the main reason for the guilty
verdict was still his misconduct that constituted the threat, not hate speech. 648

T'ai Wan Chang Hua Ti Fang Fa Yüen 101 Nien I Tzu Ti 560 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh (臺灣彰化地方法院
101 年易字第 560 號刑事判決)[Taiwan Changhua District Court 2012 I No. 560 Decision] (Feb. 17, 2014)
(Taiwan); T'ai Wan Chang Hua Ti Fang Fa Yüen 101 Nien I Tzu Ti 901 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh(臺灣彰化地方
法院 101 年易字第 901 號刑事判決) [Taiwan Changhua District Court 2012 I No. 901 Decision] (Feb. 17, 2014)
(Taiwan); T'ai Wan Chang Hua Ti Fang Fa Yüen 101 Nien I Tzu Ti 1164 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh (臺灣彰化地
方法院 101 年易字第 1164 號刑事判決) [Taiwan Changhua District Court 2012 I No. 1164 Decision] (Feb. 17,
2014) (Taiwan).The three judgements were judged by the same judge in Taiwan Changhua District Court.
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易字第 206 號刑事判決) [Taiwan Shilin District Court 2014 I No. 206 Decision] (Jun. 30, 2014) (Taiwan).
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C. Conclusion
Reviewing the text of the ROC Constitution and the decisions made by the Taiwanese
Constitutional Court, the Taiwanese legal system does not have any regulations specific for
regulating hate speech, although some particular rule may relate to hate speech. The draft of the
Ethnic Equality Act may be close to hate speech regulation if it passes the legislature. However,
the Act has been highly criticized and politically contested. The implementation of hate speech
laws in Taiwan is still an argument that needs further discussion. All levels of courts in Taiwan
usually provide ample space for people to comment on public affairs or issues, including using
hate speech. Hate speech is allowed in Taiwan.649 The current mechanism in Taiwan fails to
resolve the problems of hate speech, and victims of hate speech in Taiwan have no recourse.
Therefore, to consider a new approach to balance speakers’ freedom of expression and victims’
human dignity is significant for Taiwan.

Some scholars may discuss the hate speech issue in Taiwan and the cases in other countries, such as Charlie
Hebdo Shooting case. See Ching-Yi Liu, The events could not be limited by states’ law, No. 264 TAIWAN L. J. 29,
29-31 (Jan. 15, 2015). Hsiu-Yu Fan, Rethinking Constitutional Rights in a Society of Immigration: A Discussion
inspired by Charlie Hebdo Shooting, No. 28(1) SOOCHOW L. REV. 151, 151-183 (Jul. 2006). But most of them focus
on introducing the hate speech regulations in other countries. See Liao, What is Hate Speech? supra note 289, at
455-515 (2015). Vivianne Weng, The freedom and responsibility of speech, No. 363 TAIWAN L. J. 5, 5-11 (Mar. 14,
2019). Bruce Y.H. Liao, Virginia v. Black and the Regulation of Racist Hate Speech in Light of the Critical Race
Theory, in ESSAYS ON IMPORTANT DECISIONS OF US SUPREME COURT (Institute of European and American Studies
(IEAS), Academia Sinica ed. 2007).
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CHAPTER SIX: HOW TO DESIGN NEW HATE SPEECH SYSTEM
I.

A New System of Hate Speech Regulation in Taiwan

Before designing a hate speech law for hate speech issues in Taiwan, I would like to propose
some general rules and principles based on the theories from earlier chapters. In Western
democratic countries, there are two basic political models of hate speech regulations for Taiwan
to consider. First, the approach of the United States, which allows hate speech, but limits hate
crime; and secondly, the approaches to criminalize both hate speech and hate crime, which
Germany, South Africa, and the European Court of Human Rights do.
My proposal is closer to the approach of the United States. I recognize that a general hate
crime law is enough to fix or alleviate most hate speech issues in Taiwan. However, I also
propose hate speech laws for protecting some specific groups. Those groups are discrete, insular,
under historical oppression, and frequently excluded from the marketplace of ideas. This
particular protection must end, so those groups are no longer to be eliminated from public
discussion. Moreover, for speech immediately inciting violence, I argue for using the limitation
of speech.
II.

Reasons to Offer the New System for Taiwan
1. Taiwanese History and Culture are Closer to the United States

My new system relates to American exceptionalism. The relative parts are history and
culture, but not legal methodology. American exceptionalism, as a theory, explains why the
United States is the exception to freedom of speech rights in democratic countries. However, as
an emerging democracy, Taiwan has received substantial influence from the United States.
Although Taiwan frequently imports legal theories from some European countries, Taiwanese
courts will prefer to look to United States legal precedent and use the doctrines of the US First
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Amendment theory as their leading legal resource to deal with issues of freedom of speech.
Hence, in the freedom of speech field, the Taiwanese legal system should be included in the
American exceptionalism category.
Under the perspective of Substantive Exceptionalism,650 Taiwan’s approach to freedom of
speech is already similar to that of the US in some respects, for shared reasons based on
American and Taiwanese history. First, according to Frederick Schauer’s claim, the experience
of limits to freedom of expression during the Red Scare in the 1910s and the McCarthy era, from
the 1940s through the 1950s, affected the United States’ First Amendment theory, which
emphasizes the supremacy of freedom of speech.651 Scholar Geoffrey R. Stone has reviewed the
history of the conflict between the First Amendment and national security. The nation always
regretted its actions after its people realized that those actions were “excessive responses to war
fever” or “government manipulations.”652 Stone states that it is a great achievement that
Americans still insist on the value of democracy and First Amendment rights even under
threats.653
For the same reason, Taiwanese society respects freedom of speech because of the limits on
freedom of expression during the martial law period. Taiwanese people cannot accept the return
of thought crimes, like the former Article 100 of the Criminal Code of the ROC. We remember
that the White Terror in Taiwan created a “chilling effect” on speech in Taiwanese people’s
mindset. Besides, Taiwanese people emphasize the sacrifice of pro-democracy activists, like Lei

See Chapter Four, Section VI, part 3.
Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 94, at 42-43.
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He lists many historic events to provide evidence for his statement, including the Sedition Act of 1798, Lincoln’s
suspensions of habeas corpus, judgments during the World War I prosecutions of dissenters, the internment of
Japanese-Americans during World War II, and the US government’s action against antiwar activities during the
Vietnam War. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF
1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 529 (2004).
653
He argues, “freedom of speech can endanger security, but it is also the fundamental source of American strength.”
Id. at 548-549.
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Chen’s imprisonment and Nan-Jung Cheng’s death. Taiwanese people recognize that the right to
freedom of speech is not easy to fight for, and we should not abandon it just because we could
not tolerate other people’s expressions. Taiwanese people might be afraid to limit speech now,
just like Americans, because of this shared history.
For sure, the previous dictatorship and authoritarian rule by the Nazi Party and Socialist
Unity Party of Germany were similar to the period of martial law in Taiwan. Also, Holocaust
history in Germany is comparable to the February 28 incident in Taiwan. This similarity could be
helpful in examining whether the Holocaust-denying clause applies to Taiwan. Ruti G. Teitel
mentions that the hate speech law could link prior persecution, revive contested histories, or the
operative political abuses.654 Yet, she also points out that legal tradition in the United States is
heavily speech protective, so the hate-crime legislation could offer another choice to correct a
history of slavery, segregation, and enduring racism. Considering the culture of respecting
freedom of speech, Taiwan should learn the approach taken by the United States.
Another similarity between Taiwan and the United States is the culture of distrusting the
government. Schauer and Robert Post both observe that people in the United States trust their
political elites less than people in European countries trust theirs.655 Similarly, Taiwanese people
prefer to make their own decisions than believe politicians. For instance, as in the United States,
the majority of people in Taiwan do not accept the political elites’ idea of abolishing the death
penalty.656 Indeed, the drawback of hate speech law is about trust. The government could decide
both what hate speech is and who the protected groups are, but the two contents are very vague

TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 220, at 107-108.
Id. at 46-47; Steiker, Capital Punishment and American exceptionalism, supra note 507, 72-76.
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and unforeseeable.657 If people cannot predict what kind of statement the government may
punish them for making, they must create self-censorship in their mind. That is precisely a
chilling effect on freedom of speech, and this is what Taiwanese people try to avoid.
Moreover, the culture in the United States is highly individualistic, in contrast to the
collectivism of European countries.658 In Taiwan, individualism is also reflected in the vague
sense of national and ethnic identities. Although ethnic conflicts may happen in Taiwanese
society, politics in Taiwan has never fallen purely along ethnic group lines. For instance, some
mainlanders, whose ancestors followed the Kuomintang from China after World War II, still
support the DPP and participated in democratic activities during the martial law period, like NanJung Cheng. Indeed, first and second generations descended from mainlanders may have strong
Chinese identity, but a lot of young mainlanders do not share their political views with older
ones.659 Communities may influence people’s identities, but not everyone in Taiwan follows the
communities’ norms.660 They feel different levels of harm from the same offensive speech.
Taiwanese national identities are not only based on ethnicity but on individuals’ choice.
2. Taiwanese Legal Methodology for Constitutional interpretation is Closer to
Germany’s
Still, Taiwan does not exclusively follow the mode and precedents provided by the United
States. One interesting point is that Taiwan does not follow the legal isolationism of the United
States. One example of American exceptionalism in practice is the United States legal

See Chapter Two, Section I.
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profession’s rejection of applying international standards or foreign laws.661 By contrast, Taiwan
imports international standards or foreign laws as models to improve its legal system, including
laws from the United States. Taiwan imports freedom of speech jurisprudence from the United
States so that the right to freedom of speech in Taiwan is similar to that of the United States, but
other laws have been taken from the other countries. For example, Taiwan imported some
modern legal terminology for civil law matters from Japan. Also, the ROC government brought
its constitution and legal system to Taiwan, and the system was created and based on the German
and Japanese systems. 662
Moreover, the Taiwanese legal system does not share the idea of methodological
exceptionalism with United States theory. Taiwanese constitutional jurisprudence uses a
balancing approach to balance conflicts of rights. This means that Taiwan exemplifies
substantive but not methodological exceptionalism.663 While Judicial Review is used in Taiwan
to deal with human rights issues, the government must balance each side’s rights and follow the
principle of proportionality, not just to apply doctrine and reject one side’s claim.664 Like Guy E.
Carmi’s theory, German and South African methodology are horizontally balancing, a a
methodology that focuses on both the speaker’s and the audience’s rights, not a vertically
balancing approach, which only focuses on the speaker’s autonomy.665 The Taiwanese legal
system shares its methodological idea with Germany and South Africa.

Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 94, at 51.
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The Taiwanese legal system also recognizes positive rights. People in Taiwan can ask the
government to provide a positive duty to a third party.666 Like Germany, freedom of speech in
Taiwan could be a positive right to allow the government to apply the speech regulation and
exclude the invasion from private actors.667 By contrast, the United States legal system requires a
state action against which people in the US mainly have negative rights.668 Thus, although
Taiwan applies the United States First Amendment theory, it still can adopt a balancing approach
to seek harmony between two sides in a conflict of rights dispute.
3. Democracy Legitimacy, People’s ’s Autonomy, and Public Disclosure are Significant
in Taiwan
Other considerable elements of designing hate speech laws for Taiwan are democratic
legitimacy, people’s autonomy, and open public discourse. Democratic legitimacy and people’s
autonomy constitute the difference between a democratic country and an authoritarian regime.
After democratization, the Taiwanese government finally received the democratic legitimacy of
ruling Taiwan,669 and Taiwanese people enjoy high autonomy to make political decisions. The
highly open public discourse in modern Taiwan constitutes a tremendous difference between
modern Taiwan and the martial law period. The Taiwanese political system is open and free
rather than closed and autocratic. That is also a reason that Taiwan is not the same as its
neighbor, the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, democratic legitimacy, people’s autonomy,
and open public discourse are all extraordinary in Taiwan.

For example: Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 472 (司法院大法官第 472 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation
No. 472] (Jan. 29, 1999) (Taiwan); Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 550 (司法院大法官第 550 號解釋) [Judicial
Yuan Interpretation No. 550] (Oct. 4, 2002) (Taiwan).
667
See Chapter Four, Section IV, part 4.
668
Carmi, Dignity the Enemy from Within, supra note 443, at 995-996.
669
Or the government of Republic of China finally received the democratic legitimacy of ruling Taiwan, although
the Republic of China does not represent “China” anymore.
666

159

Yet, does this mean that Taiwan should allow all hate speech? Indeed, as Jeremy Waldron
argues, democratic legitimacy is not “an all-or-nothing matter.” 670 European countries do not
allow hate speech, but most of them are still democracies. A democratic country would not lose
any democratic legitimacy purely because of a hate speech law. It is a matter of degree for
tolerancing democratic deficits. So, the following issue might be how much in the way of
“democratic deficits”671 do the Taiwanese people prefer to tolerate?
The answer might not be much. Like the United States, Taiwanese people would not
welcome too many norms of civility to intervene in the marketplace of ideas or undermine
individuals’ autonomy. As the discussion in the above chapter stated, all level courts in Taiwan
keep enhancing the freedom of speech right and reject reducing the space for people’s
comments. That is to say, freedom of speech is superior to the value of human dignity in Taiwan.
4. Taiwanese Society Always Has Dissenting Opinions
Another strong reason for Taiwan to keep protecting freedom of speech is that the society in
this country had always had strong dissent. Under the martial law period, Taiwanese identity was
a dissent against suffering historical oppression. After democratization, Chinese identity has
become an unpopular dissent, while Taiwanese identity is political correctness in Taiwan now.672
Previous political incorrectness has become political correctness today. The Taiwanese identity’s
elevation was not based on hate speech law, but the freedom of speech. Like C. Edwin Baker’s
claim, free speech protections have likely played a significant role in political progress.673
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Besides, hate speech law is risky when it oppresses the extreme members of the oppressed
groups because objection might present as hate speech.674 For example, in Taiwan, some ideas of
ethnic history might involve criticizing the mainlanders’ roles in the Feb. 28 incident, but this
might be recognized as inciting hatred between different ethnicities.675
Also, for Taiwan the questions arise regarding which group is a discrete and insular minority.
Furthermore, which group has been historically oppressed? These might not be as clear as in the
United States and European countries. All ethnic groups in Taiwan will claim that they are
minorities, or that they suffered either historically or are currently oppressed, if Taiwan has a
hate speech law. For example, mainlanders may insist they are a minority group in the
population.676 The Hoklo Taiwanese emphasize that they have previously been historically
oppressed by mainlanders under the martial law period.677 They would like to be the victims and
enjoy the privilege of untouchability and avoiding criticism if there were to be a hate speech laws
in Taiwan.
5. Reject Both Content Neutrality for Freedom of Speech and Content Neutrality for
Hate Speech
Besides, the idea of content neutrality should be modified in relation to freedom of speech
issues. A government with a strong constitutional norm of content neutrality would not fix the
harm caused by hate speech and would not promote the public good.678 For example, in the case
R.A.V. vs. St. Paul, the Supreme Court of the United States failed to deal with the cross burning
problem due to rejecting content-based restrictions on speech. Luckily, although the Taiwanese
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Constitutional Court has imposed a lot of legal doctrine from First Amendment theory in the
United States, the Court has not followed the decision of R.A.V. to insist on the idea of content
neutrality on hate speech issues. 679 There, the Taiwanese legal system could choose not to input
the R.A.V. case. Limiting hate speech is sometimes necessary to balance freedom of expression
and human dignity, and to provide assurance to people in Taiwan.
On the other hand, I reject content neutrality in relation to hate speech itself as well. A part of
hate speech may be allowed because its harm is not serious. Some oppressed groups have
sufficient capacity to confront oral offenses. The only thing they need is a hate crime law as
protection to defend them from violence, threats, or other crimes of prejudice. However, some
oppressed groups may need a stronger assurance, namely, a hate speech law. For example, Bruce
Y.H. Liao mentions that ethnic Taiwanese and mainlanders could have the ability to rule against
each other in public discourse. He says that only Taiwanese Indigenous people and New
Immigrant populations need protection.680 For me, the key point is whether a group is frequently
excluded from the marketplace of ideas.
This concept means that the Taiwanese legal system could use its methodology of rights
balancing and apply the principle of proportionality to deal with the hate speech issue. Like
Germany, South Africa, and the European Union Court of Human Rights, the Taiwanese legal
system could balance freedom of speech and human dignity. It should always consider the means
of least harm to balance the two sides’ rights. It should focus on both speakers’ autonomy681 and
victims’ stories.682 A hate speech law only applies to those groups who are discrete, insular,
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under historical oppression, and frequently excluded from the marketplace of ideas. Moreover, if
anti-discrimination laws or hate crime laws could fix problems, hate speech laws would be
unnecessary.
6. Protecting Dignity Should Encourages More Speech, Not Avoid Criticism
Therefore, in my view, like Jeremy Waldron’s claim, hate speech laws should protect the
dignity and reputation of a group, but not to impose an aura of untouchability around their
convictions.683 Dignity is not the same as individual harm. Waldron thought that protecting
dignity meant supporting vulnerable minorities’ social standing, not their feelings or beliefs.684
Hate speech law shall not aim to create a criticism-free zone for anyone.685 Everyone, even a
discrete and insular minority, or a group that has been historically oppressed, needs to face other
people’s dissent and criticism, although the criticism might be unpopular, strong, and sharp.
Hate speech law should ensure that everyone in a society can communicate with the other
groups. No one should be excluded from the marketplace of ideas. No one should be free from
the criticism either. Only if a speech aims to exclude the other from the marketplace of ideas
should the hate speech law intervene in public disclosure to limit one side’s freedom of
expression, in turn, to avoid forcing the other side into silence. The Taiwanese legal system
should not ban speech or debate only because someone feels offended, but it should avoid the
harm of hate speech to exclude or silence an individual in order to reject their equal social
position.686
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To alleviate hate speech problems in Taiwan, I propose the idea of providing assurance to
protect oppressed groups. Under the assurance, vulnerable minorities would not be excluded
from public discussion. The assurance could be either a hate speech law or hate crime law,
depending on the groups’ needs. A general hate crime law to enhance sentences for prejudicemotivated crimes could be sufficient assurance for most communities in Taiwan. However, some
groups may be too weak to use hate crime laws as protection. Therefore, in specific situations
where an oppressed group is very vulnerable, hate speech laws should be used to prevent the
group from being excluded from public discourse. 687 A government should provide primary
evidence in order to write the legislation, to show why the group lacks sufficient social power to
protect itself against others.
7. The Role of Militant Democracy in Taiwan
Moreover, should hate speech law in Taiwan protect the institution of democracy? The
Taiwanese Constitutional Court held that a free and democratic order exists in the Taiwanese
Constitution and constitutes the boundary of constitutional modification.688 The finding follows
the same concept as the German militant democracy system. However, Justice Tzong-Li Hsu
insists that militant democracy only applies in party bans, but not in the freedom of speech. 689
In my view, Taiwan should consider extending militant democracy jurisprudence in relation
to the right to freedom of speech as a form of self-correction, or at least as a value to justify some
speech regulation. The theory would follow the European Union Court of Human Rights’
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decision that speech inciting violence or triggering warfare is not allowed.690 The reason is that
Taiwanese democracy faces a threat and a possible military invasion from China, which is not a
democratic country.691 If China destroys Taiwanese democracy, democratic legitimacy, people’s
autonomy, public discourse, and the assurance of protection for any vulnerable minority will not
exist. From this perspective, a hate speech law to protect the institution of democracy is a
guarantee of permanent assurance as well.
Another possible reason to apply militant democracy to the hate speech approach in Taiwan
is the country’s process of transitional justice, which is a state’s approach to correct systematic
human rights violations in the past.692 Teitel recognizes that transitional justice, which is based
on militant democracy, should be a justification for hate speech laws.693 The Taiwanese
government is currently performing and executing transitional justice work in order to deal with
illegal acts and the resulting harm that occurred during the period of authoritarian rule in
violation of the liberal democratic constitutional order.694 Nevertheless, the work of transitional
justice in Taiwan mainly focuses on “uncovering political archival records, removing
authoritarian symbols,695 redressing judicial wrongs, restoring historical truth, promoting social
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reconciliation, settling and utilizing ill-gotten party assets.”696 The act does not directly limit the
freedom of speech.
I agreed with Teitel’s view, in which transitional justice could be a justification for hate
speech laws. However, to use hate speech laws to correct the wrongful value in a country means
imposing current political correctness to restrict some groups’ autonomy and rejects the
possibility of counterargument at the same time. Indeed, when the injustice has been corrected,
the limitation should not continue existing. That is why Teitel recognizes that militant democracy
should be a part of transitional constitutionalism,697 and Peter R. Teachout recognizes that the
Holocaust denial clause should be not permanent.698
The drawback of the militant democracy approach to hate speech is also considerable. David
Richards has said that militant democracy is the return of the repressed.”699 In Taiwan, this
concern is reasonable. Under the martial law period, the Taiwanese government banned
advocating communism700 and used the act of sedition to make thought crime illegal.701 The goal
of militant democracy is to protect the institution of democracy, not execute political correctness
or change democracy into authoritarianism. Hence, the speech ban based on militant democracy
should be considered as a last resort thatonly applies when there is no other remedy. The
Taiwanese government should choose other laws as primary methods to protect the institution of
democracy, rather than hate speech laws.
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Certainly, I still prefer to use hate crime laws to solve the threat to the institution of
democracy and leave the space for freedom of expression. Nevertheless, if the speech incites
immediate violence, I agree to use hate speech laws to avoid the harm from the violence, like the
German criminal code that punishes calling for violence, 702 since violence is a more immediate
way to silence people than pure offensive speech. The victims would usually be excluded from
the marketplace of ideas. For me, hate speech inciting immediate violence is more severe than
other hate speech. The speech is closer to true threats or hate crimes. In Taiwan, using violence
to silence people’s expressions is a severe problem, especially considering the political risk from
the Chinese Communist Party.703 For instance, Chinese supporters in Taiwan suppress the
opinions supporting Hong Kong protests with violence.704 Militant democracy could justify the
hate crime law and the restriction on speech inciting violence.
Comparing the two models of hate speech regulation, the new hate speech law in Taiwan
would embody an eclectic approach. The new system is closer to the approach of the United
States, which allows hate speech and limits hate crime, but also has the characteristics of the
approach taken by the other democratic countries.
III.

How to Deal with Current Hate Speech Problems in Taiwan
1. Hate Speech between the Different Ethnic Groups
In Taiwan, ethnic conflicts are a legacy of political oppression and colonial history. I propose

that Taiwan should have a hate crime law to avoid crime with an ethnic bias, but a hate speech
law only for very vulnerable oppressed groups, who are frequently excluded from the
marketplace of ideas.
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In Kuo Kuan-Ying’s case, some opinions said that Kuo’s statement was not hate speech
because ethnic Taiwanese do not constitute a minority of the population in Taiwan.705 The case
triggered the argument about hate speech in Taiwan. Scholar Bruce Y.H. Liao supports Kuo’s
position and recognized that Kuo should not be punished because he stated that the hate speech
should only be defined as protecting minority groups. So, in this view, since Kuo attacked the
Taiwanese, who are not a minority, his words should not constitute hate speech, but rather
political speech. Liao also mentioned how Taiwan should not consider the Holocaust denial
model for criminalized denial of the historical oppression in Taiwan because it is too strict.706
Another scholar, Ser-Min Shei, stated that Kuo’s statement is hate speech, but the government
only punished him and has ignored other hate speech in Taiwanese society. In Shei’s opinion,
this constituted another type of viewpoint discrimination.707 However, the different opinions
pointed out that Kuo’s case embodies typical hate speech issues and reflects a lack of transitional
justice in Taiwan.708
However, if my definition of hate speech covers any group that has experienced historical
oppression, ethnic Taiwanese people are included because they were oppressed during the
martial law period. Their language was discriminated against, and they found it harder to reach
high positions in the government. No matter what “Taiwanese rednecks,” “Japanese pirates,” or
“ghost island” mean in Kuo’s mind, he has never treated the Taiwanese as equal members in his
country. He has claimed that he is a high-class mainlander in order to demonstrate that he is
superior to those belonging to other groups. His most offensive statement has been, “China
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should spend many years suppressing people in Taiwan instead of granting any political freedom
to them once it has taken Taiwan by military force.”709 This statement is one of pure hatred,
expressing the hope that China could use political oppression to suppress Taiwan and deprive the
Taiwanese people of their political freedom. In my view, his speech was definitionally hate
speech.
Hung Su-Chu’s case is another example of hateful ethnic expression in Taiwan. Her speech
offended the mainlander community. She said that the mainlanders were refugees from China.
Her meaning, along with the words “Go back to your own country,” was an expression of hatred.
However, are mainlanders a historically oppressed group in Taiwan? From one point of view,
mainlanders comprise 14% of Taiwanese society, and they are a minority of the population. As
to whether they have suffered historical oppression in Taiwan? however, the research shows that
the policy of the period may have been in their interests.
Nevertheless, under the Kuomintang’s authoritarian rule, many mainlanders participated in
democratic activities and were oppressed by the government. Some of them may have thus been
oppressed.710 For example, Lei Chen and Cheng Nan-Jung were mainlanders.711 This situation
relates to the concept of intersectionality as developed in critical race theory. Intersectionality
means that different oppressions and subordinations may overlap and combine in various
settings.712 Thus, a mainlander could also have been in an oppressed group while they were
under political oppression during the martial law period.
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However, there may be no need, in either Kuo’s or Hung’s case, to apply hate speech laws.
Both of their speeches received extensive criticism in the Taiwanese public opinion. Their free
expression did not exclude vulnerable groups; on the contrary, the speakers themselves were
almost rejected from Taiwanese society. The two biggest political parties, the Kuomintang and
DPP, all recognized that such speech was troublesome and would have a negative influence on
their political interests. Kuo and Hung were troublemakers, and few people wanted to support
them. Kuo and Hung cannot enact serious harm on their victims. They cannot exclude vulnerable
groups.
Thus, in my view, expressions of hatred between ethnic Taiwanese people and mainlanders
would not need the protection of hate speech regulations. Such groups may need the assurance of
a hate crime law to avoid insults against individuals or violence against them, but both
Taiwanese people and mainlanders have enough of an ability to fight back against hate speech
purveyors. By contrast, speech offending Taiwanese Indigenous people should be considered as
hate speech, and protection by hate speech law should be considered. For example, the term
“hoana” means that the user does not recognize Taiwanese Indigenous peoples’ social standing,
and since they only comprise 2% of the population, they lack sufficient social and economic
power to act against the offense. They are frequently excluded from the marketplace of ideas.
2. Speech Discriminating Against Sexual Minority or Sexual Orientation Minority
Groups
In addition, hate speech that attacks LGBTQ groups could be criminalized by hate speech
legislation in order to prevent increased prejudice against them. However, a question arises: does
hate speech include communications that provide untrue research or information? The issue may
be answered by the above discussion defining hate speech. Dissenting arguments relating to a
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group that are made in good faith should be allowed. However, if the communication is aimed at
excluding a group or reducing its social standing, it is hate speech, no matter its forms of
expression. Here, a hateful statement such as “Legalization of same-sex marriage is connected
with HIV”713 should be regarded as group defamation. Governmental assurance is required to
outlaw such speech by establishing rules of group defamation against LGBTQ minorities.
3. Speech Approving, Denying, Downplaying, Glorifying, or Justifying the Historical
Oppression
Speech approving, denying, downplaying, glorifying, or justifying historical oppression
injures the wounded in Taiwanese society. Take, for example, a statement denying or justifying
the massacre in the February 28 incident. Such a statement undermines the victims and their
families’ human dignity and may also exacerbate conflict in Taiwan. Under the martial law
period, the February 28 incident was considered taboo in public discussion. Not only were the
victims and their families’ voices silenced, but all of Taiwanese society was forced to remain
silent.714 If the historical injustice has not been corrected, the victims and their families may be
excluded from the marketplace of ideas again in the future. As a part of Transitional Justice in
Taiwan, I propose that there should be stronger assurances to protect the victims of these kinds
of expression. A hate speech law could apply in such a situation.
However, a problem comes into question: can a description of a historical event be
challenged by any evidence or research without the speaker being prosecuted for hate speech?715
The answer should be yes. For instance, the February 28 incident is not the same as the
Holocaust, for which clearly established historical events were identified by the Nuremberg
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Trials’ investigations. Although many Taiwanese scholars have conducted thorough research on
the February 28 incident, there are still many unclear details.716 Therefore, it is necessary to
permit contradictory views to be expressed about the incident in order to establish the historical
facts. Here, Taiwanese society should allow different arguments about the incident to be
expressed.
Even the rule concerning the existence of clearly established historical events such as the
Holocaust is debatable. The law excludes all counterarguments about the history of the
Holocaust. It means that the courts must adjudicate on the works of historians, despite the fact
that even Holocaust deniers like David Irving might still provide useful material for research on
the Holocaust. For example, Irving’s value for historians is that he has been able to unearth
documents that had been lost, or at least he has offered different perspectives for socially
responding to it.717 This is why Teachout argued that Germany should consider abolishing the
Holocaust denial law.718
What, then, should Taiwan’s line be for discussing the February 28 incident? In Hau PeiTsun’s case, he is a politician and a public figure. His speech undermined the victims of
February 28 and the victims’ families’ human dignity because he downplayed the victims’
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deaths. His speech is the same as a part of Holocaust denial: downplaying damages and death.719
He offered his evidence, which was the number of those claiming damages and cases requesting
state compensation. I agree that there should be some space for discussion of the damages and
deaths arising from the February 28 incident. Therefore, I propose applying Richard J. Evans’s
theory to judge his statement.
On the debate of justifying Holocaust denial law, Evans focuses on the method of scientific
investigation. He claims that Holocaust deniers are punishable because their methods are
inherently invalid and unreliable.720 Those deniers ignore the basic precepts of scientific
historical investigation.721 In my view, February 28 incident deniers’ speech may be punishable
if their methods of scientific investigation are inherently invalid and unreliable.
Another case was that of the Kaohsiung Butcher, Meng-Chi Peng, who was accused of being
responsible for many deaths in the February 28 incident. His son tried to justify his father’s
actions and claimed that the victims were thugs. The son might provide evidence to show that
some of the victims were possibly violent protestors, but many of the victims were not thugs,
according to the other research.722 The statement might nonetheless be recognized as group
defamation because its methods of scientific investigation are inherently invalid and unreliable.
The statement was thus hate speech and should receive punishment under the hate speech law.
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4. Speech Promoting a War or Speech Threatening Freedom and Democratic Order
I agree that it is the correct approach to use the Clear and Present Danger Test in freedom of
speech in Taiwan because of its culture of freedom of speech supremacy. However, in some
extreme periods, militant democracy could still have a place in supporting possible speech
regulations. In this particular situation, the government would still need to provide evidence of
compelling government interests to limit speech.
Moreover, I argue that strong limitations on speech may not pass the principle of
proportionality test. The Taiwanese government should always seek an alternative approach in
order to avoid restrictions on freedom of speech. For example, the Taiwanese legislature
imported the Foreign Agents Registration Act from the US to counter the information war waged
by China. This approach is one way to avoid directly limiting speech. 723
In Yi Li’s case, his statement promoting war involved invading Taiwan. His comment shows
a strongly negative attitude toward Taiwan’s free and democratic order, considering that China
has minimal political freedom. Militant democracy could find a place to deal with this issue.
However, the approach still needs to consider balancing such hatred with the right to free speech.
In this case, the Taiwanese government had a clever way of dealing with the issue: Yi Li is
not a citizen of Taiwan, and so the Taiwanese government did not allow him to enter. However,
how does one draw the line for Taiwanese citizens who urge war to threaten the free and
democratic order, especially in relation to the issue of China and Taiwan? In other words, should
promoting unification with China be a crime in Taiwan? The experience of the European Court
of Human Rights could offer Taiwan some assistance on the basis of militant democracy

Stacy Hsu, Taiwan Government Defends CCP Agents’ Bill, FOCUS TAIWAN (Jul. 11, 2019).
https://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201907110024.
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jurisprudence. The European Court of Human Rights recognized that the key to tolerating speech
depends on whether the speech incites violence and breaks the public peace.
Therefore, a speech promoting peaceful unification would be and should be protected speech,
Therefore, I propose leaving some space for such speech. At least, limiting such speech should
be a last resort. However, speech to promote war or violence may present a hard case. The
statement shows intolerance toward Taiwanese democracy.724 The speech may silence its victims
and exclude the victims from the marketplace of ideas. Following the approaches of both South
Africa and the European Court of Human Rights, the speech to promote war or violence could be
recognized as hate speech and punishable. For me, I agree that the Taiwanese legislature should
enact a law to punish speech for inciting immediate violence.
IV.

Conclusion

Based on the above discussion, Taiwanese society highly respects freedom of speech for
specific cultural and historical reasons. Under these circumstances, a strict speech ban is not
suitable for Taiwan. The legal reform to impose the approach of mainly punishing hate crime is
actually more possible to do in Taiwan under its current governmental system. This is why I
argue that a general Ethnic Equality Act to deal with ethnic hate speech is a bad idea.725
However, a hate speech law to protect a discrete, insular, or historically oppressed group could
be incremental if necessary.
Therefore, I would like to provide a suggestion as follows: first, the Legislative Yuan, which
is the Taiwanese Parliament, should add an amendment to Article 57 of the Criminal Code726 to

Nevertheless, the important thing is that Taiwan still has a military force to fight against China. To promote a war
may not be immediately dangerous to Taiwan.
725
See Chapter 5, Section V, Part 2 (B).
726
Article 59 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China: “Sentencing shall base on the liability of the offender and
take into account all the circumstances, and special attention shall be given to the following items: (1) The motive
and purpose of the offense.” HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 59 (Taiwan).
724
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rule as to what Bias-Motivated Crime is, including “a criminal offense committed against a
person or property which is motivated by the offender’s bias against a race, religion
ethnic/national origin, sexual orientation, or disability.”727 Second, in some specific laws for
vulnerable, discrete and insular minorities, such as the Indigenous Peoples’ Basic Law, the
Taiwanese legislature should design hate speech regulation to protect the group’s social standing.
Third, for the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice, the Taiwanese legislature should design
hate speech regulation to avoid approving, denying, downplaying, glorifying, or justifying
historical oppression. Fourth, the Taiwanese legislature should consider limiting speech to
promote war or violence.

727

FBI, Hate Crimes, supra note 117.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
Taiwan is considered one of the world’s free countries. However, the current Taiwanese legal
system has no law specifically for hate speech. The motivation of this dissertation is to consider
how the new approach could resolve or alleviate the hate speech problems in Taiwan.728 The
main goal of this dissertation is to design a new hate speech system for Taiwan, based on
reviewing and discussing the historical debate about the levels of limitation in hate speech.
Therefore, I did not address the interaction among the internet, social media and the hate speech
regulation. In the future, I will extend this research to the issues triggered by the said interaction,
such as: “troll armies,” which silence speakers by using hate speech, and “the cancel culture
movement,” which has been applied as an informal corrective of hate speech.729
In my view, hate speech targets a discrete and insular group, or the group has been
historically oppressed. The speech could be diverse but must be persecutorial, hateful, and
degrading to the protected groups, including hateful communication, misleading research, or any
other forms of expression that are persecutorial, hateful, and degrading. The speech should harm
the objective social standing of a community, not only be considered a subjective offense. 730
The US Supreme Court has designed an essential structure for hate speech regulation since
hate speech was allowed in the R.A.V. case. Even though hate speech might be harmful, the
Court deems that it could not regulate it without prohibiting all negative speech. In contrast,
Germany prioritizes human dignity, leading to more restrictions on hate speech. German Basic
Law is designed as a human dignity-based legal system with the jurisprudence of a militant
democracy. Criminal law, administrative law and civil law in Germany have regulations to limit

See Chapter One.
Thanks for Professor Jeannine Bell’s and Professor Anthony Fargo’s comments in my final defense.
730
See Chapter Two.
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hate speech. Also, the Constitution of South Africa is created to correct the wrongful
discrimination based on race and the apartheid system of the past. Its jurisprudence places an
emphasis on the guarantee of human rights, equality, and dignity. Freedom of speech is not the
superior right in the Constitution. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has collected
hate speech incidents from different European countries and developed unification rules and
basic standards for hate speech regulation.731
Some influential scholars in the United States have provided very significant theories to
support freedom of speech supremacy to justify the United States’ methods, including
democratic legitimacy, citizens’ autonomy and to protect the integrity of public discourse. On the
contrary, Scholars of Critical Race Theory (CRT) argue that American society is still rife with
racism and white supremacy. They recognize that hate speech is part of the oppression of
minorities. Further, Jeremy Waldron proposes that a state ban on hate speech is an assurance to
protect vulnerable minorities’ dignity. In Germany and South Africa, human dignity constitutes
an important right for supporting hate speech regulation. In addition, the most European
countries apply militant democracy theory to limit hate speech. 732
Frederick Schauer uses American exceptionalism to explain the difference between the
United States and the other countries. A variety of reasons could explain substantive
exceptionalism in hate speech doctrines, such as history, the text in the Constitution, culture, and
legal isolationism. Also, about methodological exceptionalism, the American approach could be
categorized as rule-based rather than as a balancing approach but, in other countries, the
balancing approach of the proportionality principle is mainstream.733

See Chapter Three.
See Chapter Four.
733
Id.
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The Taiwanese legal system does not have any regulations specific for regulating hate
speech. All levels of courts in Taiwan usually provide ample space for people to comment on
public affairs or issues, including using hate speech. Some problems with hate speech still exist
in Taiwan: speech that demonstrates the tension and conflict between ethnic groups or national
identities, speech that spread hatred toward discrete and insular minorities, speech that denies or
downplays the past human rights violation, speech that challenges Taiwanese democracy,
promotes dictatorship to threat the free democratic order. The current mechanism in Taiwan fails
to resolve the problems of hate speech, and victims of hate speech in Taiwan have no recourse.734
Under the perspective of Substantive Exceptionalism, Taiwan’s approach to freedom of
speech is already similar to that of the US in some respects, for shared reasons based on
American and Taiwanese history. Also, another similarity between Taiwan and the United States
is the culture of distrusting the government. Moreover, the cultures in both the United States and
Taiwan are highly individualistic, in contrast to the collectivism of European countries.
Nevertheless, Taiwan exemplifies substantive but not methodological exceptionalism, and it still
can adopt a balancing approach to seek harmony between two sides in a conflict of rights
dispute.735
Democratic legitimacy, people’s autonomy, and open public discourse are all extraordinary
in Taiwan. Taiwanese people do not prefer to tolerate too much in the way of democratic
deficits. Also, the society in Taiwan had always had strong dissent. Therefore, I recognize that if
some oppressed groups have sufficient capacity to confront oral offenses, the only thing they
need is a hate crime law as protection to defend them from violence, threats, or other crimes of
prejudice. However, some oppressed groups may need a stronger assurance, namely, a hate

734
735

See Chapter Five.
See Chapter Six.
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speech law, depending on whether a group is frequently excluded from the marketplace of ideas.
Besides, I still prefer to use hate crime laws to solve the threat to the institution of democracy
and leave the space for freedom of expression. Nevertheless, if the speech incites immediate
violence, I agree to use hate speech laws to avoid the harm from the violence.736
In sum, my proposal includes a general hate crime law to fix or alleviate most hate speech
issues in Taiwan. I also propose hate speech laws for protecting some specific groups, which are
discrete, insular, under historical oppression, and frequently excluded from the marketplace of
ideas. This particular protection must end, so those groups are no longer to be eliminated from
public discussion. Moreover, I argue for using the limitation of speech for speech immediately
inciting violence.737
Therefore, I would like to provide a suggestion to the Taiwanese Parliament. First, to add an
amendment to the Criminal Code to rule as to what Bias-Motivated Crime is. For example, a
criminal offense committed against a person or property which is motivated by the offender’s
bias against a race, religion ethnic/national origin, sexual orientation, or disability. Second, in
some specific laws for discrete and insular minorities, which is usually excluded from the
marketplace of ideas, the Taiwanese legislature should design hate speech regulation to protect
the group’s social standing. For instance, the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law should protect the
indigenous people’s social standing. Third, for the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice, the
Taiwanese legislature should design hate speech regulation to avoid approving, denying,
downplaying, glorifying, or justifying historical oppression, Fourth, the Taiwanese legislature
should consider limiting speech to promote war or violence. 738

Id.
Id.
738
Id.
736
737

180

BIBLIOGRAPHY
I.

Books
1. A-CHIN HSIAU, CONTEMPORARY TAIWANESE CULTURAL NATIONALISM (2005).
2. AFSHIN ELLIAN & BASTIAAN RIJPKEMA, MILITANT DEMOCRACY - POLITICAL SCIENCE,
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (2018).
3. AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 227-229 (2015).
4. ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR
HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2002).
5. ARTICLE 19, Germany: Responding to “hate Speech” 1 (2018),
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Germany-Responding-to%E2%80%98hate-speech%E2%80%99-v3-WEB.pdf .
6. BASTIAAN RIJPKEMA & ANNA ASBURY, MILITANT DEMOCRACY: THE LIMITS OF
DEMOCRATIC TOLERANCE (2018).
7. DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD
(2006).
8. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY PASSIM (2D ED. 1997).

9. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION INSTITUTE, HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN
SOUTH AFRICA. FXI.ORG.ZA. “HANDBOOKS” 20 (Jun. 25, 2013),
https://www.fxi.org.za/docsresources/Hate_Speech_and_Freedom_of_Expression_in_SA.pdf.
10. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION

181

ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
11. GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN
AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

(1981).

12. IAN LOVELAND, BY DUE PROCESS OF LAW: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE RIGHT TO
VOTE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1999).
13. JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012).
14. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
15. JUSTIN COLLINGS, DEMOCRACYS GUARDIANS: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 1951-2001 (2015).
16. LESLIE VINCENT TISCHAUSER, JIM CROW LAWS (2013).
17. MARI MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE, RICHARD DELGADO, & KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW,
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